


JPRS-UPA-91-015  
20 MARCH 1991



# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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20 March 1991

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**Laptev Assesses Changes in Country's Political Mood**

91UN0963A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 8, 23 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ivan Dmitriyevich Laptev, USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union chairman, conducted by An. Makarov, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent: "No One Is Going To Fix Our Life for Us"]

[Text] *Once again a year has gotten off to a difficult start. All the ills and conflicts of the transitional period have surfaced with renewed vigor. At this point we can only dream of an end to the crisis being experienced by our society and our country.*

*At moments of historical destiny like these it is important that each of us resist despair, not lose the ability to analyze the situation or our political will. In brief, this was the essence of an interview with I. D. Laptev, USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union chairman, conducted by a SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent.*

[Correspondent] Ivan Dmitriyevich, let us be frank. In society we are hearing more and more frequently the notion that perestroika has arrived at a dead end, that the country's leadership has "shifted to the right," that the time of reform is over. That causes many people uncertainty and fear, which are paradoxically combined with a desire for tranquility and dependable order. With enviable regularity our spirits are agitated by rumors of the impending dictatorship coming "very soon", rumors that it is just around the bend. What is your response to that kind of thinking?

[Laptev] Right now you and I and talking next to a window which looks out on the Czar Cannon, sitting in the Supreme Soviet building, and that alone should calm fear concerning a dictatorship. For if revolutions strike first at the telegraph offices and banks, dictatorships storm the parliaments first. As long as the parliament is intact this conversation should be shifted to a different subject. Let us first consider the reasons for the disillusionment which can clearly be observed in society nowadays. I think it is correct to speak of a collapse of unrealistic hopes which at one time were formulated with such enthusiasm and hailed by the very same people's orators who are presently making so much noise about the emergence of a dictatorship.

However, if we simply think and look the truth in the eye we realize that bringing about such grandiose changes in such a huge country, and one which did not even realize what its own level of economic and social development was, could not be accomplished either swiftly or painlessly. Suffice it to say that we essentially did not know where to begin perestroika. There was simply no true information on this.

Now let us get back to the "sore point" of the question you raised. It seems to me that even as they ponder the

threat of a dictatorship and frighten one another with it they often have no idea what they are talking about. They also have no concept of the fact that there are certain forces in our country which do not want a strong legal authority. For them lawlessness has become a very convenient and favorable environment in which to exist, and it is only natural that they would oppose the introduction of normal, rational order and the functioning of an authoritative power. Any move by that power is to them the specter of dictatorship.

However, the very existence of a legitimate authority elected on the basis of law and granted legal powers should preclude the emergence of a dictatorship. The firmness, consistency and resolve of legitimate authority are not the specter of dictatorship. And we should not yield to political naivete and see a threat of dictatorship in the making by that legitimate authority of certain decisions or in the departure of individual figures from the political scene, nor should newspaper headlines proclaim in panic: "Look Who Is Gone!" In my opinion it is easiest for a dictatorship to emerge when the law gives way to fiery speeches and loud slogans, all of them, naturally, devoted to "victories in the struggle for freedom." Then the victors begin dividing up that freedom, begin claiming monopoly rights to it, and also making their claims against each other. Then it begins to seem to some that the lovely lady with the torch in her hand has not gazed as favorably upon them, and they are prepared to withdraw out of pride. Some people cannot stand the pressure, some get fed up... In discussions and confrontations everyone starts frightening society with impending cataclysms which are supposedly confirmed by rumors of statements made by generals; they perform last rites over the people's hopes and bury their splendid dreams. And in all the noise and confusion created by the liberal and conservative orchestras society loses sight of the real issues and does not notice as somewhere at the back of the political stage there appears the unremarkable grey figure at whose command politicians and public figures, theoreticians and practical workers will all be stood on their ear.

Then it becomes clear that attention should have been paid not to who was departing the scene, but rather to those who remain. Take a look. Perhaps you will be able to determine who of those whom remain at the helm are striving to become dictators in this country...

Nonetheless all this hysteria about dictatorship is more of an act than real fear. Nor should it be forgotten that no matter how bad things may seem we do have fairly well-established democratic structures. Supreme soviets, both at the union and republic levels, are often the target of justified criticism and they often get bogged down in momentary, nonessential issues, but they are operating in an open manner, right before people's eyes, under the scrutiny of hundreds of journalists; they are held accountable to society for their activities and they, I am convinced, will not now permit anyone to infringe upon their freedom in order to mold it in some specific



direction, or let anyone declare themselves the keeper of the sole correct path and the source of all knowledge.

Furthermore, there are also different types of dictatorship. There is dictatorship by an individual and by groups of people, and it is also possible to have mob dictatorship. We know what a personal dictatorship is—we have experienced it in our own tragic past. I would be so bold as to say that we are also well acquainted with dictatorship by a group of people. But God forbid that we ever experience mob dictatorship! It would be the cruelest and most irrational, and the easiest to sway with myths and ill will. Appealing to randomly gathered masses of people is almost always as dangerous as lighting a fire atop a powder keg.

[Correspondent] Ivan Dmitriyevich, you have termed our current supreme soviets guarantors of our democratic development. In this connection could you characterize the present USSR Supreme Soviet, its membership and the balance of power which has emerged within it.

[Laptev] In its fifth session the Supreme Soviet had a largely changed membership. There were over 200 new members among the 540 deputies; as you can see, a significant turnover. Incidentally, this will perhaps complicate the Supreme Soviet's work to a certain extent, since these new colleagues will have to be initiated into legislative activity. The pluralism of ideas and opinions which have been discussed so much of late is an integral part of the very structure of our parliament. Within it there are over 20 groups of various political and social orientations. There are large deputies' groups like Soyuz or like the ecological group. The communist group is strong. Deputies from autonomous regions are active. A large group called "Zhizn" [Life] has been organized, most of whose members are female deputies, and we may assume that this group will make its influence strongly felt more than once.

I would like to emphasize that at the present time we actually have only two peripheral factions, the communist faction and the small social-democratic faction. The other formations cannot be termed parties, they are precisely groups of deputies which have come together as a result of common interests, sympathies and preferences.

Around the world, as you are aware, there first emerge political parties, and then from those parties deputies are elected to parliaments, where they form their corresponding parliamentary factions. Here we are doing things our own way. First the people elected deputies on an individual basis, then those deputies formed something akin to factions, and now some of them are attempting to become something resembling organizational initiative groups; in short, what we are seeing is something like formation of parties with the initiative coming from above. Obviously there is no need to explain that this somewhat untraditional process is rooted in our specific historical circumstances. When

elections were held there was only one party in our country, Article 6 of the Constitution had not been repealed, and pluralism was merely a subject of political debate. I would not say that pluralism has become definitively established; there is a reason that many of the parties which have emerged in recent years still resemble small circles instead of political organizations. Nonetheless I must emphasize that the parliamentary groups of which we are speaking differ greatly from one another in terms of their approaches, in the ideals which inspire them and finally in their methods of operation. That is to say, each one of them is capable of representing a certain social community and defending a certain social interest. Take, for example, the agricultural workers' deputies' group: if we had a peasants' party in this country the parliament would already have a clear-cut peasant faction.

[Correspondent] Can we assume that in the future these Supreme Soviet groups could become the precursors, the nuclei, of future political schools of thought and parties?

[Laptev] Yes, I have already said that that is what is happening. A deputies' group formed in parliament "went to the people" and created the Democratic Russia movement. I am not addressing that movement's popularity or successes, I merely want to emphasize the process. The social democrats took the same route. Their faction in the Supreme Soviet is small, but it was with that small group that the formation of a new party began.

Nevertheless it is essential to bear in mind that despite all this our parliament still does not have a sufficiently clear-cut structure. That is to say, the differences between groups is still not of a such a clear-cut, obvious nature. Hence the confusion at many of our sessions, which often resembles trade union meetings. For instance, a member of the communist group will speak, but it is not clear whether he is expressing his personal viewpoint, that of the whole group or that of only a part of it. In traditional parliaments things are simpler and more productive: the opinions of parties compete. Our preferences are still too individualized, and therefore every proposal is adopted with colossal effort. To give an extreme example, you could say that we have as many factions as we do deputies. That means that there can be an equal number of viewpoints.

[Correspondent] Though you have mentioned many of the main groups in the Supreme Soviet, you have not said a word about the Interregional Group...

[Laptev] The Interregional Group... I admit that it is difficult for me to talk about it. In my opinion, though I realize that not everyone will agree with me, it was precisely this group which most clearly reflected the stance of our liberal intelligentsia, and it was most prepared for parliamentary work; our new parliamentary system felt its influence very strongly. It is unfortunate that now the Interregional Group is losing its political clout and is both shrinking numerically and in a way fading qualitatively.

What is the reason for that? I think that there is more than one cause here. But above all one objective one. There has been a shaking of the foundation upon which the group's support was based. I am referring to the sentiments of certain segments and groups of the population. As you are aware, this intangible substance is a great force. But therein also lies its weakness: a sentiment is able to weaken, become dispersed and disappear. We have all witnessed how support, enthusiasm and inspiration are followed by weariness and apathy. Those forces for which the Interregional Deputies' Group served as a nucleus attempted and are still attempting to maintain among their constituents and supporters the former mood, but that is like trying to hold back an ocean wave. Especially since they are trying to do it with words instead of with the results of realization of their announced programs. Things have gotten nowhere with regard to results...

But of course there were also subjective reasons. You will agree that Academician Sakharov left the members of the Interregional Group a solid heritage of great ideas. One may argue and disagree with him, but one must acknowledge the scale of his thoughts, musings and ideas. Yet after Sakharov's death these great ideas were often replaced by circumstance-oriented calculations and private tactical moves in the process of political confrontations.

One of Vysotskiy's songs contains this line: "There were book children who knew no battles, pining over their childish catastrophes." Sakharov knew real battles and real catastrophes, and he developed a fully adequate reaction to them. But among his successors, and I do not want to accuse anyone, there were quite a few "book children" who could not compare their childish misfortunes and insults with the catastrophes which threatened all of society. It was they who reduced the civil and state potential of the Interregional Group. I say that with sincere regret. Because the Interregional Deputies' Group usually represents the possibility of an alternative, of another view and another approach to any issue, and thereby it makes its contribution to the making of responsible decisions.

Incidentally, I also cannot keep silent about the lack of consistency on the part of some of its members. You will recall how we were all enraged in the recent past by the double standard in assessments, the most primitive sort of dual thinking: one for the public, another for their own needs. Suddenly we see a return of that same way of thinking in the positions of the very people who were outraged at it, and rightly so! We say that no one has a right to infringe upon the legally elected organs of power in the Baltic republics. Absolutely right, completely true! Yet have we forgotten, was it so long ago, that those same orators stood right near here on Manezhnaya Square and called for the dissolution of the legally elected USSR Supreme Soviet, for termination of the legal powers of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the resignation of the legally elected president of our country? I could cite many such examples and, believe me, this kind

of double standard in assessments and approaches has caused much harm to the democratic movement.

Unfortunately there were also miscalculations of an organizational nature. Remember how consistently, brilliantly and boldly the members of the Interregional Group defended the proposals and positions of their Baltic colleagues. Incidentally, thanks to their support many of these ideas were embodied in laws in one way or the other. But after the Baltic deputies had achieved their goals they left the parliament and, I think, thereby caused the Interregional Group greater harm than all its competitors and critics combined.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, Ivan Dmitriyevich, but I think we have excessively narrowed the topic, for the Interregional Group does not exist in isolation, just as a group of deputies. It is identified with a large wing of the democratic movement in our country. The view from this standpoint seems to me the most important. Especially if we take into account the widespread notions about "correction" of society. What is your opinion?

[Laptev] Andronik Migranyan recently wrote that the democrats should not take power. I would say the same, but since they already have taken it they should hang on to it! There has been much talk about how the right has grown stronger, despite the fact that right and left, democratic and undemocratic are very provisional concepts in our country. Sometimes you see this: in the past a person was a democrat, now he puts forward such a reactionary idea! Or suddenly a dyed-in-the-wool conservative pounds his chest and tries to convince everyone that he is in fact the greatest revolutionary of all and was dreaming of perestroika while he was still in diapers. We should bear that in mind when we talk about "right" and "left." In my opinion it is not so much that the right has grown stronger but that the left has weakened. And as a result the political center of gravity has shifted. Do you know which thought I regard as central in the very controversial speech given by E. A. Shevardnadze from the podium of the Congress of People's Deputies? This: that democrats have scattered in every direction... Yes, it is the democrats themselves who are beginning to desert the field of battle. Now the question arises: why?

Let us ponder that. I see two factors here. Firstly, when they took power the democrats managed, generally speaking, to remain in opposition to that power. After that no serious matters could be dealt with: one cannot sincerely fight for implementation of a plan, a program or an idea with which ones does not agree; one cannot play on a team whose captain one does not acknowledge and whose goals one does not share. To use the soccer terminology which is currently in vogue, I can tell you that by doing that you can only score a point in your own goal. That is what is actually happening.

The second factor is not as obvious. Remember how easily our young democrats came to power. And not just on a wave of public disfavor with the old apparatus, but actually with the silent consent of the apparatus. It was

as if they were whispering to them to take all the power they could, as much as they could swallow. And it turned out that they themselves were devoured by our entrenched, unsinkable bureaucracy. Because by taking over key posts without the slightest experience with administrative work, unable to organize a specific job involving even two people, and feeling such pervasive repugnance for administrative skills, they immediately became hostages of the same old apparatus. It is no surprise that we are seeing a rapid increase in bureaucracy in the new structures. New aides, consultants, abstractors and advisers are appearing; now even the head of a soviet consults, advises or chairs some concern or association simultaneously. A talon-like grip! We must realize that the bureaucrats control the recently elected authorities in a way the party and the KGB never dreamed of. And a time will come when they will make that publicly evident! Because the bureaucrats' supervision has always been more vigilant, less principled and more merciless than the unsleeping eye of any monitoring agency.

The positive changes have been few, yet the office staff is growing as we watch. The power of rejection greatly helped the democrats in the election campaign, but now the time has come for positive action and positive thinking, and those things are not yet in evidence. As a result we are seeing a loss of confidence credit.

[Correspondent] Now let us recall how many hopes and aspirations the democratically inclined intelligentsia pinned on perestroika. Everyone remembers that it was precisely this group which more rapidly and more passionately than anyone else responded to the slogans of perestroika and marked in the front ranks of those who followed Gorbachev unconditionally. So how has it happened that for some time now there has been a rift between the intelligentsia and our country's leaders? What is the source of the crack which now runs through our entire thinking society?

[Laptev] In the initial years of perestroika the intelligentsia really was on the cutting edge and served as something of a standard bearer for the coming positive changes. But as perestroika processes expanded, regardless of their success and real results, the intelligentsia had to be transformed from the herald of the processes into their practical organizer. Yet, as you are aware, to make an appeal and to organize are, as they would say in Odessa, two big differences. Some time ago I talked with a writer who had gotten together a massive demonstration, and I made this comment to him: dear colleague, I have no doubt that you can bring 100,000 or 200,000 people out into the street. But are you capable of sending them back home again? Are you not afraid that they will dispense with you in the future? What if you are replaced by someone else who will control the masses with the help of completely different appeals and who will be guided by diametrically opposed principles? Unfortunately that sort of thing has actually begun to happen. Just as soon as the intelligentsia began noticing that attention at the meetings was gradually being won by

other people, it either despaired or got involved in other causes. It was here in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA that the first article appearing saying that it was not the business of creative and scientific workers to join political battles, that they should return to their desks, laboratories, microscopes and so forth.

This idea has begun to be mentioned in many speeches and articles and is now being implemented on a fairly widespread fashion. But that is not the end of it. It is not bad that people have gone back to their desks or their easels; the question is in what mental and moral state they have gone back. One time Hegel, pondering the fall of the Roman Empire, cited this as one of the main reasons for the fall: the power of morality in the people's spirit had been shattered. Forgive the bitter comparison, but we are all witnessing how that power is being shattered before our very eyes. It had been undermined in the past, but have you seen what is being done today? An outpouring of "smut", baseness, and banal tastelessness. We have lost our criteria and lowered intolerably the standards by which we gauge artistic content. This flood cannot be countered by an ukase or a ban, and no one seems to be in any hurry to do so with his or her own voice, creativity and thoughts. One gets the impression that a segment of our intelligentsia has simply lost all sense of its predestination to serve as a model of spirituality and honor. Many of our masters of thought and engineers of human souls have been infected with the same herd instinct as politicians and the bureaucratic apparatus hordes. That was one of the most bitter discoveries of perestroika at the present stage. Our intelligentsia, our brightest and best minds and hearts, proved powerless when faced with reaction and charlatanism; they cannot oppose lies if "nice" people lie, supposedly for the sake of laudable political interests—there are no good lies. Nowadays it is not fashionable to defend the honor of a person who does not share your social views. It is not fashionable to be outraged at an ideological speculator if that speculator for reasons depending on present circumstances is criticizing things which we do not like either. Nor is it fashionable to raise one's voice in defense of the state, even if only to support our leaders.

Yet there is no one besides the intelligentsia who can do this; there is no one in our society who is capable of substituting for the intelligentsia. Whether at his desk or not, a member of the intelligentsia has no right to close his eyes to the fact that intensification of destabilizing processes only plays into the hands of those who support violent solutions. And in this respect we should take into account not just that which is happening here at home. If our perestroika initiative and its processes evoked literally a tidal wave in the social life of the almost 10 countries in Eastern Europe which have swept the old regimes from the political scene, then think of the seismic shocks that the failure of perestroika would create there. That is yet another argument in its defense. But let us return to our topic. I will conclude this segment by saying that the crack which has split our

society runs primarily, as regretful as that is, through the consciousness and spiritual world of the intelligentsia.

[Correspondent] When did this spiritual crisis first become evident, and at what moment did this rift first form in a society which has attempted to convince the whole world and itself of its unswervingly monolithic nature?

[Laptev] I think that the point of departure for this sad rift was the publication of Nina Andreyeva's letter "I Cannot Betray My Principles." For good or for ill, up until that time either harmony or consolidation, which seem nowadays like pipe dreams, still prevailed in society. It was precisely those people who supported Nina Andreyeva who laid the foundations of the social strife which has so greatly complicated the progress of perestroika.

Let us reconstruct the social state of that time. Publication of the letter. Fear for the fate of perestroika. Virtually a three-week silence in the press, worsening the fear. People who had already succeeded in linking their lives with the new course, regarding it as the most favorable chance for our Motherland, began to feel a need to defend themselves. Then there emerged the first associations of what are now called left radicals, and they emerged, I reiterate, as a reaction against the manifesto of anti-perestroika forces. The groups of the left-wing spectrum had no need whatsoever to unite; they were not yet aware of their significance. Of course, they would have united, but substantially later, at some new turn in social development, perhaps at that stage of creative work when conflicts would have been only of local, tactical significance. In any event we would have avoided such a deep rift running through our entire society.

I recall the day when the editors of the main central newspapers were assembled and it was recommended that they be guided by the "principles" in Nina Andreyeva's letter. Some people hastened to do so. And those who did not want to be guided were compelled to keep quiet. Incidentally, it was at that time that the first public complaints about Gorbachev were heard. Why did he not say anything? Why did he not state his position? Was he suddenly on their side as well? Clearly what was needed was an immediate speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich to preempt the famous article in PRAVDA. But we all have excellent hindsight; at that time we did not think of this, did not imagine that it was precisely in those days that the first seeds of mistrust in the leaders of perestroika were sown. That is what the publication of Nina Andreyeva's letter meant, and what it means to this day.

I repeat, the rift began to open up in March 1988. And it began at the top. As the latest articles by participants in those events indicate, this was done quite intentionally.

[Correspondent] Ivan Dmitriyevich, in the eyes of the general public you remain linked to IZVESTIYA, and as its editor at that, though you have not worked there for

quite a while now. Even today it remains a solid and proper newspaper which does not stoop to the political baseness which you so correctly pointed out. It will undoubtedly be a moral loss for society if notions regarding an attack on glasnost are borne out.

[Laptev] The changes in the newspaper and its course were determined not so much by the editors as by the times, the times of perestroika. It was not just I; anyone else would have done the same.

Glasnost, in my opinion, is not just informing the public. Not just reporting the news. Incidentally, the charming young women on our television like to say that negative information is preferable to none at all, forgetting that true information is best of all. Whether negative or positive is a matter of minor importance. But back to my point. We have focused on fears regarding glasnost, but the time has come to focus on its problems. Today this is the Achilles' heel of glasnost.

To me glasnost has always been above all a matter of politics. Furthermore, of the kind of politics which measures its success in proportion to how well people are informed about it, how well they understand and share its goals and its principles, how well they know what is going on in the corridors of power, in the economy and in the world at large. This kind of approach to glasnost triumphed during perestroika. And today, after the President's slip of the tongue—and that is what it was, merely a slip of the tongue—after a few imprecise words which were immediately used to reproach him, I must say that I see the problem of glasnost not in someone intending to restrict or prevent it. That is out of the question. The problems are with its quality and with its economic underpinnings. The people now have a saying: there is much glasnost but little truth. Those are terrible words. They should be written like fire in the mind of every journalist.

The emergence of a tremendous number of new newspapers can only be regarded as positive. But one cannot help but notice also that it is precisely those newspapers which are lowering the quality of glasnost. Often they are staffed by people who are unprofessional and poorly trained, who do not understand what it means to influence public opinion, who attempt to manipulate public opinion shamelessly, with no understanding of what that could do to their country, their city or themselves personally. The main thing is to shout louder than all the rest! One must assume that the large, well-established press will find it beneath its dignity to respond in any way to what is published in these newspapers and mini-newspapers.

Presently the press is entirely subordinate to pure politics. As if that were good. But how often politics gives way to political demagoguery! Unfortunately, one can only witness in amazement how dependent is the stance of many publications and journalists. You know, in one of the chapters of "The Gulag Archipelago" Solzhenitsyn described a chief, of the Far Eastern camps, I believe.



The whole description is crowned with this withering phrase: "This person greatly hated the country in which he lived." Think about that! That is the portrait of an outsider, is it not?! Today some of our journalist colleagues seem to feel like outside observers in their own country. They do not understand our country's suffering, they do not feel its pain, and they do not realize what can happen as a result of the events and actions which they describe to their readers. Under these circumstances it is of fundamental importance for there to exist what might be termed benchmark publications. Let them be an open club for all newspaper people. Let them ensure study and exchange of experience. IZVESTIYA was always accessible to colleagues from any newspaper, either formal or informal. This created difficulties in our work, but it permitted us to a certain extent to have an influence on those publications, to lend support to some while saying to others in a comradely fashion: you know, dear friend, your game is not quite dignified.

It is like the joke the Americans tell, freedom of the press consists of hundreds of people imposing their opinion on hundreds of millions. Was that what we wanted?

There is no question of having any sort of supervisory agencies today. Nor will there be any agencies to bail us out! Today it is the journalist corps itself which must be primarily responsible for monitoring the quality of its work and preserving the high level of respect and the confidence which it has won from people during the perestroyka years.

Now about the economic aspect of glasnost. We have never had precise criteria for, say, newspaper economics. Prices for newsprint, for printing and for distribution were pulled out of thin air. But when these low prices are replaced by high prices from the same source the future of the press becomes a subject for concern. I am not revealing any secret if I tell you that at present newsprint prices the huge Izvestiya Combine could suffer losses running into several tens of millions of rubles. And that is for a newspaper with an excellent circulation, with three inserts, with a book publishing house and with a well-organized and already internationally recognized advertising department...

Under these circumstances dozens of publications will go under. Let us suppose that the party will support some of them. But what about the soviets' newspapers? Will they seek help from the soviets? But then what will happen to the newspapers' policy, to their course? For instance, if a soviet finances a newspaper and that newspaper pursues the policy of a certain party, then the soviet is in effect financing that party. Yet that is categorically forbidden by the Law on Public Associations. Complete chaos prevails in this regard. And in that chaos serious newspapers could lose—and already are losing—their best personnel, who are being lured away by the huge salaries paid by ephemeral little publications. In this chaos newsprint is being bought up at tremendously inflated prices. In this chaos the reader becomes disoriented, losing values and criteria. When all

these things are taken together one can quite readily agree that today glasnost is truly in need of protection.

Implementing the policy of glasnost means providing objective information to the broad masses. It means intolerance of speculative behavior which, incidentally, is also manifested by the fact that after losing one master many newspaper people hastened to find another whom they could serve with their former zeal. Glasnost must take into consideration the real state of our social consciousness. And quite frankly it is disheartening. Moreover, I am not referring to ideological postulates, but rather to our attitude toward people, toward the humanistic aspects of daily life, to the things which humanity has accumulated through a millennium of history. That is where we are suffering our greatest losses today. There is an amazing thought in the manuscripts of the young Marx. It goes something like this: in crude or levelling communism the universal form of human relations become envy.

That was truly vision across the centuries. Why suddenly so much attention to envy? Because where there is envy there will be hatred. And what if that hatred is accompanied by assurances that we are living in a hostile encirclement? Appeals to constant vigilance, as the enemy never sleeps, are always close at hand. By this time people are becoming certain that it is not we who are to blame for all our failings, but rather someone else whom we need merely find and expose. Today that witch hunt mentality has become very evident. The most terrible thing is that it is easily acquired on a mass scale, but with effort can also be made an individual belief. That is of what we must remind those who work in the intellectual realm. Of course this is not the sole source of our mutual cruelty. Attempts have always been made to persuade us of the predominance of the material principle over the spiritual. So should we be surprised when people who have received freedom of internal choice focus all their preferences on things and are practically willing to sacrifice the very life of their neighbor for the sake of acquiring some tape recording system?

At one time I thought that we were going through some sort of spontaneous injection of a pragmatic world view which we had formerly rejected. However, it seems that the problem lies elsewhere. One of the founders of this philosophical system, the American James, expressed the essence of pragmatism thus: the world lies before you pliable and submissive and awaits the touch of your hands. From the context it is clear that this refers to the world of nature. Our militantly materialistic approach is much harsher: philosophers merely explain the world, while our goal is to remake it. I hope you will recall those theses on Feuerbach. This striving to remake everything at once, to dig up and move around, it turns out, can take root in the mind and economic practice so deeply and be accepted as such a universal approach that it acquires a new quality. One of our philosophers termed that quality activism.

It is precisely "activism," one might say, which has sanctified all our recent history: in offices an appealing diagram was worked out, and then real life was forced to comply to it with pressure and effort. But here is the amazing thing: the new rebuilders, who reject this method of violence against human and social nature, are acting in exactly the same way! They, too, sit in their scientific offices and their university departments developing splendid theoretical diagrams which they then set about superimposing on sinful reality which is often completely foreign to them. Just read some of the new works by our radical reformers! It looks so easy on paper.

I want to scream: when are we finally going to let people define their own spiritual world? Let them, and help them. And start talking about good and evil, about relationships with our neighbors and the world, about our interaction with the world? Then each of us will learn and strive above all to become a human being. Not capitalist, not socialist, not "theirs" or "ours," just a human being. The crowning glory of nature anyway.

That is what our tormented mind is lacking. Our mind is great. Everyone senses that, but they do not want to think about it, though it is precisely in this way that genuine glasnost should manifest itself—through healing of our spiritual world.

[Correspondent] No matter how difficult or many the trials being suffered today by our country and people, we still continue to think about tomorrow, and hence about the historical outlook for our Fatherland. What, in your opinion, is most important of all today in this regard?

[Laptev] It seems to me that society should become aware of the need to coordinate actions within the bounds of our union in a new way.

Once again, we see a curious thing which never becomes a topic of discussion and debate. We have proclaimed a transition to the market. What does that mean? That the producer will be the central figure, the main character, in our economy. The producer will strive to achieve maximum presence, to expand, to overcome all sorts of obstacles, barriers and boundaries. He needs freedom in the broadest sense of the word. That is precisely why the world economy leaps across state borders, religious barriers and social prejudices. No matter to whom a Buddhist prays, no matter what rituals he performs, the latest electronic equipment can be found next to him in his shrine.

The emergence of the market corresponds to the process of political development, an extremely important and natural process. I am referring to the emergence of sovereignty for our republics. I am filled with respect for that idea. But the best way to ruin an idea is to carry it to the point of absurdity. Look at what is happening. If you look at the situation just from a fundamental standpoint, then you see that formerly the efforts of our producer were restricted solely by union borders. Now his activities are restricted by the boundaries of a republic, oblast or even rayon. What do these restrictions mean for

enterprises? An unambiguous demand: share with us what you have earned. Seemingly logical. But it only seems that way. As a result, though we have proclaimed movement toward the market we have with the best intentions restricted that movement by a political factor: the striving toward sovereignty and independence. We must clearly realize that either this sovereignty is not connected with economic borders and does not restrain anyone in any way, or else it intentionally restricts trade and the movement of capital and people.

That is why when I think about the outlook for the future I think mainly in terms of a new Union Treaty. Without it there will be no normal economic cooperation. In propaganda we often hear that the Union Treaty is advantageous and essential to the center. That is one of the greatest untruths! It is the republics which have a greater stake in it! More than anything else it is needed by and advantageous to the goods-producing enterprises which intend to become an independent economic subject! Local authorities, accustomed to monitoring everyone and everything, will not give them real commercial independence. They will not just tie their hands, but their feet as well.

Therefore I am convinced that it is essential to conclude a Union Treaty as soon as possible. Even if only in regard to those points on which agreement has already been reached. Above all we must define which powers will be exercised by the Union and which by the republics. After we have determined that then let us continue working on one position after another. And more quickly. For the treaties between republics which are being widely referred to as new means of interaction and cooperation are not working. In the best of cases they are being complied with halfway. This is causing a gigantic drop in production. Disorganization of all of industry. While they are working out what belongs to whom within which boundaries and under whose jurisdiction huge enterprises are standing idle.

As you know, there is an organization called the Council of Europe, with over 20 member countries. That council has not passed very many general legislative acts, only about 40. Yet those acts replaced over 1,500 bilateral international agreements, simplifying and easing the very process of economic and humanitarian cooperation. Yet we continue to insist on bilateral agreements! We already had a system of general standards, it functioned, and it could have been improved and perfected; what are we going to do now, throw it all away?

What is the origin of this striving for continual settling of scores and continual confrontation? You will note that it is always directed upward, not downward. But have no doubt that it will immediately follow from below as well.

If we could get rid of all the excess emotion, if we studied the logic of world development to which we so often refer a little more attentively, a Union Treaty would have been signed long ago. But if a treaty is not concluded, then all our talk of democratization, glasnost, freedoms



and prosperity will have no foundation under them. That is what we must clearly and soberly realize.

Today we are witnessing how the lack of a single dye can shut down a whole factory. There is not a single republic or country which can shut itself off and rely solely on its own production. Distribution of labor and a world economy are not some utopia, they are a remarkable achievement of civilization. Dividing up into republic-sized quarters and dividing up property also means dividing the market. What prosperity would there be in that case? Is it not madness to reject benefits toward which others have been striving for centuries?

I sometimes think sadly about the kind of sons of our Fatherland we are. You can rail against fate, you can be dissatisfied with the regime, you can not trust some politicians, but there is still the land on which you were born, the culture in which you were raised and the country in which you live!

Its state has taken shape over millennia, it occupies one of the leading chairs in the world orchestra, and it is essential to the world community. Yet some of its citizens are doing nothing but heaping all the blame on its head. And while doing so they cleverly manage to appear almost as if they were struggling to achieve happiness for their countrymen.

The time for rallies, brilliant philippics and emotional appeals is past. The time has come to think, analyze, weigh and compare. And to take action. Because no one is going to fix our life for us.

#### **Liberal Democratic Party Denied Registration**

91P50100A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Feb 91 p 1

[TASS report: "To the Ministry of Justice To Register"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Justice has refused to register the Liberal Democratic Party, because documents certifying that the party has at least 5,000 members were not provided.

V. Zhirinovskiy, head of the Liberal Democratic Party, said in a conversation with our TASS correspondent, that he agrees with the arguments of the representative of the Ministry of Justice, and he stated that the necessary document will be provided as quickly as possible. Today, according to USSR Ministry of Justice information, the question of the registration of the Association of Free Trade Unions of the Country and the Trade Union of USSR Navy Workers and Servicemen, has essentially been resolved.

#### **USSR MFA Official on Western Immigration Restrictions**

91UN1007A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
1 Mar 91 Union Edition p 7

[Article by F. Ivanov: "USSR MFA Warning: The Law on Leaving Does Not Guarantee Entry in the West"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has repeatedly written about many problems which may arise after the passing of the USSR

Law on Entry and Leaving. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] recently made a study which answers the following question: Are the Western countries prepared for a possible influx of immigrants from the USSR?

Igor Khalevinskiy, first deputy chief of the Consular Affairs Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked by the correspondent of IZVESTIYA to share his conclusions on this subject:

Sociologists and economists are already quoting different figures about possible levels of emigration from the USSR, ranging from two to 10-20 million people. This applies to people who are able to find employment abroad. This situation has been closely studied by the Western governments and discussed in business and public circles.

The USSR MFA is also looking closely at the problems which could arise in connection with emigration. Our study of the labor market in Western European countries indicates that their market is saturated, that the need for immigrants is minimal and, furthermore, that the Western countries are, one after another, increasing the strictness of immigration procedures.

Thus, the question of the need to strengthen border safety, even if no additional calling of reserves is necessary, is being discussed in Finland. Sweden has undertaken to set up camps for immigrants. Norway, allowing for the possibility of uncontrolled emigration, has begun to draft a "crisis plan." The plan is being formulated by that country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with the Ministry of Justice, and the Directorate for Foreigners' Affairs, in touch with the respective organizations in Sweden and Finland. In particular, the Norwegians have initiated preparations for the possible reception of immigrants in the northern part of Norway, stockpiling additional food supplies up in that area. Their assumption is that, after obtaining a three-month tourist visa, some Soviet citizens will use that time for seeking temporary work or else try to obtain residency status or a work permit in that country. However, with 110,000 unemployed, it would be difficult to hope for even a temporary job in Norway. The local press notes that in that area the Norwegians are having problems with Polish citizens, who make use of a labor "black market" in that country.

Most Australian sociologists believe that the government's immigration quota for 1990, which was 126,000 people, was excessively high and that in the future it could be reduced to 100,000 or even to 50,000 people annually. Supporters of restricting the influx of foreigners refer, in support of their conclusions, also to the demographic boom in Australia: the annual population growth is almost two percent. Therefore, the right to priority immigration in that country will benefit essentially gifted and talented people, such as promising scientists or artists.

It is true that according to the latest draft bills, it will become easier for relatives of American citizens and individuals who have skills considered most necessary in the United States to enter that country. The draft laws stipulate an annual immigration quote in the United States of 700,000 people. This rate will become effective as of 1 October 1991, for a three-year period. As of 1995, however, the annual quota will be reduced to 650,000. Currently it is 490,000. Of the total number of 700,000, 465,000 immigrants will fall into the category of relatives of U.S. citizens and only 140,000 will be accepted if they are skilled specialists, together with their closest family members.

The Canadian annual immigration quota of 200,000 people will be raised to 250,000. However, most Western countries are concentrating on reducing immigration, and favor restricting a mass influx of foreign citizens. The Spanish government, for example, was forced to pass exceptionally strict immigration legislation. According to it, a foreigner arriving in that country may work only after obtaining a residency permit and a work permit issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The FRG law on foreigners does not stipulate the free entry into the country of citizens from other countries. In order to enter the country, the foreigner needs a special work permit, which is distinct from the right to reside in the FRG.

On the eve of the immigration wave from the East, Sweden as well is taking steps aimed at holding back the entry of Soviet citizens, including those with invitations. Until recently, in order to enter that country, even on a temporary job, a foreigner had to be familiar with the local language or with English, and have a contract for a job, housing, etc. The present difficult financial situation in which Sweden finds itself, and the government's line of reducing state spending also indicate that in the years to come the Swedes will not be ready to spend more money on the mass acceptance of Soviet citizens who would like to work in that country.

Iceland has passed a conservative and quite strict immigration law on alien control. It prohibits entering the country for any kind of work by foreign citizens without a preliminary agreement to this effect, i.e., an invitation from employers and the permission of the authorities. Otherwise, foreigners who come to Iceland are expelled from the country without even leaving the airport.

Any mass influx of manpower from the Soviet Union to Switzerland is excluded, for the employer must hire the necessary manpower above all in traditional recruitment areas (members of the EEC, Turkey, Yugoslavia). An exception is possible only in the case of highly skilled manpower or other special cases such as, for example, citizens of developing countries who reside in Switzerland in accordance with programs for scientific and technical cooperation.

The characteristic aspiration of the members of the European Community is not only to find their own

national way for solving problems related to the expected increase in the number of Soviet immigrants but also to formulate a common approach consistent with the interests of the Community as a whole.

The 14 June 1985 Schengen treaty, signatories to which are the Netherlands, Belgium, the FRG, France, and Luxembourg, calls, among others, for a coordinated visa policy, aimed at protecting such countries from illegal immigration and from activities which could threaten their security. Recently Italy joined in the treaty. Unquestionably, when it becomes a question of the numerical quotas of foreigners who would like to immigrate into the most developed countries, which are EEC members, priority will be given to the citizens of Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, and not the USSR.

#### **Ukrainian Proposed Amendments to Union Treaty**

91UN1026A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
22 Feb 91 pp 2-3

[Introduction and text of Proposed Union Treaty: "For a Sovereign Socialist Ukraine in a Renewed Union"; Original item presents both Presidential Draft of the Union Treaty and the Ukrainian Communist Party variant. For a translation of the Presidential Draft Union Treaty see FBIS-SOV-90-227 for 26 Nov 90 pp 39-42.]

[Text] On 17 March 1991 each of us must define his own clear-cut position with respect to the future of our country—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This event is the center of attention of political parties and public associations. Proceeding from the interests of the people of the Ukraine, communists are speaking out for a Union in which the creative potential of the republics, the energy of the fraternity and friendship of the Soviet peoples, engendered by our common fate and the socialist option, would be completely realized.

At the present time intensive work is under way on preparation of a new Union Treaty, which is to define the system of relationships among the sovereign republics, guarantee their real independence as subjects [sic] of a federation, clearly delimit the powers between the republic and union organs, and create the conditions for genuinely free and universal development of all the nations in our multinational country.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee has examined the draft of the Union Treaty published in the press, presented by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, and believes that on the whole it corresponds with these tasks.

At the very same time, the Central Committee, proceeding from the decisions of the 4th Congress of USSR

People's Deputies, the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine and the Program Documents of the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian CP, and also considering the opinion of many communists and the public at large, considers it necessary to introduce a number of significant amendments and addenda to the draft. Basically, they boil down to the fact that the draft of the Union Treaty should:

- stress that every republic entering the Union as a sovereign, independent state, reserves the right to supremacy and independence in the resolution of all questions in its life as a state; in economic, social and spiritual development; in the totality and indivisibility of power within the bounds of its own territory; independence and equality in foreign relations and in interrelationships among the republics. The USSR shall be the guarantor of the sovereign rights of the republics, their state independence and their territorial integrity;
- have a statute on reserving the rights of the republics to freely withdraw from the Union; and,
- clearly formulate the lofty goals, for the achievement of which the republics are concluding the Union Treaty, and principally the preservation of the integrity of our state, the flourishing of each republic, and the strengthening of the positions and prestige of the USSR as the guarantor of peace and stability in the entire world.
- specify the powers which the republics voluntarily delegate to the Union for carrying out the goals stipulated in the Treaty, for more fully satisfying the interests and needs of the members of the Union, and for more effective solution of vitally important problems, by common efforts. The list of these powers must be exhaustive, and the powers of the Union may not be changed without the consent of all the republics participating in the Treaty;
- note that the republics which are members of the USSR—shall have their own citizenship. At the very same time, it should be stressed that citizens of the USSR shall have equal rights and responsibilities, guaranteed both by the Constitution of the USSR, the laws and international treaties of the USSR, and by the constitutions of the constituent republics;
- define the content of the concept of all-union property, the procedure for formation and financing of joint programs and projects as well as the expenses for maintaining the union organs; and,
- specify the forms of organization of the Union, and the structure of the organs of power and administration.

Today your attention is called to the texts of the aforementioned draft of the Union Treaty and the Ukrainian CP Central Committee's amendments and addenda to

this document. For convenience, the proposed amendments and addenda are printed in boldface type.

#### Proposals of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee

The sovereign republics of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,**

- while realizing their inalienable right to self-determination and free democratic development;**
- expressing the will of their peoples for the renewal, based on the socialist option, of our multinational state as a voluntary Union of sovereign republics with equal rights;**
- continuing to strive to live in friendship and concord in a unified fraternal family, while guaranteeing equal, mutually-advantageous cooperation;**
- proceeding from the historical fate we share and considering the lessons of the past, and the necessity for conducting our mutual relationships in accordance with the profound socio-economic and political transformations which have taken place in the life of the country and each republic since the concluding of the 1922 Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, and the profound changes throughout the world;**
- for the high purposes of preserving the integrity of our state, the flourishing of each republic, and the elevation through joint efforts of the material well-being and spiritual development of the nations and the mutual enrichment of the national cultures, the undeviating observance of the universally acknowledged rights and freedoms of the citizens regardless of their nationality and dwelling place, the assurance of commonsecurity, and for strengthening the positions and prestige of the Union as the guarantor of peace;**
- guided by the principles proclaimed by the republics in the declarations on state sovereignty,**

have decided to conclude a new Union Treaty and to subsequently build their relationships in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the following principles.

#### I.

##### Basic Principles

**First. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be a democratic sovereign federated state, an association of sovereign republics with equal rights, formed on the basis of voluntary choice and popular self-determination for the purpose of achieving common goals, defined in the present Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exercise the power of the state within the bounds of the authority which the signatories to Treaty have voluntarily delegated to it.**

Each republic, entering the Union as a sovereign, independent state, shall retain its supremacy and independence in resolving all questions in its own life as a state and in its economic, social and spiritual development; the

fullness and indivisibility of power within the bounds of its own territory; and its independence and equal rights in foreign relations and in its interrelations among the republics. Union member-states, acting as full-fledged subjects in the international arena, may enter into direct relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them, and take part in international organizations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall act as the guarantor of the sovereign rights of the republics, their state independence, and their territorial integrity.

Each republic shall retain the right to freely withdraw from the Union.

Second. The republics forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognize the inalienable right of each nation to self-determination and self-government, and to independent resolution of all questions of its own development. Proceeding from the harmony of common human and national values, the Treaty member-states shall decisively speak out against racism, chauvinism, nationalism, and any attempts to restrict the rights of the nations.

Third. The Union member-states acknowledge that the most important principle of their association is the priority of the rights of man, which is proclaimed in the UN General Declaration and in other international pacts. All citizens of the USSR shall be guaranteed the opportunity for the study and use of their own native language; unlimited access to the achievements of native and world-wide culture and to information; freedom of religion, and other political and personal liberties.

Fourth. Union member-states see the most important conditions for personal freedom and the well-being of the nation in the formation and development of civil society. They shall strive to satisfy the needs of the people on the basis of free choice of forms of property and methods of management, and consistency in the realization of the principles of social justice and social security. In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the free development and the protection of all forms of property shall be guaranteed, including the property of the citizens and their associations, and state property.

Fifth. The Republics shall independently determine their state structure, administrative-territorial divisions, and system of organs of power and government. They acknowledge the common fundamental principle of democracy, based on popular representation, and shall strive for the creation of a rule-of-law state which would serve as the guarantee against any tendencies toward authoritarianism and arbitrary rule.

Sixth. Union member-states consider it their important task to preserve and develop the national traditions of all nations which dwell on their territory, and to provide state support to education, science and culture. They shall promote the intensive exchange and mutual enrichment of the humanistic spiritual values of the nations in the country and the entire world.

Seventh. Union member-states declare, that their chief goals in the international arena are—a stable peace, elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, cooperation among states, and the solidarity of nations in the solution of ecological, energy and other global problems facing humanity.

## II.

### Structure of the Union.

#### Relationships Among Its Members

##### Article 1. Membership in the Union

Membership in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is voluntary. Republics and autonomies [avtonomiya] of the Soviet Union who express their consent to assume the obligations established in the present Treaty may be members of the Union.

The addition to the Union of new republics and the conditions for their entry require ratification by all other members of the Union.

Republics and autonomies who take part in the Treaty shall enter the Union directly, or as members of other state formations [obedineniy], which shall not limit their rights, nor shall it free them from the obligations to the present Treaty.

Relations between republics and autonomies, one of which becomes part of the other, shall be regulated by treaties and agreements between them.

Withdrawal of a republic from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be accomplished on the basis of the expression of will (referendum) of the citizens of the given republic, according to procedure defined in the laws of the union.

Members of the Union, and also the President of the USSR, the Federation Council [Soviet Federatsii], and the Constitutional Court of the USSR may put the question of terminating membership in the USSR of republics which violate the conditions of the Treaty and the obligations they have accepted. The USSR Supreme Soviet shall take the final decision on this question. The decision shall go into effect after ratification by all other members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

##### Article 2. Territory

The territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall consist of the territories of all the republics taking part in the Treaty.

The territory of each republic within its existing boundaries can not be changed and used without its consent. Borders between republics may be changed only by means of agreement between them.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the republics who are members of the Union shall guarantee the political rights and opportunity for free socio-economic



and cultural development to all the nations and ethnic national groups [narodnost] that dwell on their territory.

### Article 3. Citizenship

**Member republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have their own citizenship.**

A citizen of a republic that is a member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be at the same time a citizen of the USSR.

**On the territory of all member republics of the Union, citizens of the USSR shall have the equal rights and obligations established in the Constitution, laws and international agreements of the USSR, and also by the constitution of the corresponding republics.**

### Article 4. Relations Between Republics

Participants in the Treaty shall structure their mutual relations as members in the Union on the basis of equality, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, resolution of all disputes by peaceful means, cooperation, mutual assistance, and conscientious fulfillment of the obligations of the Union Treaty and inter-republic agreements.

**Republics may conclude among themselves treaties and agreements on cooperation in the areas of politics, economics, culture, health-care, the ecology, science, technology, information science and trade; in humanitarian and other spheres; and they may draw up joint special-purpose programs, and set up the necessary organizational structures (temporary or permanent) necessary for carrying out these agreements and programs.**

**Members of the Union are obligated to refrain from any actions whatsoever which could cause harm to the state sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or to its member republics; and above all shall not permit the stationing on their territory of military formations and military bases of foreign states; they shall not conclude agreements with other countries and between themselves, which contradict the goals of the Union or its international obligations, or which are directed against the interests of any of the member republics of the Union whatsoever.**

### Article 5. The Powers of the Union

**In order to accomplish the goals envisaged by the present Treaty, to more completely satisfy the interests and needs of the members of the Union, and to effectively resolve through joint efforts vitally important tasks, the republics participating in the Treaty shall delegate to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the person of its highest state organs the following powers:**

1) Adopting the Constitution of the USSR and introducing amendments and addenda to it; guaranteeing together with the republics the basic rights and liberties of citizens of the USSR;

2) Defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union; defining and defending the State Borders of the USSR; ensuring the state security of the USSR; organizing the defense and the leadership of USSR Armed Forces; declaring war and concluding peace. **For the protection of public order on their territory, republics may create their own armed formations (internal troops);**

3) **Determining strategies for foreign policy and foreign economic actions** and for carrying out the foreign policy of the Union; concluding international agreements of the USSR; representing the Union in relations with other states and in international organizations; coordinating the foreign policy activities and foreign economic associations of the republics; **organizing customs activities jointly with the republics;**

4) Determining jointly with the republics the strategy for economic development, **formation of common economic territory** [prostranstvo] and creating conditions for development of a national [obshchesoyuznyy] market, **and administration of national property; creating and administering national state funds, including development funds and funds for eliminating the consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes; conducting a unified financial, credit and monetary policy, based on a common currency; forming and executing a national budget by means of national taxes coordinated with the republics, and collections and national grants, and by republic deductions from their own budgets; maintaining and coordinating with the republics the use of a gold reserve and diamond fund. The currency debt of the USSR and the indebtedness of other countries to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and also USSR assets in foreign banks, shall be distributed among the republics according to principles agreed upon by the Union members. Each republic shall have its share in the national diamond fund and gold reserve, created by the common efforts of the nations of the USSR;**

5) **Determining the strategy for developing the fuel and energy complex and the metallurgical facilities of the Union; joint control with the republics of atomic power engineering, defense enterprises of union subordination and space exploration; railroad, air, sea and mainline pipeline transport, national communications systems (including satellite communications and telecommunications) and information; land surveying, cartography, metrology and standardization; conducting a coordinated ecological policy, and establishing the basis for the use of natural resources and protecting the environment;**

6) Organizing together with the republics fundamental scientific research and stimulation of scientific-technical progress; **working out and implementing national socio-economic, scientific-technical, and ecological programs; and,**

7) **organizing the struggle with crime, above all with organized and international crime.**

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall assist the republics in coordinating among them the bases of social

and humanitarian policy, policies in the areas of education, culture, law, protection of public order, and in solving their internal problems; and shall coordinate, according to the wishes of the republics, cooperation in the questions which are of general interest to them.

The powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may not be changed without the consent of all members of the Union.

#### **Article 6. Republic Participation in Implementing the Powers of the Union**

Republics shall take part in implementing the powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by means of joint formation of union organs, and by creation of other mechanisms and procedures for coordinating interests and actions.

Each republic may, by means of concluding an agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, additionally transfer to it the implementation of certain of its powers; and the Union, in agreement with all the republics—may transfer one or several of the separate powers implemented on their territory, **delegated in accordance with the present Treaty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.**

#### **Article 7. Property**

The republic shall be the owner of the land, its minerals and other natural resources, as well as the state property on its territory. The regulation by means of republic laws of the relationship of property to the land, its minerals and other resources, may not prevent the realization of the powers of the Union. **That portion of state property which is required for implementing the powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be the national property (common property) of all the republics, and shall be protected by the Union. Republics shall guarantee the inviolability and unrestricted possession [vладение] of national property on their territory, and the use and disposal of it by union organs or by the juridical persons whom they authorize.**

#### **Article 8. Taxes and Duties**

Republics shall independently determine their own budgets, and shall establish republic taxes and duties.

In order to implement the powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and realize national and joint programs, and to maintain the union organs of power and administration, union taxes and duties shall be established, as well as proportional deductions from the budgets of the republics, which shall be determined by the Federation Council.

#### **Article 9. Laws**

On the territory of a republic, republic laws shall have supremacy on all questions, except those which have been assigned to the jurisdiction of the Union.

The laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted on questions of its jurisdiction shall have supremacy and shall be obligatory for execution on the territory of all republics.

The laws of the Union on questions assigned to the joint jurisdiction of the Union and the republics, shall go into effect, if the republic whose interests the given laws affect has no objections.

The provisions of the present Treaty, the Constitution and laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the constitutions and laws of the republics must not conflict with another, nor with the international obligations of the USSR and the republics.

A republic shall have the right to appeal a Law of the USSR if it conflicts with its Constitution and exceeds the powers of the Union. The Union shall have the right to appeal the legislative acts of the republics, if they violate the present Treaty, the Constitution and laws of the USSR. Disputes in both cases shall be decided by means of conciliation procedures or shall be transferred to the Constitutional Court of the USSR.

### **III.**

#### **Organs of Power and Administration**

##### **Article 10. Formation of the Organs of Power and Administration**

Union organs of power and administration shall be formed on the basis of broad representation of the republics and shall operate in strict accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty.

##### **Article 11. The USSR Supreme Soviet**

The USSR Supreme Soviet shall exercise the legislative power of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The USSR Supreme Soviet shall have two houses: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union shall be elected by the population of the entire country by electoral districts with an identical number of voters. The Soviet of Nationalities shall be formed from delegations of the highest representative organs of power of the republics and the organs of power of national-territorial formations, in accordance with agreed-upon norms.

All nations which dwell in the USSR shall be guaranteed representation in the Soviet of Nationalities.

##### **Article 12. The President of the USSR**

The President of the USSR shall be the head of the union state, and shall possess the highest directive and executive power.

The President of the USSR shall be the guarantor of the observance of the Union Treaty, the Constitution and the Laws of the USSR; he shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR; **head of the**



**Federation Council and the Security Council [Sovet bezopasnosti] of the USSR;** shall represent the Union in relations with foreign countries; and shall exercise control over the fulfillment of the international agreements of the USSR.

The President shall be elected by the citizens of the USSR by the majority of votes in the Union as a whole, and in the majority of republics.

#### **Article 13. The Vice President of the USSR**

The Vice President of the USSR shall be elected together with the President of the USSR. The Vice President of the USSR shall carry out, upon the authorization of the President of the USSR, certain of his functions, and shall substitute for the President of the USSR in the event of his absence and his inability to carry out his obligations.

#### **Article 14. The Federation Council**

The Federation Council [Sovet Federatsii] shall be convened under the leadership of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and shall consist of the Vice President of the USSR, **the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Prime Minister of the USSR, and the chiefs of state of the members of the Union, in order to define the basic directions of the internal and external policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to coordinate the actions of the republics.**

The Federation Council shall exercise coordination and agreement of action of the highest organs of state power and administration of the Union and the republics, monitor the observance of the Union Treaty, determine measures for putting into effect the national policy of the Soviet state, ensure the participation of the republics in deciding questions of national significance, and shall draw up recommendations for resolving disputes and regulation of conflict situations in international relations.

**Questions concerning the interests of the nations which do not have their own national-state formations—who are direct subjects of the Union, shall be examined in the Federation Council, with the participation of representatives of these nations.**

#### **Article 15. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers**

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers, **as the executive and directive organ of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,** shall be formed by the President of the USSR in coordination with the USSR Supreme Soviet, and shall consist of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the ministers of the USSR, and the leaders of other state organs of the USSR.

**The heads of the governments of the union republics shall take part in the work of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers with the right of deciding vote.**

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers shall be subordinate to the President of the USSR and shall be responsible to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In order to coordinate the resolution of questions of state administration, collegia shall be established in the ministries and departments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; membership of the collegia shall consist of the heads of the corresponding republic ministries and departments.

#### **Article 16. The USSR Chamber of Control**

**The USSR Chamber of Control, which shall be formed by the USSR Supreme Soviet from representatives of the members of the Union, shall implement control over the expenditure of funds from the union budget and the use of national property.**

#### **Article 17. The Constitutional Court of the USSR**

The Constitutional Court of the USSR shall exercise control, in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the republics, of the observation of the Union Treaty and the Constitution of the USSR, and shall decide disputes among the republics and between the Union and a republic, if these disputes cannot be regulated by means of conciliation procedures.

#### **Article 18. Union Courts**

Union courts shall consist of—the USSR Supreme Court, **the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration,** and the courts of the USSR Armed Forces.

The USSR Supreme Court shall be the highest organ of judicial power in the Union. The chairmen of the highest judicial organs of the republics shall be members of the USSR Supreme Court by virtue of their position.

#### **Article 19. The Union Procuracy**

The union procuracy, headed by the General Procurator of the USSR, shall exercise surveillance over the execution of the legislative acts of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on questions pertaining to its jurisdiction and the joint jurisdiction of the Union and the republics.**

Republic procurators shall be members of the USSR Collegium of Procurators.

#### **Article 20. Official Language of the Union**

Participants in the Treaty acknowledge that **official language of the USSR is the Russian language,** which has become the means of international intercourse.

#### **Article 21. Capital of the Union**

The city of Moscow shall be the capital of the USSR.

#### **Article 22. State Symbolology of the Union**

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have its own seal, flag and hymn.

IV.

**Entry of the Union Treaty Into Force, and Introduction of Amendments to the Treaty**

**Article 23. Entry of the Union Treaty into Force**

The Union Treaty shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall enter into force at the moment it is signed. For the republics who have signed the Union Treaty, the 1922 Treaty on the Formation of the USSR shall, on the very same date, be deemed invalid.

**Article 24. Amendments to the Union Treaty**

The Union Treaty or its individual provisions may be annulled, amended or supplemented only with the consent of all the member states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proposals on changing the conditions for a republic to be a member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be introduced no earlier than five years after the signing of this Treaty, and only on the basis of the expression of will (referendum) of the citizens of the given republic.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine appeals to communists and non-party persons, veterans and young people, women, and all citizens of the republic, to take part in the nationwide referendum of 17 March, to support the idea of the preservation of the Soviet Union state as a renewed federation.

**Ukraine Warned of Dangers of Separatism**

91UN1025A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
13 Feb 91 p 2

[“Prepared at the request of PRAVDA UKRAINY by a group of scientists-economists of the Council for the Study of Productive Forces of the Ukrainian SSR of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences”: “Why We Need the Union—Instructions for the Participant in the Forthcoming Referendum on Preserving the USSR”]

**[Text] The Union as a united state:**

- is a powerful military-political shield that ensures the security and peace of the people of the USSR, and it provides an opportunity for resolving problems that arise among them through civic methods;
- maintains a single market without customs-currency barriers and a single monetary and banking system, which are a necessary prerequisite for stabilization and future successful economic development;
- ensures international stability, maintaining a balance and deterring the development of aggression and revanchism that potentially exist around the territory of the Union.

*What can the consequences be of the state separation of the Ukraine from the USSR?*

- An outbreak of interethnic and interfaith (religious) conflicts, foreign territorial conflicts, and political instability.
- The danger of a terrorist dictatorship of irresponsible extremists of the national-fascist persuasion.
- Militarization of the economy for the suppression of dissenters attempting to separate themselves from a nationalistic Ukraine, and also for retaining borders and counteracting revanchism on the part of other states.
- Worsening of the economic situation as a consequence of the destruction of the network of economic ties and a single market, since it will be necessary to purchase many vitally important products and raw materials at world prices. Our own monetary unit will be devalued quickly as a result of a negative trade balance (the Ukraine will be forced in the meantime to buy more than it can sell). Political instability and militarization will increase the budget deficit and inflation.

*What can the consequences be of the dissolution of the USSR as a united state?*

- Tension, political instability, and chaos on the territory of the Union will transform it into a likeness of postwar Africa: continuous civil dissension and internal wars, political coups, and hunger and devastation. The possession of nuclear missiles, which the separating unstable states will demand, will make the region of the Union especially dangerous for Europe and the world. The elimination of the Union military-political shield will revive the danger of aggression and revenge in Europe and Asia. Feeble efforts can be undertaken to redraw the political map of the world, in Europe—on the part of revanchists and nationalists, and in Asia—on the part of Muslim fundamentalist and other destructive forces. Equilibrium will be disturbed in the whole world.

*In introducing its own monetary unit and customs border, will the Ukraine be able to protect its own consumer market and increase the material well-being of the people?*

- It will not be able to do this. The reason for low consumption is that much less consumer goods are produced in the republic than is paid out in monetary income. It is necessary to change the structure of the economy and to create the prerequisites for the efficient work of agricultural enterprises. Cutting off from the Union will not be effective for the following reasons. A Ukrainian monetary unit will be bought and sold on the black market for Russian rubles and convertible currency. In the process, Ukrainian money will fall in value, because all told the Ukraine buys more than it is able to sell (at world prices). What will happen is what also happens with “coupons,” which have not substantially improved the condition of the market in the republic. Customs and currency barriers will render economic relations difficult and will worsen conditions for the development of production

and trade. Maintaining our own money and customs will not be cheap, about 200 million rubles a year, and just the printing of the new money will require \$450 million.

*Finland and Poland at one time separated from Russia, and this did not lead to an economic shock. Is it possible to draw a parallel with today's Ukraine?*

—In the first quarter of the century, the economy of the Russian Empire was not developed industrially in the same way. Production relations and exchanges to a predominant degree could be locked into regions according to the principle of self-support. But modern industry requires broad cooperation and networks of communications for deliveries. The more developed a large industry is, the closer and broader are the ties. There is an analogy with a living organism: If you cut up a simple worm, then each severed part will restore itself, and it will live, but if you dismember a higher organ, then it will either perish or will remain mutilated. The Ukraine today receives from the Union republics 600 designations from a list of only the most important types of products. Through imports almost the entire requirement for oil and gas is covered, more than half of the timber, paper, and dyes, and a significant part of rolled metal, pipes, and metal articles.

Already today, because of the uncoordinated actions of the republics that are demonstrating their sovereignty, a lot of production is being stopped. A drop of 15 percent in production is predicted for 1991, but there are even more critical forecasts. And this is the threat of massive unemployment. The vital fabric of the economy is being torn, which will take a long time and be difficult to replace.

*Is the free development of nations in one multinational state possible?*

—The presence of a joint defense, monetary, and banking system, and certain branches of the economy (the so-called infrastructure)—transport and power—does not preclude an independent determination of the most beneficial structure of the republic economy, availability of its own budget, establishment of its own cultural and religious institutions, adherence to national and local traditions, the adoption of one or another language of intercourse or several languages, and the conduct of its own social policy. Moreover, given a reliable military-political shield and the absence of territorial expansion, each nation will receive a real opportunity to develop its own way. At the same time, it is true, a mutual permeation of cultures and languages occurs, but this only enriches; that is, a beneficial process of development is going on. A multinational state should be organized so that not one nationality receives political and administrative advantages. But the central organs of authority

and administration should consist of representatives of all of the people that are part of the Union republics.

*Who is interested in national separation from the Union? Where are the sources of nationalist-separatist ideas?*

—The toiling people, the peasant, and the workers do not need this. Working people have always worked side by side, not contemplating questions of national differences, and respecting each other. Nationalism appears where greed and envy grow. It is not accidental that encroachments on land or water boundaries usually were given a national nuance. Thus, envy of aggressive and commercially capable and skilled craftsman and tradesmen aroused anti-Semitism. Aspirations for popularity, fame, the attainment of positions, and outlasting competitors can be very conveniently attired in nationalistic clothing—"we will fire the Muscovites, and we will (I will!) govern ourselves," "why do we need a Jewish director, are there no intelligent Ukrainians (first of all, me!)" In our time, national separatism is being stirred up by an untalented and ambitious intelligentsia and officialdom. Nationalism does not come from the people, since the working people do not hold positions. National-separatism always involves careerism.

*References are made in some publications and speeches to information from the Deutsche Bank concerning the readiness of the Ukraine for independent inclusion in the world market. This was talked about, in particular, in the newspaper ZELENYY SVIT in December 1990. How reliable is this information?*

—The question concerns an expert evaluation of general economic development in nominal terms. They assert the relatively high level of development of the Ukrainian economy. No one denies this. But the readiness or unreadiness to become an independent subject of the world market depends on the competitive ability of production, the ability to sell no less than what is purchased, and also transport capabilities for delivery. The last exists, but the first two do not exist at present in the republic.

But this is the opinion on this of experts of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Whatever the new constitutional and political positions might be in the USSR, the erection of barriers on the way to economic transactions would be an extremely expensive undertaking. Consequently, it is proposed that the republics retain the all-Union market. Also proposed is the absence of trade barriers between republics, a common monetary unit, and a single rate of exchange and monetary-credit policy, and also a common foreign tariff and coordinated assignment of responsibilities for tax collection and expenditures at various levels of administration. Otherwise, we will not pull ourselves out of the economic pit.

### Brezhnev-Era Official on Rehabilitation

91UN0942A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 4

[Interview with V. Vyshku, former deputy chairman of the Moldovan Council of Ministers, by N. Zenova and V. Kamenshchik, from a series of short interviews with Brezhnev-era officials: "What They Are Saying Today"; Moldova and Moldavia as published]

[Text] V.K. Vyshku, former deputy chairman of Moldovan Council of Ministers, was convicted of bribery in 1986 and sentenced to 14 years in a maximum security correctional facility (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA wrote about him and his criminal case in the 9 April 1986 issue in an article by I. Gamayunov and G. Malarchuk, "The Boss And His Retinue"). In 1990 the verdict was changed, and the sentence commuted to 10 years.

Our correspondents interviewed him in the correctional labor facility.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Vasilii Konstantinovich, we were told that you are working on your own concept of how to get the country out of the crisis...

[Vyshku] Yes, I have not only my belief, but also my own concept of the country's transition to market relations.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] That is, you are for the market?

[Vyshku] Not only am I for the market, I published a book on market relations two years before perestroika.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] In this correctional labor facility No. 13, right next to you, are rather famous people: Churbanov, Brovin, Usmankhodzhayev... You are in contact with them. It is interesting: What do they think of the current situation?

[Vyshku] Many are nostalgic for times past: They had a sweet life...

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Did you not have a sweet life?

[Vyshku] My life was torturous.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] It is possible that your current comrades-in-distress could say the same: Remember the classic—those whose conscience is not clean... However, the curious phenomenon is that today people who had been written off the political arena are making a comeback to power—both in the sense of real power and of power over minds. For instance, Aliyev. There was a whole wave in defense of Rashidov in Uzbekistan. In Alma-Ata, Kunayev's authority is still high among some people... What do you think: Is it a coincidence or a trend?

[Vyshku] I think it is a trend. Although figures of this kind will not come into real power. They will compensate for the shortage of myths in the mythological

thinking of one kind of people, and contrast with the thinking of another kind of people—those, who think that it is possible, in a country like ours, to instantly shift to the democratic form of government... In short, I personally do not see any danger either in Aliyev's election, or in a kind word about Kunayev. By the way, I have had an opportunity to meet both of them in the past, and I must say that we still suffer from a prevalence of black-and-white opinions among the people. This is completely wrong, because the world is multi-colored. We have this habit of a purely class consciousness—you are either a friend or an enemy; and if an enemy does not surrender, he is to be destroyed...

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] You have applied for clemency. If your request is met, where do you see yourself in the future?

[Vyshku] I have stated that if the decision is positive I intend to return to Moldavia and will make my contribution to the attainment of civic accord. Of course, I would like very much for my knowledge as an economist to be put to good use.

If my ideas are needed, I will help whatever power is in Moldavia at the time. If not—I will live in the woods and be a beekeeper.

### Growing Nostalgia for Brezhnev Era Viewed

91UN0942B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 4

[Article by Arkadiy Vaksberg under general heading "What They Are Saying Today": "The Shadows Return: Instead of an Afterword"]

[Text] Against the background of universal bitterness and intolerance, the headline above the interview published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA stands in pleasant contrast. It says: "I Do Not Blame Anybody."

Who is this person, so loudly declaring his charitable attitude? He is a former mayor of Sochi, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Voronkov, once sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment for bribe-taking; he was the subject of my essay "Screen," published—as the interviewee shyly acknowledged, in "one of the popular newspapers." That is, to put it simply, in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (No 46, 1980).

Voronkov, of course, is not the first: Shadows of the past are coming out of the darkness, one after another, reminding us that not only do they possess powerful vitality, but they also suffer from an indomitable thirst for revenge. But even in comparison with them Voronkov's unexpected renaissance is astounding in its aggressiveness, and its conviction that he will be believed.

Our mayor is not just "one of the insiders" whom, as he maintains, the System decided to throw to the wolves. Far from ONE! Among the affected (but, alas, not

defeated) high-ranking extortioners are tens of Krasnodar Kray party functionaries and apparatchiks: Merzlyy and Tarada, Taranovskiy, Sushkov, Karnaukhov... And Rytov, an all-Union deputy minister with whom this chain was deliberately broken. In essence, this was the first—and the last!—mafiosa group from the upper echelons that was unmasked precisely as such. Having realized where escalated unmaskings might lead, the power dealt the unmaskers a cruel blow.

Of course, the system did not “throw to the wolves” any of “its own”: It was fighting for them, desperately and mercilessly, sweeping away those who were trying to carry out their professional duties. And when it “let off steam,” it made some let go of life. Let us recall, for instance, Deputy Procurator General V.V. Naydenov: It was Voronkov and his criminal gang that caused Victor Vasilyevich's suffering—a fact that was also related in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* (No 44, 1987). Among others, the essay “Screen” contributed to the wrath that befell him: Oh, how the System wished to keep the secret from coming into the open!

Then why has it become necessary now to resuscitate one of the few people who were punished for committing real—not imaginary—crimes? The crimes that turned into tragedy for a great country plundered, deceived, and humiliated by its “bosses.” The intent of the interview is clear. It is not accidental that the article underscores twice—and quite persistently—that Voronkov was released “recently,” “Not too long ago...” These notions do not fall under clear criteria, so let us translate them into a more precise language of numbers: Voronkov had been incarcerated for seven years two months and 23 days. He was released by the decision of the Tagilstroevskiy Rayon People's Court on 23 June 1986. Is it long ago? Or not too long ago? In comparison with eternity it is less than a fleeting moment.

A legally released person regains all civil rights; therefore, there is no need for him to disprove the rumors that he walks his dog, drinks Danish (!) beer, and get his suntan on Sochi beaches. Neither the first, the second, nor the third are proscribed to him by law, so let him live in peace and quiet under the protection of the law that defends his (and our!) rights.

But that is the point: He does not want this—to live his life peacefully and quietly. Neither he, nor the others of the same ilk. There are at least two very serious circumstances that stimulate their efforts.

First, and obvious for everybody, is the total and irreversible loss of trust in the “current ones,” the too stunning—on the philistine, everyday level—contrast between what has been and what has become. As one of the former said in court—obnoxiously, but somewhat truthfully: “When we took bribes, everybody could have sausage; now, neither you, nor we can have it. Go and ask the people what they prefer.” It is not too hard to disprove this logic, but still not for those who brought the

country to the state of total impoverishment. The shadows begin to look better than those “out in the sun...”

The second, and no less obvious, circumstance: The “has-beens” realized that the new power is in panicky fear of personal unmaskings. It does not dare to take the deeds of all top nomenklatura members to the end prescribed by the law. Everyone—no matter who they might be. As our friends, until recently, from the former common “camp” are doing! They do not get ceremonious with Zhivkov, Honecker, and such. But they, of course, do not tell us what to do. We have enough of our own decrees.

What else is the power counting on? On the unspoken statute of limitations (“let bygones be bygones”). On the fact that for society, crushed under the burden of today's worries, it is a “back burner issue.” The power appeals to tolerance, tries to convince us that revenge is not humane. It knows perfectly well that punishment for the committed evil and for the abuse of force is not at all a sign of revenge but of justice. That punishment cleanses, not embitters. That it reinforces trust in both the law and in itself—the current power. But it also knows something else: A public trial may lead to undesirable (undesirable for the power, that is) revelations, to attract attention to not only those who have already been removed, but also to those who are still at the helm. Today. And even tomorrow. Therefore those who have been “thrown to the wolves,” and here I agree with them completely, believe that this is not fair. Moreover: They believe that they will still be needed. That the hour of their triumph will come, perhaps soon.

Kunayev, not prone to excessive speeches, is making the rounds of his comrades-in-arms.

All Rashidov's men are flexing their muscles.

Medunov thunders at the “detractors” and “slanderers.”

Aliyev has acquired dual deputy immunity.

Grishin accepts kisses from his devoted fans.

The master of radiant plots, Churbanov, is all in the ecstasy of reminiscences (“all that was”).

Vyshku is busy drafting projects for our revival. Now it is Voronkov...

Who is next?

### Present Nostalgia for Stalinism Examined

91UN0921A Moscow SYN OTECHSTVA in Russian  
No 1, 4 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by N. Sergeyev, under rubric “Resonance”: “Back to Stalin?”]

[Text] The short interview with the president of the “Stalin” society, I. Dzordzhadze, published in the weekly, SYN OTECHSTVA, No. 37, 1990, struck an



unexpected chord. Also unexpected was the number of responses and the extraordinarily unanimous accord with which readers express their unqualified support of the program for resurrecting Stalinism espoused by the founders of this society, followers of "the Leader for all times and of all peoples." "Back to Stalin!" was the theme of all these letters. Of course, not to the gulags or to repressions, but definitely to Stalin's law and order, to his ideology, and to Stalinist methods of governing the country.

Virtually every letter asks how to become a member of the society, about its by-laws, and in what cities branches can be found. Virtually every letter expresses faith and conviction that only by restoring Stalinism, with its clarity of goals and objectives and rigidly controlled operation of all the machinery of government, can we extricate the nation from its current dead-end and return her to her former power and glory.

"Give us a single five-year period and a Stalinist constitution, and we will resurrect the nation, we will extricate it from the crisis it is in today," V. Romanov, a reader from Cheboksar, repeats the words of the society's president. "I am certain that millions of our fellow citizens and foreign friends will respond: 'Give it to us!'"

"Give it to us so that the kind of patriots of the Socialist Fatherland that arose in our generation can again be born in the younger generation.

"Give it to us so that the love and friendship among all nationalities that existed during the Great Patriotic War can again exist.

"Give it to us so that the shelves of the stores can be filled with the food and other products that are needed, and so that the Soviet people each spring can joyfully hear the news that prices have been reduced.

"Give it to us to protect honest people from the swindlers and bandits terrorizing society."

This theme is further developed by readers I. Sidorov (from Yakutsk), V. Sergeyeva (from Kuybyshev), and V. Dmitriyev (from Komrat).

"I vote in favor of a Stalinist constitution," writes Ye. Chislova. "It must be done, and not merely for a five-year period but for an indefinite period, since this constitution would guarantee good organization and law and order, comradely labor, and a respectable life. The only ones who have anything to fear from it are opportunists, manipulators, speculators, and other criminals who do not want to work, but to live off others instead."

What is this? Nostalgia for the past, relapse by old "Stalinists" into heretofore concealed yearning for the just and unjust deeds they did in the past for the sake of the "teachings of the Leader" and for their lost privileges? But what deeds could, for example, worker N. Lebedev from Volgodonsk have done and what privileges could he have been granted, who in that long ago time was a "militant Komsomol, an activist secretary of

the All-Union Komsomol organization and a chairman of the All-Union Red Banner Volunteer Organization for Support of the USSR Armed Forces for his raykom, and who in the time of Stalin, in his youth, was imprisoned for borrowing 3.5 kilograms of grain from the kolkhoz? Or 46-year-old N. Aleksandrov from Krasnodar, a class II disabled veteran, a lawyer, and a retired officer? No, even if one studies the letters with great care, there is no hint, either in the lines or between them, that their authors are among those who, during the ill-famed period of the iron hand, implemented the ideas or objectives of the "Leader." The letters are from laborers, agricultural workers, housewives, and rank and file veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

But what could remain, after our celebrated debunking of the cult of personality, which amazed the world, after the endless exposures of the atrocities performed in our country for decades that could so attract these people to Stalinism? And has not this society with the odious name grown up today precisely because everything is permitted, everything is possible? One would think that the real issue is not Stalinism itself as an ideology, nor image of the "Leader" who embodies for many the image of the statesman concerned with the welfare of his nation and its citizens. The real issue is the dislocations and costs of democracy, into which we plunged without looking back, without possessing either the requisite experience, or the traditions, and without having prepared legal, governmental, social, or other structures that could restrain our nation from slipping into anarchy and chaos.

The euphoria engendered by the first few tastes of freedom has long since passed. For the majority of the population, hopes and anticipation of rapid changes have turned into empty daydreams. Many of the radicals and democrats who made so many promises and came into power in the Councils at all levels have as yet only succeeded in the area of the destruction of the machinery of government, which although unsuitable was still reliable, without putting any efficient machinery in its place. In record time, people have found themselves abandoned on the verge of destitution, approaching a point beyond which there is complete uncertainty, unpredictability, anxiety for the fate of their children. And all this is occurring to the unavoidable accompaniment of empty words, ubiquitous meetings, and rampaging crime. Is it surprising that many, growing disillusioned with the lines of embittered people and shortages of everything, turn their attention to the past, when people lived, if not well, at least completely tolerably, when faith was alive, and ideas actually were implemented at the level of concrete actions. Given the conditions that hold today, the formation of the "Stalin" society was inevitable, if only as a sort of elemental protest against the grotesque phenomena that our democracy has been unable to avoid.

I think that such societies will spring up one after another, will gather strength and weight in society. What should our attitude to them be? That is a matter for each individual. But sooner or later we will have to reckon



with this phenomenon, which for now is still new. And we will have to take it seriously. That is what the letters to the editor imply.

"The President of the 'Stalin' society says, 'There are many who will follow us..' Will they really?' This was the

headline under which the interview that had such great reader response, was published. Commenting on this headline, reader, Z. Makarova from Tambov writes, "Yes they will! Not just thousands, millions."

And indeed they will.. They are already doing so.

## Baltics

### Estonian 'National Unity' Government Proposal

91UN0769A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
20 Nov 90 p 3

[Proposal by J. Allik et al.: "Objectives of the National Unity Government"]

#### [Text] Statement

*Ever since the joint statement was published on November 4, meetings have been held between the undersigned and leaders of most of Estonia's political parties, several district elders and mayors, and influential political figures for the purpose of exploring the possibility of forming a National Unity Government in Estonia.*

*We have now worked out the objectives which we are submitting for consideration to the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Committee, to all political parties and the public of Estonia.*

**Jaak Allik, Sirje Endre, Siim Kallas, Kaido Kama, Tunne Kelam, Toivo Kuldsepp, Vardo Rumessen, Indrek Toome**

**Tallinn, November 18, 1990**

#### To the Estonian Supreme Soviet, the Estonian Committee

Persuant to the March 11, 1990 declaration of the Estonian Committee regarding restoration of legal state powers and the March 30 resolution of the Estonian Supreme Soviet regarding Estonia's statehood status and recognition of the Estonian Committee as the entity authorized to restore legal state powers to the Republic of Estonia

—we propose to the Estonian Supreme Soviet, as the representative body of Estonia's population, and to the Estonian Committee, as the representative body of citizenry of the Republic of Estonia, that they discuss and take a stand on the following objectives of the National Unity Government:

1. The legal status of the National Unity Party (RUV) is derived from the concept of a transition period declared by the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Committee. Since RUV is being formed under conditions of continuing occupation by the Soviet Union, and in a situation where the Soviet Union has control of the territory and borders of the Republic of Estonia, RUV cannot represent the Republic of Estonia in its *de jure* form. RUV will be appointed by the Estonian Supreme Soviet. The Estonian Committee will recognize it as a Transitional Government.
2. Agreements entered into by RUV are not binding to the Republic of Estonia being restored. RUV will be authorized to enter into agreements for finite terms only, up to the end of the transition period, provided such agreements would contribute to the restoration of the Republic of Estonia, and that they

would have the approval of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Committee. RUV will not enter into agreements changing the statehood status of the Republic of Estonia.

3. The foreign policy of RUV calls for a continued stance of not recognizing Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union until the occupation has in effect ended. RUV solicits international support to restoring Estonia's independence. RUV is not asking for the statehood of a transitional Estonia to be recognized.
4. The objective of RUV's eastern policy is to have the Soviet Union own up to the 1940 occupation and annexation of the Republic of Estonia, with all of its implications, that must lead to concrete steps toward restoring independence to the Republic of Estonia.
5. The main objective of RUV is the restoration of the Republic of Estonia based on legal continuity, which constitutes the only guarantee for preserving the ethnicity, language and culture of Estonia. At the same time, RUV will make use of the existing autonomy within the framework of the Soviet Union to do everything possible toward a gradual expansion of such autonomy.
6. Upon restoring legal state powers to the Republic of Estonia RUV, through its action, must guarantee the civil rights of its citizens. The right to participate in the restoration of the Republic of Estonia can also be exercised by citizens of other states who are permanent residents of Estonia and who wish to apply for citizenship of the Republic of Estonia. RUV assumes the responsibility of guaranteeing, to all inhabitants of Estonia, the socio-economic rights and human rights deriving from the UN Human Rights Declaration and general humanitarian principles. RUV will not tolerate any ethnic oppression or racial discrimination under its administration.
7. For all practical purposes, RUV is bound by the territorial integrity of the Republic of Estonia, as defined by the 1920 Peace Treaty of Tartu. RUV's activity is geared to the gradual restoration of Estonia's governmental order over the entire territory of the Republic of Estonia. The state borders of the Republic of Estonia can be changed only by its citizenry, after the legal state powers have been restored.
8. RUV calls for an actual end to the occupation within the territory of the Republic of Estonia. To accomplish this, one must first determine the status of the Soviet forces in Estonia, along with the size and local distribution of its personnel. The gradual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Estonia must be preceded by locating them and neutralizing them politically.
9. RUV's efforts are geared to stopping the activity of repressive organs of another state (KGB among them) in Estonia, to curbing corruption, restoring a normal judicial system and guaranteeing the inviolability of civil and property rights.

10. Placing an emphasis on decentralization of power and on activating a market economy, RUV must guarantee state regulation of the economy in areas where other methods have not yet taken effect. Restructuring of the economy must proceed smoothly and gradually, according to an integrated model of economic strategy. In this context, it is important that the actual economic situation be disclosed and all practical measures applied to protect the people undergoing an economic crisis.

The National Unity Government is not seeking the role of an exclusive ruler of Estonia's society, but will carry out the will of the people, as expressed in a parliamentary fashion through the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Committee. RUV will not interfere with the operations of media and will, in the performance of its tasks, respond to constructive criticism from the public.

The program and the personnel of RUV call on the different political forces to unite in the spirit of national unity and cooperation, so as to achieve a maximum balance of social forces in Estonia and thus ease the impact of the crisis.

RUV can operate successfully only by relying on democratic local governments, and by maintaining trustful and close collaboration with representative bodies, parties and political movements. The domestic policy crisis in Estonia can be overcome only by relying on the principles of democracy.

### **Estonian Opinion Poll on Political Parties**

91UN0686A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
25 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Indrek Pauts and Olev Sild: "Whose Nerves Are Being Trodded On?"]

[Excerpts] With the help of local enthusiasts from the Estonian Citizens' Committees a public opinion survey involving all administrative districts was conducted by the undersigned over the last two weeks of September. Its objective was to study the opinion of the Estonian-speaking adult population, especially on the issues relating to internal politics.

The survey was conducted partly over the telephone (37 percent) and partly by means of personal interviews. The minimum sample size was 743 which would guarantee at least one response for each thousand of adult Estonians. [passage omitted].

Men comprised 52 percent of the respondents, women 48 percent. Youths between 16 and 20 made up eight percent and respondents of retirement age 18 percent. Workers and service personnel made up 53 percent, specialists 15 percent, foremen seven percent and members of intelligentsia nine percent of the respondents. [passage omitted].

Our efforts to evaluate the sample and results obtained from the study allow us to say that even though the sample was markedly skewed toward the more educated segment of the population, the results are representative of the Estonian-speaking population of Estonia.

Let us start with the most difficult question for the people:

### **Is our leadership on target?**

Attitudes regarding performance by the leadership organs of the Republic of Estonia are reflected in Table 2. Let's face it, performance ratings for the republic's leadership have fluctuated throughout the period of transition. If in the spring (June) the respondents rated the performance of the Supreme Soviet at 3.55 points, then by the fall (September) there had been a marked drop to 2.92. Same is true of the performance rating given to the Estonian Committee that had dropped (from 3.13 in June) to 2.99 by the fall. The government of Edgar Savisaar, however, found not only mercy but also recognition in the eyes of the people. The government's performance ratings were considerably higher in September than those given to the same representative body on two previous occasions, and that in all of the regions, except for the city of Tartu.

What are the political forces behind the ratings obtained for the government of the Republic of Estonia? The results of the survey indicate that the political climate of Estonia is still being formed by different movements, and that the role of political parties in shaping public awareness is still rather limited. [passage omitted].

The 24 percent support figure for the ERSP [Estonian National Independence Party] seems to be an exception. How could this be explained? First, ERSP has been able to create a well defined image for itself. As a party of protest, trail blazer of the freedom movement, and the bearer of an unenviable burden, it has earned the support of the people. Secondly, by getting "negative" attention, ERSP has been getting free advertising in the media. Thirdly, the format of the survey also has a bearing here since respondents do not have a crib sheet to which they could refer for the names of the parties. The absence of a given party listing also accounts for the 43 percent response between the "don't know" and "don't support any party columns."

The distribution of political forces by those supporting different movements was delineated more clearly. Some 30 percent of the respondents named the People's Front first among the movements they support. The Greens were mentioned first in 16 percent of the instances, and both the EKK/EK [Estonian Citizens' Committees and the Estonian Committee] and EMS [Estonian Heritage Society] in 12 percent. [passage omitted].

One of the key issues of Estonia's internal and foreign policy during this year's spring-into-summer season has been the cooperation between the Supreme Soviet and

the Estonian Committee. Passing judgment on the relations between these two representative bodies should be left, first and foremost, to the people involved. More than half of the respondents consider these relations to be disturbingly messed up. This knowledge weighs especially heavily on the fairer sex, out of whom 60 percent (51 percent of men) think that relations are much too edgy already. The ones most disturbed by this, accounting for 66 percent of their total, are women between the ages of 31 to 50, who are at the peak of their life and work-cycles. It pays to know whose nerves are being trodded on! [passage omitted].

**Which of the two is seen by the people to be the bigger culprit in the mounting of tensions between the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Committee?**

Half of the respondents find that they are "equally guilty." The other half is divided more-or-less equally for or against either the Supreme Soviet or the Estonian Committee. By the regions, however, the results are significant: the southern Estonians, headed by Tartu, tend to defend the honor of the Estonian Committee, while the islanders along with the northerners, headed by Tallinn, tend to line up behind the Supreme Soviet. Whatever the case, it is significant that every fifth respondent (19 percent) has reached the conclusion that the two representative bodies should oppose each other openly.

(To be continued).

# **Estonian Committee, Supreme Soviet Conflict Viewed**

91UN0686B Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
26 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Indrek Pauts and Olev Sild: "Whose Nerves Are Being Trod On?" Part 2.]

[Excerpts] The survey also touched on several other issues of the political life. [passage omitted].

Due to the colonial policies of superstates, Estonia is caught in a situation that has required it to form two representative bodies to carry out the different functions of Estonia's political life. The Estonian Committee is there to keep an ever-watchful eye on the interests of the occupied Republic of Estonia, while the Supreme Soviet, dealing in political realities, has to be ready for step-by-step compromises with our big neighbor to the East that often run the risk of becoming permanent and posing an irreversible threat to the interests and the very existence of the Estonian people, now being protected by the Estonian Committee's stand for a *de jure* restoration of the Republic of Estonia. Which, in your opinion, is the main cause for mounting tensions between the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Committee (1) The politics dealing with these compromises and possible dangers or simply (2) Mistakes in the activity of our politicians and their personal interests?

Table 4 (In percentages)

	1	2	1+2	Do Not Know	Do Not Wish To Reply
Estonia	27	43	24	6	1
Northern Estonia	26	46	22	5	1
Southern Estonia	27	40	26	7	0.4
Tallinn	25	50	22	2	1
Tartu	24	36	36	2	2
Saaremaa	30	46	6	18	—
Harjumaa	29	42	24	3	2
Võrumaa	22	43	31	4	—

**Estonian political life is making due progress toward its objective—the elections for the State Council. Who, in your opinion, has the right to participate in State Council elections? Out of the following, please pick those to whom you would give the right to participate in these elections:**

1. All citizens of the Republic of Estonia and their descendants.
2. All Estonians now living in Estonia, even if they are not citizens of the Republic of Estonia.

3. Including all non-Estonians now living in Estonia, who have applied and expect to have their citizenship by the day elections start.
4. All citizens living in Estonia, except military personnel representing the Soviet Army.
5. Including military personnel mentioned above.

Table 5 (In percentages)

	11	11+2	11+2+3	11+2+3+4	11+2+3+4+5	Do Not Know
Estonia	23	22	48	5	0.5	1
Northern Estonia	21	22	50	5	0.8	1
Southern Estonia	25	22	47	5	0.3	0.4
Tallinn	21	22	51	3.6	1.3	0.8

	11	11+2	11+2+3	11+2+3+4	11+2+3+4+5	Do Not Know
Tartu	26	14	48	11	0.8	—
Saaremaa	6	18	66	6	2	2
Harjumaa	28	29	39	2	0.6	1
Võrumaa	24	31	43	2	—	—

The line between who should be given participation rights in the State Council elections and who should not emerges quite clearly from the data in Table 5: Participation rights should be given to all who have recognized the Republic of Estonia and who, by living in Estonia today, have involved themselves legally with it.

It is somewhat surprising to note that only half (50 percent) of those surveyed (see Table 6) would allow election participation to those citizens of the Republic of Estonia who live outside of Estonia. [passage omitted].

An overwhelming majority of respondents from all regions favor amending the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia to reflect the new realities of family life, including the crumbling of its traditional structures, the changing role of women, and the political realities attributable to the occupation.

#### **How long should a non-Estonian live in Estonia to become a citizen of the Republic of Estonia?**

The arithmetic average of all the replies (15.5 years) coincides quite closely with results of earlier studies conducted in Estonia, while the averages for different regions vary within the span of two years.

Question number 14 states that **fifty years of Soviet occupation have caused great moral and material damage to the people of Estonia, and asks for the respondent's attitude to seeking indemnity for material damages.**

An overwhelming majority of those surveyed maintain that damages caused by the occupation should be indemnified. This feeling is particularly strong among the much-suffered population of Võrumaa.

**The last question asked for an opinion about the action of the Defense League that took place on the eastern border of the republic on September 2.**

Despite the political ruckus caused by this action, the "prank" received a positive rating, on balance. Some 21 percent of respondents in Estonia considered it the right thing to do, while 32 percent considered it right rather than wrong. One should also mention that, in the case of this question, the replies were influenced somewhat by the nature of a telephone survey itself, that may have caused the support for this undertaking to go up as much as five percent.

#### **Estonian Green Party Opposes 'Coalition Statement'**

91UN0768A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
13 Nov 90 p 3

[As released: "Statement of Estonian Green Movement's Green Party"]

[Text] The Estonian Green Party's evaluation of the political situation is not based on politicians or parties, but on the plight of the land and the suffering of its people. The political and moral crisis has been brought about by ambitions of individuals and conflicts between the parties. This is known as a power struggle. History shows that the pursuit of power has always overruled the best of intentions. Power can be sweeter than ideals. This is like a law of nature that one has to know and reckon with.

The Estonian Green Movement, within its rights as a political party, was the first to join the People's Front as a partner in a coalition to form the government. Considering the dire circumstances of the land and the people, the Green Party supports primarily those who do something real or bring about change—such as the executive power in the form of state or local government. Those who make something have earned the right to make mistakes. The verbal criticism of talkers, however, can turn into a political game.

The Supreme Soviet hires and fires the government, by picking the best performers. Let us leave it up to them. The Green Party has nothing to say to the eight aspirants who came out with the statement. They have brought nothing to the government besides their personal aspirations. A dual government faced with three or four opposition parties is just what the empire is hoping for.

As we turn our eyes to the people, we can see that the power struggle is taking place outside of them. Having power is not as important as using it for the benefit of Estonia. More difficult times are yet to come, with real challenges awaiting us. We will touch the earth again as we did during the phosphorite war, we will listen to the voice of nature, and to that of our own conscience—only then will we find the truth and the strength to go on together.

November 10, 1990

**Estonian Conservative Party Supports 'Coalition Statement'**

*91UN0768A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
13 Nov 90 p 3*

[Release from the General Council of EKRE: "Statement of the Estonian Conservative Party"]

[Text] The general assembly of the Estonian Conservative People's Party [EKRE] supports the September 6, 1990 statement issued by EKRE's executive board expressing its lack of confidence in E. Savisaar's government and calling for the formation of a new broad-based coalition government.

The EKRE general assembly stresses that the government crisis in Estonia was not brought about by the November 4, 1990 statement issued by eight politicians. The government crisis in Estonia has been going on for half a year now, and the statement of the eight politicians offers an opportunity to get out of that crisis.

The EKRE general assembly finds that the November 4 statement helped to curb the growing threat of dictatorship and Estonian society's plunge toward an authoritarian order of government. Let us recall that the "silent era" effected by K. Päts on March 12, 1934 made it possible for the events of 1939 and 1940 to take place in Estonia (in Finland, democracy was not restricted and this is why Finland did not succumb to Moscow's ultimatum). **If such single-handed power effected in 1934 caused the destruction of the Estonian state, then now it could cause the destruction of the very concept of Estonian.**

The EKRE general assembly must note with regret that many of Estonia's parties were not yet ready to form a new cabinet. Up until now, the parties have only discussed secondary issues related to the statement. This has contributed to further splitting of the Estonian society and to the strengthening of autocratic trends. EKRE calls on all of Estonia's parties to start constructive talks about the program and staffing of the new government.

The EKRE general assembly stresses that the government crisis cannot be resolved from the top down by reorganizing the present government. **The present government cannot be turned into a coalition government by simply injecting some rightist-sounding politicians into its ranks.** That would not contribute to the development of national unity. Instead, it would only create an illusion of national unity that would add further to the internal political tensions. A coalition government can evolve only from the bottom up, based on the principle of equal partnership.

The EKRE general assembly is deeply concerned about the future of Estonia's democracy, especially in view of the dangerous single-leader ideology, fostered by the media, that is spreading among the population.

**EKRE GENERAL ASSEMBLY Tartu, November 11, 1990**

**Estonian Committee Requests Budget Allocation**

*91UN0768C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
16 Nov 90 p 3*

[Report by Political Editors: "Estonian Committee Asks for 2 Million Rubles Out of the State Budget"]

[Text] Estonian Committee chairman Tunne Kelam has turned to the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet and the government with a request that 2,153,700 rubles be allocated to them next year out of the state budget. Up until now EK [Estonian Congress/Committee] "has been sustained by allocations and grants from business firms and organizations." Mr. Kelam notes in his letter: "Currently, delegates to the Estonian Congress and members of its operating entity, the Estonian Committee, have been participating in a variety of activities on behalf of the Estonian people without receiving any compensation." Such a situation is considered abnormal.

Out of the more than two million rubles less than half is earmarked for the salary fund. Thus, Estonian Committee's chairman of the executive board would draw a monthly salary of 900 rubles, assistant chairmen would be getting 750, the eight members of the executive board 600 each, EK members (except Supreme Soviet deputies) 500, EK office manager 700, press secretary 600, personnel manager 500, two supervisors 350 each, chief accountant 600, citizen liaison manager 450 etc.

Thus, the request calls for an average salary of 550 rubles for a total of 131 full time employees. The average compensation of workers and employees in the Republic of Estonia is currently 330.2 rubles a month (including jobs in the government sector averaging 359.6 rubles). EK chairman's salary, as requested, would equal the official salaries of Edgar Savisaar and Arnold Rüütel.

Total operating expenses for the Estonian Committee are rated at 580,000 rubles (maintenance of passenger vehicles 35,000, official security 24,000, public relations expenses 50,000, long distance calls including telefax 60,000, miscellaneous expenses 25,000, special events 300,000 ...).

Renovation costs for the Estonian Committee are projected at 230,000 rubles, travel assignments at 100,000 and acquisition of inventory 170,000.

The request for money is backed up by the resolution passed at the third session of the Estonian Congress regarding "Financing the expenses of the Estonian Congress and its operating entities." This asks for a resolution to be passed by the (Republic of Estonia) Supreme Soviet that would guarantee to the EK "financing of its expenses out of the state budget until elections be held for a lawful State Council."



In a few days, the Supreme Soviet will be presented with the government's budget proposal for the coming year. That would be the time to find out whether the ministers approved Mr. Kelam's request for the two million, or left this delicate problem to be solved by the lawmakers.

### **Future Goals of Estonian Communist Party**

*91UN1019A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 31 Jan 91 p 3*

["Future Goals of the Estonian Communist Party" adopted by the 21st Congress of the Estonian Communist Party on 26 January 1991]

[Text] During 1991-1992 the Estonian Communist Party will direct its activities toward achieving the following political and socioeconomic goals:

1. Negotiations with the USSR organs of power directed at restoring the state independence of the Republic of Estonia. Definition of basic stages of the transition period.
2. Legislative activity and state policy that will ensure the widest possible support of all groups of the population for Estonia's drive for independence, ratification by the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet of international pacts on human rights, and amendment of the laws of the Republic of Estonia to accord with them.
3. Guarantees for all permanent residents of Estonia of equal socioeconomic rights. And of equal political rights for all who permanently reside in Estonia and wish to receive Republic of Estonia citizenship.
4. Agreement with the USSR Ministry of Defense on determination of the status of military units of the Soviet Army stationed on the territory of Estonia and full legal protection of youths of draft age in their relations with the Soviet Army.
5. Open opposition to the concentration of power in the hands of individuals or its monopolization by some parties.
6. Development and strengthening of such economic ties with the Soviet Union and the Union republics that ensure normal provision of goods and exchange of commodities.
7. Implementation of effective reform of government; guarantees of the financial and economic independence of volosts, cities, and uyezds to ensure decentralization of power.
8. Implementation of an antimonopoly policy and state regulation of prices on prime necessities until real competition between producers has been achieved.
9. Differentiated compensation for increased living costs to poor residents, including people with fixed incomes. The introduction of wage levels depending on education and qualifications.

10. Implementation of agricultural reform in the interests of those who work the land, with a transition to a multiplicity of structure on a voluntary basis.

11. Reimbursement for illegally confiscated property, for the most part in the form of monetary (or money-related) compensation, with the goal of preventing new unlawful actions.

12. Active opposition to speculation, corruption of the governmental apparat, and expansion of bureaucratic structures.

13. Support of the state policy of material support of Estonian national culture, science, and education (a science fund, capital for culture, etc) and encouragement by nongovernmental sources of the development of those spheres of life. Guarantees of the availability of education, culture, and medical aid for all categories of citizens. Real concern for the disabled.

14. Dispassionate study of public opinion and a process of taking it into account when making political and economic decisions. A prohibition on any state pressure on the mass media.

15. Support of everything that contributes to the formation of a younger Estonian generation that is educated, morally healthy, and dedicated to its homeland.

16. The use of the property of the Estonian Communist Party in the public interests and to assist in the formation of a multiparty system.

### **Tallinn Social-Democrats Organize**

*91P50112A Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN  
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 1*

[Article by Ille Grun: "The Tallinn Social-Democratic Organization Was Formed on Saturday"]

[Text] Social-Democrats assembled in the auditorium of the 20th Secondary School in Tallinn on Saturday. Andres Mandre, general secretary of the Social-Democratic Party of Estonia [SDPE], spoke prior to the beginning of the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to establish the Tallinn organization. As you know, the SDPE was founded on 8 September of last year after the merger of three small parties.

Sixty-two delegates, guests, and journalists were in attendance. Marju Lauristin, SDPE chairman, chaired the meeting and delivered the main report.

Vello Saatpalu became chairman of the board of the Tallinn SDPE organization. Karu Kook and Anatoliy Ovchinnikov were elected deputy chairmen. Alar Sudak became the responsible secretary. In the first of their appeals the Social-Democrats supported the referendum and called for active participation in it. In the second appeal they expressed the opinion that a price freeze will not improve the economic situation.

### Ideas About Estonia's Status Within USSR

91UN0807A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
29 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by Albert Paltser: "Some Questions Regarding Principles Proposed for the National Unity Government"]

[Text] Since I am neither a political practitioner, nor a theoretician of political science, but merely a jurist, I would just like to dwell on some of the legal aspects of the objectives put forth by the National Unity Government [RUV] (see PAEVALEHT November 20). Because we are dealing with objectives for a high institution of states rights, the government, it should be clear to all, both the people and the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, what is meant by this document. For the time being, however, a lot remains unclear. It would be salutary if the authors of the "Objectives" would find it possible to clarify the following points.

First, it is not clear to whom the document is addressed. There is no doubt that one of the addressees is the Estonian Committee. Listed as an addressee before that, however, is the "Estonian Supreme Soviet." There is no such state organ. As we know, there is the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia, whose deputies include three of the authors of the "Objectives", one of them even a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Republic of Estonia. Does the use of the "Estonian Supreme Soviet" throughout the text of the document signify non-recognition of the Republic of Estonia and the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia? In this context, the question arises: If the "Objectives" do not recognize the Republic of Estonia and the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia what, then, will be the organ that is going to appoint the RUV and that is called the Estonian Supreme Soviet in Section 1.

Does non-recognition of designations such as the "Republic of Estonia" and the "Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia" in the present situation imply that in the event RUV is formed, it would propose substituting the Republic of Estonia as the present designation of the state of Estonia with some other name? If yes, one would like to know what would be the official designation proposed by RUV for the state whose government it wants to be, and who should make that decision? Since Section 5 talks about autonomy within the framework of the USSR and the gradual growth of such autonomy then, considering that the USSR consists of union republics and autonomous republics, one wonders if the Republic of Estonia would be renamed the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic or even the Estonian Autonomous Socialist Republic. In the latter case, which Union republic would it be a part of?

Since RUV is committed to a long-term and gradual increase of autonomy of the republic (Section 5) within the framework of the USSR, would it also deem it necessary for the state, whose government it wants to be, to sign the Union Treaty prepared by the central powers

of the USSR and assume legal responsibility for the unwavering execution of everything such a treaty calls for. And, should it choose to ignore the responsibilities inherent in the treaty, how then could it claim the state to be within the framework of the USSR?

Considering the fact that RUV's "Objectives" call for the Republic of Estonia to stay within the framework of the Soviet Union over a long period of time, as can clearly be inferred from information presented in Section 8, does RUV's remark about guaranteeing the inviolability of property (Section 9) refer to socialist property, which would include guaranteeing the inviolability of property declared to be theirs by the Soviet Union? What makes this question particularly significant is the fact that the "Objectives" make no mention of state ownership reversal, privatization or denationalization.

In the context of what was said in Section 5 (activity within the framework of the USSR) one can conclude that what is called the uniform concept of economic strategy in Section 10 refers to the uniform economic reorganization concept recently approved for the entire Soviet Union by the Soviet Union Supreme Soviet. If it is some other concept that is referred to here, then how could that be implemented within the uniformity of the Soviet Union?

Section 7 recognizes the borders of the Republic of Estonia in accordance with the 1920 Peace Treaty of Tartu. What, however, should one make of the last sentence of that Section: "The state borders of the Republic of Estonia can be changed only by the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia, after the legal state power has been restored" (my emphasis—A.P.)? Since the text, in this case, refers to changing the state borders of the Republic of Estonia, and not the state borders of Estonia or the Estonian SSR after legal state power has been restored, is it really deemed necessary or even possible to change the 1920 state borders of the Republic of Estonia. Why is that necessary? Why was this sentence in the "Objectives" at all?

It is my opinion that everybody who has to decide for or against the RUV, or indeed the whole population, would benefit from knowing what the authors of the "Objectives" have to say, in concrete terms, about the legal problems outlined above.

### Estonian Politicians Rated

91UN0807B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian  
29 Nov p 2

[Article by R. Rosimannus and M. Veskimagi: "Whom Do the People Support?"]

[Text] Nine hundred and fifty nine people from all over Estonia were surveyed by the Emor Corporation between November 9 and 14, 1990. Out of the respondents, 62 percent were Estonians, 30 percent Russians, and eight

percent of other nationalities. Men made up 43 percent, women 56 percent, one percent did not specify their sex.

The survey asked respondents to express their attitudes toward 80 public figures who stand out in the contemporary political scene. The question presented was worded as follows: Below, we will give you a listing of people who are actively engaged in Estonia's political life. What is your attitude toward them, how do you support their activity in Estonian politics?

The respondents had a choice of seven options: Support completely, tend to support, indifferent, tend not to support, completely opposed, cannot tell, do not know the person. Having the questions posed in this manner enabled the respondents to express their positive, negative and neutral attitudes. Since Estonians and non-Estonians support politicians differently, two separate rankings are given below. The table shows, in percentages, the extent of supporters, opponents, and those not knowing the person listed. The rankings are based on the percentage of supporters.

Combining the results of both tables reveals Arnold Rüütel as the Estonian politician with the greatest (75 percent) support, followed by Marju Lauristin (61 percent), Endel Lippmaa (60 percent), Edgar Savisaar (57 percent) and Tiit Made (55 percent).

All politicians listed are well known to Estonians (known by more than 50 percent). The least known politician is Leo Shtarkov, chairman of the United Republican Party [Vabariiklaste Koondrakond] (not known to 42 percent) and Andrus Ristkikk, member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (not known to 40 percent of Estonians responding).

Estonian politicians are known far less among non-Estonians. Half the names listed are known to less than 50 percent of the respondents. Only six of the politicians (Lauristin, Rüütel, Väljas, Savisaar, Yarovoy and Kogan) can be considered popular among other-nationals. They are known by more than 90 percent.

Comparing the present situation to results of the survey conducted in August, there has been a considerable drop in the support of Estonians to several of the politicians. The number of supporters has gone down by 27 percent for Siim Kallas, 24 percent for Enn-Arno Sillari, 22 percent for Indrek Toome, 18 percent for Tunne Kelam, 16 percent for Jaak Allik and Ulo Vooglaid, 15 percent for Vello Pohla, 13 percent for Lennart Meri and Vaino Väljas and 11 percent for Vello Lind and Jaak Jõerüüt. Among reasons mentioned were lack of activity on the part of the politicians over the last three months (Sillari, Vooglaid, Pohla, Väljas, Jõerüüt), the continuing decline of the Estonian CP image (Sillari, Allik, Väljas), and the November 4 statement issued by the so-called Eight (Kallas, Toome, Kelam, Allik).

Support figures for the government's cabinet members participating in politics show a drop for the foreign minister, minister of agriculture and the prime minister

(Meri, Lind and Savisaar), and a gain by 11 percent for the social services and environmental ministers (Oviir and Frey).

Among other-nationals, there has been a marked (14 percent) increase in the number of Savisaar opponents, compared to August. The non-Estonian supporters of E.A. Sillari have also decreased by 11 percent.

#### Footnote

\*The Emor Corporation, Estonia's center for market and opinion research, is a privately funded corporation formed by staff members of the former Mainor public opinion research center, and dedicated to nation-wide or regional market and public opinion research in Estonia.

#### Stipulations for Estonian Decree on Immigration Presented

91UN0980A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, Jan 91  
p 9

[Article by Galina Velman, SOYUZ correspondent: "I Am Changing Moscow for Tallinn"]

[Text] On New Year's Eve the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic adopted a decree regarding the immigration quota for 1991.

In accordance with the norm set upon the government's proposal, the cities and districts [uyezds] of Estonia will be able to accept 1,290 people as residents, to be broken down as follows: Tallinn—504, Kokhtla-Yarve—280, Narva—480, Parnu—57, and Tartu—188.

The greatest population increase will probably occur in the Kharyus District, which is next to Tallinn; the quota here amounts to 110 people. The least increase will occur in the Khiymaas District; only 12 new persons will be allowed to settle on this island.

And in case the established norm for immigration is exceeded, the appropriate local administrative unit will have to transfer from their own budget to the state budget 100,000 rubles for the immigration of each person in excess of the quota. However, the following exception has been provided for here: The Department for Migration Affairs shall issue temporary and term-type visas for residence to those persons who shall come to Estonia at the invitation of competent organs of the Estonian Republic or the USSR. In excess of the quota in the procedure for the so-called "pendulum-type" migration, this department will also issue job-placement permits to seasonal workers—without granting them residence visas.

But how is it proposed to set up relations on this level with the army and with the personnel of those units [chasti] of the USSR Armed Forces stationed on Estonia's territory? Prior to concluding the appropriate agreements, it will be permitted to issue military service personnel and members of their families temporary and term-type residence visas in excess of the quota; this

shall be done at the requests of the local organs of self-government. This same procedure has also been provided for the personnel of embassies, consulates, and representative bodies, as well as for refugees and those persons requesting to be granted political asylum in Estonia.

As to the reverse process—exiting this republic—here the rules and regulations will be changed somewhat. For example, persons leaving Tallinn for good will now receive for an apartment left to the city a larger compensation—not 200 but rather 500 rubles per square meter of total living space. For space being vacated in a communal apartment, the compensation will amount to 2,000 rubles per person; for a room in a dormitory, the former inhabitants will be able to receive 1500 rubles.

I have been assured in the gorispolkom that filling out the appropriate forms for such agreements is a procedure which is free of charge and is not cumbersome. The time periods for the payments to be made are to be brief—"two months at the maximum—and you will be the possessor of a nice, round sum of money." Frankly speaking, it is difficult to imagine how a person or family could set themselves up in a new place on such a "round sum of money." It is obvious that this, aside from everything else, is restraining people from moving out; during the preceding six months only 31 families have expressed the desire to leave Tallinn voluntarily. Twenty-three apartment occupants were paid compensations, while eight waited for the prices per square meter to rise. They achieved their goal by thus waiting. But, as the saying goes, people are not flocking away from Estonia in droves. In fact, just the opposite is the case. The following messages flash now and again in the VECHERKA: "I am changing Bryansk, Pechora, Leningrad, Kemerovo, Donetsk, Moscow, etc. for Tallinn...."

Will we not have to adjust once again the decision as to the price per square meter in order to round off at a somewhat higher level the "round" sum of money?

#### **Military Call-Up Problems in Latvia Viewed**

91UN1000A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Inna Kanevskaya: "The Fall Draft Continues"]

[Text] Colonel Teyvans, deputy military commissar of the republic, reported that in January 300 young men were called up and sent to the troops; one in three of them is of Latvian nationality. A majority of draftees had been previously inducted into the alternative service. The colonel maintained that at this point they had changed their place of service without any coercion.

According to the data of Cochairwoman of the Latvian League of Women Anita Stankevich, the picture of the draft cannot be referred to as completely satisfactory. The League of Women has registered a number of cases when threats were used, as well as deception—arrival in

the apartments of "alternative-service personnel" at night, calls to the place of work of their parents, promises that they would serve only in Latvia, and so on. However, all the negative phenomena notwithstanding, the worst fears have not come true, and there have been virtually no clear-cut violations of the law.

The defense of deserters from the Soviet Army is also one of the most significant avenues of work of the League of Women. In the event assistance is genuinely needed, the organization contacts USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies and members of the independent military organization Shchit, and retains attorneys. During this month, representatives of the League of Women have already organized assistance before three tribunals, following which they have succeeded in releasing one deserter from service in the Army.

If you have problems, complaints, or suggestions associated with the service of your children, you may call the Latvian League of Women at the telephone number 210376.

#### **Latvian Front's Status, New Leadership Viewed**

91UN1049A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian No 1, 8 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Latvian People's Front Chairman Romualdas Razukas, by Yana Rubinchik: "We Shall Not Allow a Repeat of 1940"]

[Text] We had been planning on having a talk with NFL [Latvian People's Front] Chairman Romualdas Razukas about the results of the past year and his hopes for the future; but the takeover of the Press Building by the OMONovites [OMON—special purpose militia detachments] forced us to begin our discussion with that very topic:

[Razukas] I believe that the purpose of the action to seize the Press Building was to exacerbate the situation in the Republic. The Communist Party resorted to a major political provocation in the hopes that the Republic MVD or the People's Front would attempt to liberate the Press Building, and that open conflict would occur. And this would lead to the introduction of Presidential Rule in the Republic. The occupation of the Central Committee building in Lithuania, the seizure of the Press Building in Latvia, the ban on the Central Television program VZGLYAD in which Eduard Shevardnadze took part—all are links in the same chain. I was present during the telephone conversation between Dainis Ivans and Boris Pugo, who protested that he did not give the order to seize the Press Building, and accused the democratic forces of Latvia of "misappropriation" of the property of the Communist Party.

[Rubinchik] What is the NFL's tactic in the situation that has come to pass?

[Razukas] We are appealing to the people of Latvia not to give in to the provocation, and not to undertake any kind of spontaneous actions. We organized a political meeting at the Latvian CP Central Committee building, in which 20-25,000 people took part. We want to show the Soviet Union and the entire world that we shall not allow a repeat of 1940, when the Communist Party spoke out in the name of the entire nation.

[Rubinchik] Of late the people's interest in politics has fallen off. Has this had an effect on the popularity of the NFL?

[Razukas] Of course political activeness is falling off; after all, people cannot confine their interest to politics alone three years in a row. The popularity of the People's Front has not declined, but the attitude toward it has changed: the euphoria and feelings of rapture among the masses that characterized the first two years of NFL's work is no more. But is there really a political organization in Latvia whose popularity has grown in recent times?

[Rubinchik] What is it that distinguishes the new membership of the NFL Board from the preceding one?

[Razukas] Of the officials who previously served on it, only Andrey Pantaleyev and Dainis Ivans remain. This time various regions of Latvia are represented on the Board, and not just Riga.

[Rubinchik] What are your wishes for your friends in the New Year?

[Razukas] Wisdom and prudence, so as not to give in to provocations; and to treat all people with kindness, no matter what their nationality. Wisdom, in order to understand that it will not be possible to change our lives for the better in a day, nor in a year. Many of the changes will be rather painful—such as, for example, the price increase—but they are necessary.

[Rubinchik] Did you have champagne on your holiday table for New Years?

[Razukas] No. My wife is expecting a child, and this time we decided to do without alcoholic beverages. But our feelings during the Christmas and New Years holidays were very intense, like never before.

[Rubinchik] I wish you success! Thank you for the discussion.

### **Latvia's Political Factions Debate Self-Government for Riga**

91UN0994A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Tatyana Mass: "Opposite View: What To Do With the Deputies?"]

[Text] Virtually at the start of its proceedings, the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic passed, in a first

reading, the Law on Riga's Self-Government. This became a stumbling stone in the differences among the various factions of the People's Front and the Center for Democratic Initiative within the city soviet.

We call upon our readers to arbitrate the deputies' disputes by listening to the arguments presented by both sides.

**Oleg Vovk, Riga city soviet deputy, member of the TsDI [Center for Democratic Initiatives]:**

One could envy European cities which have a single boss: the municipality. In our country, where we have "all power to the soviets," a paradoxical situation has developed: the city soviet may decide, let us say, to build a public bath but is unable to do so without the permission of the rayon soviet. This means the existence of several cities within a single city. It may seem that the solution lies in abolishing the rayon soviets, as was done in Tallinn and Vilnius, and to place the entire power of the city into the hands of the city soviet.

Today, however, a state of parity exists in the city soviet: an almost equal number of votes for the TsDI and the NFL [Latvian People's Front] factions. In order for the People's Front not to lose its power in the city, a two-chamber system was invented. According to its authors, the power in the city should belong to the city soviet, consisting of two chambers. The first, consisting of city soviet deputies; the second, of deputies of the rayon soviets, elected at the sessions, 20 representatives per rayon. The city has six rayons, four of them controlled by the People's Front. A simple addition shows that even with the worst possible apportionment, the NFL would have a majority in the two-chamber city soviet.

The fighters for democracy in the People's Front are not concerned by the fact that the creation of the second chamber violated two principles of electoral law: those of direct and of equal representation.

Direct representation, because the deputies in the chamber are elected at the sessions of the rayon soviets; the equal representation is violated because the rights of a city soviet deputy, elected with 6,000 votes, and of a rayon soviet deputy, elected with 1,000 votes, become equal.

All that is left for us is to appeal to the... NFL, whose third program calls for the existence of only one soviet in the city—the city soviet.

**Andris Teykmanis, city soviet chairman, member of the NFL faction, author of the two-chamber system:**

The view of the TsDI concerning this draft bill is excessively political. I was interested above all in strictly urban problems.

Today the rayons refuse to obey the city, and the result is that in Riga there are seven equal soviets which try to



solve all problems by themselves, single-handedly. This confusion worries me more than the struggle among factions.

Indeed, Vilnius and Tallinn abolished the rayon soviets. However, they did this before the elections. Since we did not, what are we to do now with 600 rayon soviet deputies? Should we tell them, you are all free to go? Yet they too have been elected by the people and are doing extensive work: they meet in sessions, they deal with problems of housing allocations, etc.

The deputies must learn how to be deputies. To be a good person or a good family man is one thing; to be a good deputy, another. If we were to appoint new elections, two-thirds of the previous membership would find itself elected to the дума or the soviet. Therefore, in my view, it is necessary for the people to learn how to work.

What was my objective when I drafted my concept? It was necessary, somehow, to rally the soviets so that they may engage in joint work. They must realize that the city does not end with their rayon. Working in the second chamber gives the rayon soviet deputies rights but also limits their jurisdiction, for in this work there will be clashes among the interests of the individual rayons.

There will be three levels of jurisdiction: city, rayon, and municipality. The city will not have the right to interfere in rayon affairs, but in the case of its own problems which are strictly those of the city, such as transportation and land, it will have the monopoly in decisions making.

A mechanism is being drafted for protecting the deputies in the second chamber from the other deputies in the rayon soviet, should their views differ. As yet we do not know precisely how many representatives from each rayon will become members of the soviet. In my view, 10 would be amply sufficient.

The forming of the second chamber will not mark the end of the municipal reform, for it is linked to the same type of reform in the Republic. What will change will be the very structure of self-government: the executive committees, as groups of people who must exercise the power but which, in fact, exist as power organs, will be abolished. This will make the soviet cumbersome. According to our draft plan, it will deal only with very important problems such as taxes and the budget. Some of the problems will be transferred from the jurisdiction of the soviet to that of a board made up of deputies of both chambers, which will also include members of the executive committee.

This law was drafted for the transitional period. The existence of rayon soviets, which are indeed unnecessary, is not contemplated in the future.

### Director of Latvia's Department for Ethnic Issues Interviewed

91UN0994B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 4

[Interview with Vladimir Steshenko, director of the Latvian State Department for National Problems, by Nataliya Morozova: "I Am Entirely Depoliticized"]

[Text] And so, Vladimir Steshenko (born in 1944, higher education) is now the first director of the first Latvian State Department for National Problems in the past 50 years. It turns out that this man of history worked by our side in the newspaper and, several years ago, left his position as SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH deputy editor in chief. He then worked for Latinform, was most active in public affairs, and edited POISK, the all-Union newspaper. He participated in the founding of the Latvian Socialist Party and was member of its presidency.

[Morozova] Vladimir Petrovich, allow me to congratulate you on your appointment to such a high state position. How did this happen?

[Steshenko] It was about one year ago when, for the first time, Ivars Godmanis offered me this option, that the question of setting up such a committee or department arose. Recently, on 6 February, I was invited to attend a Council of Ministers meeting, at which it was decided to set up our department. My nomination was approved with virtually no objection.

[Morozova] Naturally, you left POISK?

[Steshenko] Of course, but I would like to continue to publish in order to keep my hand in writing.

[Morozova] Will you remain chairman of the Socialist Party?

[Steshenko] No. I have become totally depoliticized. For the time being I am only a member of the consultative council of the Democratic Congress, which rallies more than 30 democratic parties and movements in the country. Recently the board of our Socialist Party congratulated me on the occasion of my new position and, on my request, relieved me from my presidential duties. A person who goes to see a state official with a complaint or a suggestion should not be concerned about that official's affiliation with one party or another.

This is actually my first attempt at creating something from scratch as a government official. Let us see what will happen.

[Morozova] To the best of my knowledge, there have been other "scratches," such as the Baltic-Slavic Society, the People's Front....

[Steshenko] Yes, but I did not play first violin in those projects. For the NFL [Latvian People's Front] it was Janis Peters who brought me into the organizational committee, for which I am very grateful to him. The

cultural and educational Baltic-Slavic Society is continuing to work calmly and quietly. The Socialist Party is only beginning to set up its structures, but there are other people who will pursue this project. Most of them are Russian-language speakers and they will participate in organizing a Russian-language democratic movement in Latvia and a dialogue with Latvian democratic organizations. In my view, this left-of-center social-liberal party has a good future.

[Morozova] Tell us about the future structure of your department, its prerogatives and areas of activities.

[Steshenko] We shall not have a big staff. In addition to myself, there will be four specialists and two other people to handle supplies, bookkeeping, and finance. For the time being there is only me, and I am facing a mass of problems which I did not have to face in the past, for I then functioned within established structures.

The number one problem, naturally, is that of personnel. There are candidates, and perhaps everything will be settled by next March. For example, the applicant for the position of chief specialist is a very energetic woman, who proved herself during the electoral campaign. She authored the report to the government in which, although unfamiliar with the talks I had had with Godmanis, she suggested precisely the creation of this type of department in which we could possibly work together. Our first area of work will deal with the reception of citizens. It will involve the study of specific situations and projections, and taking steps based on complaints voiced by organizations and private individuals.

Today the most difficult matter is the Law on Languages, the implementation of which has been assigned precisely to us. Less than 1 year is left before the law becomes fully effective and so far we have not solved problems, such as training specialists and developing training methods.... Possibly, additional efforts will have to be made on the level of the Council of Ministers, and subsidies will be needed. Some changes may be necessary, for instance, in the case of Latgaliya. A particular linguistic situation exists in that zone, and should we ignore it, this could worsen the tension.

Another major problem is that of the future law on the free development of national ethnic groups and the right to cultural autonomy. There are problems of education and, particularly, the need to open a Russian school in Latvia, something which is essentially lacking today. This involves cultural problems and work with ethnic societies and communities. The state must assist them in their activities without, however, interfering in their affairs.

[Morozova] How do you feel—would it be possible to clear up some of the "trash" in the future?

[Steshenko] In another interview I already said that I am an optimistic pessimist, even if a certain worsening were to occur now on the purely political level, related to the "war between laws," and difficulties on the way to

gaining real independence. Even if a power pressure is applied from the center, with the support of some political structure in Latvia and, at any given stage, it emerges victorious, in any case it will be a pyrrhic victory and a temporary one, as the experience of Poland and Czechoslovakia has indicated.

I am confident that no mass re-emigration from Latvia will take place. Latvia has always been multinational and shall remain such. We must act in such a way that this multinationality becomes the real wealth of the Republic and work for the good of every individual and the entire nation. A great deal of work is needed to prevent interethnic problems from hindering us. There is a certain tension. The main thing is not to allow it to develop into a social conflict, although attempts at promoting such a turn of events are being made (I shall abstain from making a political assessment); there is some speculation on problems of ethnic minorities and the problems facing the Latvian people.

Today an increasing number of people are realizing the reasons for the tension. For example, one of them is the unclear status of Latvia's future independence. This problem must be resolved in time. On the one hand, however, it is necessary to pass more quickly the law on citizenship and, on the other, I would not say that the entire Latvian people is ready yet to adopt a maximally democratic form of such a law. We, journalists, must work even harder than we have in the past, to convince the people of this.

We wish to organize close relations between our department and the information media which would favor this. Everyone has already noticed that the length of radio broadcasts in Russian has been increased; the translation of the most popular programs from the Latvian has been organized. Therefore, the initial steps have been taken.

Many people are convinced that, unfortunately, these steps will be of short duration....

I respect the head of the Latvian Gosteleradio and I believe that he personally perfectly realizes that such a step cannot and should not be temporary.

The interests of the different ethnosocial groups in our country have not been harmonized. This is the legacy of a certain national policy about which more than enough has already been said and written. Today we realize that the theory of the national problem, as developed by Kautskiy, Stalin, and Lenin, failed. We shall keep crashing against conceptual and terminological confusion.

How was it possible to resolve the national problem in Latvia in 1920 and 1934, and why was it that Latvian democracy was able to create virtually ideal conditions for that time for ethnic groups to coexist? Most likely, there were two reasons. The first was Raynis' responsive heart. He did a great deal to develop the standards of the ethnic minorities. Furthermore, there already existed

international documents such as, for example, the Versailles Treaty, which regulated interethnic relations. Today in this matter we can rely on an entire packet of international documents, ranging from the Declaration of the Rights of Man to the documents of Helsinki, Madrid, Paris, and Vienna, as well as the experience of Latvia of 1934 and that of foreign countries.

We shall submit to the government specific suggestions on any problem which is within the jurisdiction of the department.

[Morozova] But would it be possible for a few persons to cope with all this?

[Steshenko] Naturally, the burden we are assuming is tremendous and I am already being described as a "kamikaze." However, if we are going toward a market system, our small group ought to be able to function successfully. Look at the British Ministry of Education: unless I am wrong, it consists of eight or nine people. Naturally, it will become necessary to set up working groups working on a contractual basis. It is precisely thus that we hope to complete the studies related to Latgaliya and implement expensive major target programs.

[Morozova] What will your first practical steps be?

[Steshenko] By the beginning of March we shall have drafted a regulation on the department and chosen our personnel. In a few days I intend to go to Vilnius for a meeting with my colleague Galina Kobetskayte, director of department such as ours in the Lithuanian government. There will also be a meeting with Eduard Kuznetsov in Estonia.

I mentioned the Law on Languages. Undesirable conflicts may break out as early as January 1992, when the law is scheduled to become effective. Since our task is prophylactic, the prevention of conflicts and injustices, we shall begin with the study of what has been done so far, the amount of appropriated funds, and their use. This has as yet to be accomplished. I am also looking for a person with legal training, under whose guidance resolutions and decisions passed by enterprises and organizations will be subjected to expert evaluation. We shall take the necessary steps if violations of the laws have been found.

[Morozova] Still, will not this be merely the latest gesture, deprived of any real content?

[Steshenko] No, we have come here precisely in order to do real work and we shall behave with dignity. We do not intend to act either as children to be spanked or as scapegoats, although whenever there is a conflict, naturally, attempts will be made to accuse us by saying that the department did not work hard enough. The decision will belong to the government. However, our department will have the right to appeal any decision which harms the interests of the population.

Feedback is of exceptional importance to us, such as letters and addresses sent to us by the people. Frequently, however, what reaches us are less facts than fears. This is understandable, and complete confidence that everything will develop normally is not to be found either among the Latvians or the non-Latvian population. And all Russian people will become the Latvians' allies only after they realize absolutely clearly that it is only jointly that something can be truly accomplished in order to have a truly democratic Latvia. We must realize that the national liberation movement is heterogeneous and that the more actively we support democratic aspirations the sooner this movement will acquire a democratic content.

[Morozova] Finally, where should one address oneself to express wishes or ideas, or else to ask for protection?

[Steshenko] We shall make our telephone number public in March, when the department will have its own premises. For the time being, letters can be addressed to the Council of Ministers of the Latvian Republic, National Problems Department.

[Morozova] Thank you for this talk.

### **Latvia's Citizens Committee Losing Support**

91UN0995D Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Boris Bakhov: "3 March: Political Extremism Is Out of Fashion"]

[Text] A meeting of the Latvian Citizens Committee took place on 18 February. Due to lack of quorum and the difference of opinions on this issue, the committee was not able to work out a definitive position on the referendum, but a considerable part of the committee is against conducting the referendum under the conditions of the "occupation regime." The meeting, however, adopted a resolution stating that each citizen of the Latvian Republic must decide for himself whether to participate in the referendum. Committee Chairman A. Irgens refused to sign this resolution, and the "intransigents" left the meeting hall during the discussion. Therefore, there is an obvious split on this most important matter in both the "right" and "left" extremist camps, since the position taken by the Latvian Communist Party on the CPSU platform is also ambiguous. On one hand, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee denies the legal validity of the results of such a poll; on the other hand, it is urging its supporters to participate in order to soften somewhat the result, which will potentially be extremely unfavorable for the Communist Party. Actually, the poll will determine with a fair degree of precision just what kind of social base the Communist Party has in the republic.

The Citizens Committee faces exactly the same problem. Being aware of the fact that because of the uncompromising policy of their republic leadership the committee is losing popularity among Latvians, rayon organizations

are increasingly less inclined to support their leaders. Evidence of this can be seen, for instance, the decision of the Saldus branch which called on the rayon population to actively participate in the poll and to vote for the restoration of a democratic and independent Latvia.

The Citizens Committee is losing support abroad as well. The World Association of Free Latvians—an influential organization of Latvian emigration—made the decision to support the poll and categorically denied an allegation that the association approves the position of the Latvian Citizens Committee.

So, is it civic accord? No. Let us be realistic—not yet. But there is a tendency toward it. Let us hope it will continue to develop.

#### New Fraction in Lithuania's Parliament

91P50116 Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian  
3 Jan 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "New Fraction in Parliament"]

[Text] Our editorial office received the following statement from a group of deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Council which included Professor K. Glavecko, A. Kuzma, B. Lubis, D. Morkunas, V. Pikturna and E. Vilkas:

The Liberal Party is an indispensable element in the grouping of political forces and a distinctive feature of European democracy. Its formation will make it possible for Lithuania's multiparty system to stand on its own two feet. Moreover, we believe that the ideas of liberalism have their most important role to play in defending the freedom of the individual and the nation, in reviving the institutions of free enterprise and ownership and in strengthening the freedom of creativity and thought. Intellectuals such as scientists, writers, artists, and others, as well as economic activists such as entrepreneurs, people of the free professions, managers, farmers, etc., are the natural bearers and defenders of the ideas of liberalism. And, at the same time, they are the most tangible workers for the creation of Lithuanian freedom and goodness. They deserve to have the type of influential organization which we believe the Liberal Union of Lithuania will become.

We are undertaking the task which is so important for Lithuania, that of securing a place for the Liberal Union in the political life of Lithuania, and would like to announce that we, together with other deputies in the Supreme Council who are members of the Union, will form the Liberal fraction.

#### Political Perceptions in Non-Urban Areas of Lithuania

91UN0993A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
2 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by V. Simonenko, special correspondent: "A Hundred Kilometers From Vilnius: At the Political Crossroads"]

[Text] The mass media have elucidated the situation in Lithuania primarily through the events in Vilnius; and from time to time they mention the other large cities. But how do people live during these unquiet, unsettled times in the remote, rural areas of Lithuania? This question is frequently encountered in letters from our readers. I spent several days in the republic's "purely rural" Anikshchyayskiy Rayon. The people living here are predominantly Lithuanians; the latter account for more than 95 percent of the total population in this rayon.

I have had occasion to visit Lithuania many times, and I thought that I had a fairly good knowledge of this region and its people; they seemed industrious, calm, affable, and friendly. During the present winter I have discovered this republic anew, so to speak....

The roads in Lithuania are suitable for driving at high speeds, and they are endless. They cover a map of this republic like a dense network, reliably connecting cities, villages, and settlements, as well as farmsteads, kolkhoses, and sovkhoses.

"Russia should have such roads." It was just as if my thoughts were being read by Povilas Matulaitis, first raykom secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform), Anikshchyayskiy Rayon. He was sitting behind the steering-wheel of the "wagon" type motor vehicle which was "eating up" the kilometers on the highway between Vilnius and Panevezhis. Lying on the back seat was a stack of freshly printed LITVA SOVETSKAYA newspapers. This publication is not, to put it mildly, "in favor" with this republic's present government and, therefore, is not recommended for distribution through the Soyuzpechat system. "To my way of thinking, if they had such roads in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian rural areas, the authorities there would not have to go around the world with an outstretched hand—something which causes our elders to shed tears when they see cartons and boxes sent to us from overseas. And none of this would have happened." He turned his gray head over his shoulder in the direction of Vilnius, where we had recently driven past the barricaded building of the Supreme Council. "Everything that happened there was not due to our good life. To a large extent, it was caused by our poverty."

*Matulaitis knows better than most Russians what kinds of roads they have in Russia. Life has beaten down and worn away this man. He was born in 1937 to a peasant family in the village of Plyushka, Radvilishkiy Rayon. His father owned 16.5 hectares of land. It is not difficult to guess that he was considered a kulak, and for this reason*

*he was sent away over a bumpy and long Russian road; he was sent together with his family to Krasnoyarsk Kray. It turned out that quite a few people like Matulaitis were in the settlement of Khabaydak, Partizanskiy Rayon—people who have been forcibly driven here from all corners of our vast country. Estonians, Kalmyks, and Koreans were living in barracks. There were, in fact, 18 nationalities in all. How were they greeted by the local inhabitants? As enemies of the Soviet regime. It was only later that life itself settled everything in place or, to put it more precisely, by work. The Matulaitis family became accustomed and acclimatized. They secured a house, bought a cow, a pair of suckling pigs, and other provisions.*

*After 10 years the younger Matulaitis returned to Lithuania. He was already 20 years old at the time, the time to go into the army. Having served a hitch, he worked for a year and a half in the civil service; and then he re-enlisted in the army. Subsequently, as an external student, he passed the military school exams and became an officer. By the way, he had joined the party when he was a soldier without concealing his "non-proletarian." He was recommended by his commanding officers.*

*Lieutenant-Colonel Povilas Matulaitis went into the Reserves as military commissar of the Anikshchayskiy Rayon.*

Why have I told you this whole story? So that the reader will understand the following point: If Matulaitis had accepted the new "rules of the game," he would have been a desirable member of the Landsbergis "team." But such as it is, he was called an "enemy of the Lithuanian people." That is a very stringent designation for an official to be responsible for. But more about that somewhat later.

In Povilas's opinion, he became secretary by chance. Prior to the split, this rayon party organization numbered approximately 2500 persons. For reasons of people's safety and security, the secretary does not want to say how many now remain. But it is a fact that in December 1989 the entire raykom apparat without exception went over to the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, or, as it is still called, the Brazauskas Party. Together with their new convictions, they also took over the old party property. And the "CPSU Platform" group was left with only two offices. It was also at that time that the Initiative Group of Communists came into being, whose membership also included Matulaitis. Did these people know what things were heading toward? They had guessed! A nationalistic psychosis had already been whipped up in the republic at that time, and the badgering of CPSU members had begun. The mass media was "dumping" all mistakes on the party and putting out versions on mass crimes committed by the Communists.

The Lithuanian Communists were faced with the following serious tasks: to prevent the party structure from utterly collapsing, to protect people from attacks, and to become a genuine alternative to the patently undemocratic procedures being imposed.

After splitting up, the Communist Party in the localities, because of increasing badgering, virtually "went underground." Therefore, Matulaitis deemed it one of his main lines of endeavor to support those persons who had fallen into "disfavor."

Meanwhile, the machine of anti-communism was rapidly gathering momentum. One of the first persons in this rayon to fall under its "roller" was Algis Yanichyus. At one time he had graduated from a zoological tekhnikum and the higher party school under the auspices of the CPSU Central Committee. He was working on one of the farms as deputy chairman for supplying farmstead-type and individual, i.e., private, farms. Unexpectedly and inexplicably his position was done away with without any reason being given. But the reason was not difficult to guess; it was his membership in the CPSU. Yanichyus was unable to find work in his own field of specialization; instead he obtained a "post" of being responsible for fire safety. The wages were not enough to support his family. And nowadays he, who is a specialist with two advanced degrees, is forced to work at washing the floors in a sports gymnasium. One must "pay" for one's convictions....

"He who is not with us is against us."—that is the principle which, as I understand it, prevails in this rayon. Moreover, it has spread very rapidly throughout this entire republic. And it is here, I think, that the time is right to tell you about my meeting with Bernardas Andrukaitis, an instructor in the territorial security department. It was he who so scathingly characterized Matulaitis as an "enemy of the Lithuanian people."

Air was blowing into one of the two rooms remaining to the Lithuanian Communist Party raykom. They were taking out jagged pieces of glass still sticking in the window frame. Lying on the table as a kind of souvenir were two large cobblestones. They seemed to pose the following rhetorical question: "Just where were the police looking?" Inasmuch as this latter institution is long gone in the rayon, and I was still unable to figure out what was taking its place under the new structures, I headed for the closest legal-type institution in the raykom—the territorial security department. By the way, I simply wanted to find out what the functions of this organization were. Matulaitis kindly agreed to take me there.

"Hello. May we come in?" Povilas, smiling broadly, swung open the door.

The reply followed immediately, as soon as the "master" of the office caught sight of his visitor:

"You may not. I will not permit it...."

I must admit that such a reception by an official was somewhat discouraging. Nevertheless, I held onto the door handle and introduced myself. To a look of silent amazement I stated the purpose of my visit.



"You have come here with this person?" And the "master" of the office nodded toward the door.

"Yes."

"And do you know that he is an enemy of the Lithuanian people?"

It was evident that my fellow-traveler had cast a shadow of doubt upon my person as well.

"Do you have your identification papers?"

I took out my editorial identification papers. The instructor studied them attentively, comparing the photograph with the "original."

"Are you a communist?" Bernardas Andrukaitis inquired, as if anticipating my question.

"Yes."

"And are not you ashamed to be in the ranks of this bloody party?"

"And what party do you belong to?"

"There can be no party members in our structures."

"Well then, what kind of activity does your department engage in?"

After a brief period of silence my fellow-conversationist remarked that he was not empowered to reply to such questions.

"Why so? Is it a secret?"

"No, but I must obtain permission from my superiors to hold a conversation with a journalist."

Andrukaitis began the process of telephoning Vilnius.

"Now, while we are waiting to be connected, let us try to solve this crossword puzzle," he politely but firmly suggested, thus circumscribing the framework of our communication.

But we did not succeed in solving the crossword puzzle. The required interurban telephone call rang out. But nobody answered at the number which he had called. And it was not until the third attempt that Andrukaitis managed to find someone. From the other end of the line the order came not to reply to the journalist's question but to re-route him, together with his questions, to Vilnius. With that we parted company.

*It is difficult after a meeting with one person to draw conclusions concerning the merits and shortcomings of a certain system, structure, or organization. Therefore, after my conversation with Andrukaitis, if it can be called that, I cannot definitively judge the department of territorial security and its civil servants. To be sure, as I have understood it, the followers of Landsbergis adhere to another principle in making their own evaluations. This may be fully and specifically judged by their attitude*

*toward the CPSU, its press, and the army. From frequent facts, all-too-often thought up, the appropriate organizational conclusions may be drawn. In sum, they boil down to "closing down," "eliminating," "expelling," etc. And one does not have to go far to find examples. Quite recently by an arbitrary decision or, more precisely, by an order a stop was put to the publication of all newspapers belonging to the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Radio Taryba Lietuva because they supposedly belong to an "organization not registered in Lithuania."*

*It is important to note what happened in Anikshyayskiy Rayon within a week after the tragic events which occurred in Lithuania's capital. People responded with heartfelt pain to the shots which resounded around the television tower. In contrast to many journalists, I do not intend to categorically assert who fired the bullets which killed people. This matter can and should be analyzed and settled only by an investigation and a court. But I would like to provide some thoughts about something else—about those events which have remained outside the competence or purview of a lawcourt.*

*A few days before the fateful shots were fired V. Landsbergis called upon the population to defend and protect democracy, which, as it later turned out, was somehow concentrated primarily in Lithuania's parliament building. The voice of the Supreme Council Chairman resounded several times over the radio: "Lithuania is in danger! We must save the republic!" He appealed to the public and to the Sajudis Sejm [parliament]. He called for Sejm to be encircled and protected (along with the television studio, the television tower, and other important facilities) by a living ring. The radio and the local newspapers conveyed these calls to the remotest corners of Lithuania.*

And people did respond—some voluntarily, others under pressure. Buses filled with defenders drove into the capital from practically all corners of the republic. On the first day about 10 buses filled with rural inhabitants left from the Anikshyayskiy Rayon alone. The following question arises: How and by what means were the peasants supposed to protect and defend their democratic parliament? And did Landsbergis and his entourage think about this? To put in bluntly, you do not just oppose with bare hands tanks, VTR's [armored personnel carriers], and the soldiers of the "occupation army," which had supposedly been directed to destroy the democratic gains and establish a military regime in Lithuania.

Did the chairman of the Supreme Council understand what he was calling upon his fellow-countrymen (whose nerves were at the breaking point) to do? But perhaps he and his "team" were consciously provoking a conflict-type situation. Could this be the case? They most likely understood that they would not avert a loss in any outcome. And then the blame for what happened would

be heaped on their ideological opponents—the Communist Party, the military, and Moscow. And the Lithuanian parliament, together with its leader, would strengthen their own seriously shaken position at such a price.

*After the events which occurred on the night of 12-13 January the telephone calls to Matulaitis became more frequent. The things that they threatened to do to him! To hang him, to shoot him, and to deal roughly with his family. And it would be one thing if he alone were to hear these things! However, when Povilas was not at home at night, his wife would lift the telephone receiver and hear something like the following: "Tell your husband that his end is at hand." Later his ninth-grade son heard the following "monologue" intended for his father: "We will settle old scores with you; your hands are bloody!" Matulaitis's daughter was informed that she could not come to work after 29 May inasmuch as her position had been eliminated, even though Dayla Pranskyavichena has a small child, and the KZOT [Labor Law Code] prohibits such dismissals from work.*

And you know what tangled webs life sometimes weaves! Dayla's husband Aydas differs in his convictions from his father-in-law; he is more inclined toward the positions taken by Sajudis. After the call by radio he voluntarily went to safeguard the Lithuanian parliament.

Furthermore, as I understand it, the issue of the protection of people's rights and Lithuania's proclamation of itself as a democratic state remains an open question. Obviously there are more important tasks, such as creating structures for the police and the department of territorial security, the press, and a carefully regulated ideological course, as well as the return of land and other property to the former owners who lost it after 1940. By the way, as far as I understand it, the category of former owners in accordance with the present-day republic-level laws, also includes...Matulaitis—the secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party raykom.

On the road to one of kolkhozes to us a woman hitched a ride in a motor vehicle; she had come to the village to see her own relatives. She was related to Belauskas—the former chairman of the village soviet. Nowadays this position is called a "vershaytis," as it was in bourgeois Lithuania. Our fellow-traveler told us that in the autumn Belauskas will be forced to vacate the house in which he has been living. The former owner has been found, and he will be moving from Kaunas. Whether he actually moves into the house or not is a secondary matter, but the living space will have to be thoroughly cleaned.

"Did you hear that?" Matulaitis asked me after the woman had left us. "You wanted to find out what the common people are thinking about concerning the present-day situation. Well now, you heard it. By the way, is today Saturday?" We drove to one more place....

Soon we drove up to a two-story building. Situated on the first floor was an industrial-goods store with empty

counters and shelves. Near the cash register three likeable salesgirls were carrying on a conversation. There were practically no visitors or customers. But it was noisy on the second floor. Here there was a predominance of the male contingent. As I understood it, many persons knew Matulaitis. Some broke into smiles, while others shook hands in greeting. When we took our seats at a little table, a strong young lad sat down with us. He addressed us in Lithuanian, but upon finding out that I was a Moscow journalist, he immediately switched to Russian and began speaking as if to an old friend.

"There is no calmness or tranquility in our souls. Do you understand how things were previously? It is springtime, and so we have to get the equipment ready—to plow and to sow. But nowadays you think: Is it worth it to do all this? We are all in the kolkhoz. Our place of employment is there. So is it worth doing all this when you do not know whether we will be chased out of here or not? And, in general, a strange sort of situation has come about. Formerly everybody was forced to join kolkhozes. Many persons became accustomed to them. And it is, to a large extent, due to them that we began to live so well. Just look at what houses were built! And almost every one has a car. We have our own, farmstead-type system. Do we need anyone to provide us with fodder or feed? And suddenly they want all of us to become private farmers. Well, let anybody who wants to become one. But not absolutely everybody...."

Having heard their comrade speaking Russian, two more lads approached our table. They stopped by, listened for a while, and then joined in the conversation.

"Does the peasant have to change his psychology 180 degrees again? Are we like rabbits being subjected to experiments? Over there in the parliament they adopt a law, even though they could not care less about it. Have they really thought about what I would need in order to become a private farmer?"

"There is no stability, understand? No stability—that is the entire trouble. For example, I have a brother. His term of service was up a year ago. And so one government says: 'Go!,' the other one says: 'Don't go!' When are they going to settle it among themselves? Only if you write this down, do not give our names. You are leaving, but we have to live here. We would be put on a 'list.' And so our mother sewed a bag for my brother. It was so nice and white. She put everything necessary in there. The only trouble is that now we do not know whether he will go into the army or into prison with that bag. And my brother himself says the following: 'If only I had already served my year!'"

I listened to these thoughts from the village's inhabitants, and I thought as follows: "What are they guilty of? Why has democracy, about which Lithuania's present government talks so loudly, become such a regime for them? Why are people afraid to give their own names? Why are those persons who profess other views suddenly declared

to be outlaws? Is it possible that we have not passed through all of this? Can it really be that life has not taught us anything?"

I recall a conversation which took place just before my departure. Having found out that a Moscow correspondent had arrived in this rayon for the first time in many years, local inhabitants began to seek meetings with me.

"Several days ago somebody phoned me," Sofya Chaponene told me. "The voice sounded like an acquaintance. But so far I have not been able to place it. The voice said the following: 'Your time is up, and you have very little left. You are going to be shot as a communist.' And I have been in the party since 1946. Before I had a chance to say even a word in reply, they hung up on me. After two days they called me up again and said: 'We know where you live, and so your days are numbered.' And again they hung up on me. Word of honor, I began to be afraid of going out onto the street. Certain women would come up to me. By the way, they were Lithuanians, and I am Russian, though born here. They would ask: 'Where should I write?' But how should I know?"

How I would like to believe that these shameful threats are by some sort of lunatic—merely isolated instances. How I would like to believe that a woman whose only concern should be for her grandchildren is "laying it on a bit thick." But.... Lying in front of me is a noteworthy document. Let me cite just a few sentences from it.

...In Alitus during a meeting attended by the followers of Landsbergis a correspondent of the newspaper ALITUS NAUNOS was summoned to witness physical punishment being meted out to Subachene, the first secretary of the party gorkom.

...In Uteny Communists do not spend their nights at home. Young persons have come and threatened death to I. Zhemaytis, the secretary of the party organization at the Daugilyay Kolkhoz.

...Unknown persons have presented a demand to the secretary of the Pasvalskiy Communist Party raykom that he cease his party activity. Otherwise he will be placed on a blacklist of "enemies of the people."

...A demand has been made of V. Renkyavichius, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, that he give up his awards and repent the fact that he fought on the side of the occupation army.

...Vilnius schoolchildren were ordered to make drawings about the aggression of the Soviet Armed Forces, "marching out of children's hearts...."

In short, is this democracy in action...?

## RSFSR

### Silayev on Career, RSFSR Government

91UN0967A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, Jan 91 pp 4-5, 9

[Interview with I.S. Silayev by Vladimir Patsiya: "Ordeal by Government"]

[Text] Ivan Stepanovich Silayev was born on 21 October 1930 in the village of Bakhtyzino in Gorkiy Oblast. He graduated from the Kazan Aviation Institute. In 1954, he started work at the Gorkiy Sergo Ordzhonikidze Aviation Plant, where his father worked also, and in the following 20 years progressed from shop foreman to plant director.

In 1974, he became deputy minister of aviation industry of the USSR, and in 1977, first deputy minister. In 1980, he was appointed minister of machine-tool building and instrument industry of the USSR, and in 1981, minister of aviation industry of the USSR. In November 1985, he became deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Machine-Building Bureau.

A winner of the Lenin Prize (1972) and Hero of Socialist Labor (1975).

Married. He has two sons. The elder is a doctor of technical sciences and works in aviation industry, the younger is a specialist in applied mathematics.

In June 1990, Ivan Stepanovich Silayev was confirmed as chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.

The present Russian Government is only six months old. But its first steps in a social and political and economic situation difficult not just for a newborn government have been decisive and firm. Not only a majority of the population of the Russian Federation but of all the other republics of the country also links its hopes for a better future with the government's new policy.

What is happening in the government and what will be its next steps? Our correspondent talks about this with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

[Patsiya] Before becoming chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, you worked in sectors determining S&T progress and had a lengthy career as a leader. How do you evaluate it: In what have you been successful and unsuccessful, and how has this been reflected in the development of our industry and the economy as a whole?

[Silayev] I attempted to analyze what attracted me most and on which I worked most perseveringly. And I came to the conclusion that there were two such fields—S&T progress and, however strange, agriculture.

The bulk of my work has been done in the city, in industry. But when I became chairman of the Council of Ministers, the peasant blood in me began to speak, most likely. It seems to me that material connected with the peasant question has proven the most successful for the government. I do not, of course, wish to attribute to myself all that has been done but I have paid more attention to this matter and I feel it deeply, and, yes, the situation in agriculture made it necessary. For this reason I was very pleased on a purely human level that we together with the Supreme Soviet managed to persuade the Congress of People's Deputies of the need for land reform and support for its basic principles.

As far as S&T progress is concerned, even when I worked in positions connected with purely economic functions, I nonetheless involved myself in S&T problems with great pleasure. There were the appropriate conditions for this. Very much attention was being paid to the defense sectors of industry: the necessary monies, resources, the best personnel—all was sent.

I believe that I can be satisfied with the fact that certain results were achieved in aviation industry even in the time that I worked there. I have every right to speak about the fact that with my participation and under my direct leadership both combat aircraft, which brought prestige to our aviation worldwide, and passenger aircraft, such as the Il-86, Il-96 and Tu-204, were built, and I was also involved, in fact, with the "Buran" for practically 10 years.

Now about what was not a success. I was not, of course, able to solve problems of S&T progress in that same aviation industry on a broader scale, not to mention the fact that I was unsuccessful in eliminating serious shortcomings throughout the structure of economic and management activity. Even then many problems were a matter of the absence of an economic mechanism and the substitution therefore of arbitrary decisions, given the colossal concentration of forces and resources in the hands of the state. It was largely for this reason that there were at that time major shortcomings in the provision of passenger aircraft with equipment—the main emphasis was put on the development of combat aircraft.

[Patsiya] Was not your last appointment in the Council of Ministers connected with the pronounced "demilitarization" of your views?

[Silayev] I do not think so. The Machine-Building Bureau had been created in the image and likeness of the Military-Industrial Commission, and the expectation was that it would operate just as successfully. And I had great experience working in the defense complex. But it became clear immediately that civilian engineering cannot operate like military industry. Five times fewer resources had always been invested in it.

The main thing that I managed to understand—but not at once, incidentally, after approximately two years of activity—was how far we lagged behind the overall level, not to mention world achievements, of machine

building. It was clear that it was absurd to even put the issue so that we should do everything ourselves and that everything of ours should be the best in the world and made quickly. This was sloganeering, to which I also had been attached initially.

But I then saw that something was wrong, that we were trying and working hard, that more attention was being paid to us and more money given us, but no results. What was the problem? We began to analyze and came to the conclusion that the path chosen for the elimination of our lag was wrong. Abiding by the traditional principles of the administrative system, I reported much and actively to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and in the Council of Ministers Presidium on what needed to be done and how to at least slow down the growing lag. There were attempts to support this proposal or the other, but they could not have altered the situation.

I have no doubt that the Tu-204 and Il-96 are super-modern machines. In terms of engineering level they are not inferior and will hardly be inferior before the end of the century to newly developed machines. I state this because I know the development cycle. But we lag behind considerably in electronic equipment. The giant concentration of forces, resources, and the best personnel in the military-industrial complex had brought us to this global lag. All was concentrated in the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry. In accordance with the old plan, this was, perhaps, logical even. But even then, in 1983-1984, I was showing at various levels that the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry's absolute monopoly of electronic equipment and electronic components was causing colossal damage. I spoke about this also at the June 1985 conference, which is well known to those who are involved in S&T progress. I requested one thing: Permit not only the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry but also the other industries of the defense complex to become involved in electronics. It was prohibited. Civilian engineering was, naturally, simply prohibited from involving itself with electronic components. Only several years later did we manage to persuade the corresponding leaders that this monopoly had to be broken.

All this: on the one hand the colossal concentration of attention and everything else on defense industry and the militarization of our machine building; on the other, isolation from the whole world and complete lack of integration and, again, some strange confidence that if a decree were adopted and a directive issued, all would subsequently go swimmingly, and our high opinion of ourselves simply brought domestic machine building to a calamitous situation. I relate all this to my activity also. There is much that we failed to do.

[Patsiya] What you have described is hardly known to the public at large. And, judging by your career, you still represent a man of the military-industrial complex. It was for this reason, perhaps, that your confirmation as head of the Russian Government was a surprise for

many people. How did this happen? What forced you to change your fortunes so abruptly, and how is your work going now?

[Silayev] I was dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Machine-Building Bureau and was looking for some solution, but my ideas were not being supported. After last year's spring session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, when the government program for the country's economic development and transition to market relations was rejected, I wrote a very serious letter to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. I set forth my views in principle on economic problems. I offered to have this program reworked by the fall and to have it submitted at the fall session and to resign.

This letter was discussed in the presidium. I was seriously reprimanded. But I had no thoughts at that time about changing my fortunes and of moving in some other direction. Then suddenly, literally a week after this discussion, there came an offer to participate in an election competition, so to speak, for the office of premier of Russia. I unhesitatingly agreed. I was lucky. It was entrusted to me.

How is my work going? I have not had to become accustomed to the physical strain. Starting out as foreman at the Gorkiy Aviation Plant, I have my whole life worked no less than a shift and a half. I have cultivated a particular system and habit. But morally, I find it easier. I sense that we are getting some things done. Some proposals that I have submitted to the Union Council of Ministers for examination, insisted on them, have come off here. I believe that we will be able to realize additionally a number of former plans, they being general for our economy. But, of course, the feeling of particular responsibility to the Russian people and the deputies keeps me in a state of constant tension. This is understandable.

It was for me a very hopeful situation when an understanding was reached between Gorbachev and Yeltsin on the elaboration of a joint program of transition to the market. I had every confidence that strong support for the work would be secured. And we mobilized all the resources of our government for this. But subsequent events developed per an entirely different script, and, to my great distress, the work was not realized in full. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, inasmuch as he was with a group of comrades the author of the "500 days," came to me and tendered his resignation. This was upsetting, of course. I continue to believe that he should have continued to work in the Council of Ministers. Responsibility to Russia is such that all else should be set aside. And we had placed big hopes in him, and his departure weakened, of course, the government's economic activity.

[Patsiya] What, in your view, played the decisive part in the rejection of the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program?

[Silayev] The Union Government has its own views of the development of the country's economy. They contrast too greatly with the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program.

Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, member of the working group, did not, unfortunately, do a single day's work. Not cooperation but confrontation began as of day one. It should be said that some of the questions, under pressure from the president, for all that—there were two presidential hearings into the progress of the work—were harmonized, and some revisions were made to the Union program. But then, evidently, both Mikhail Sergeyevich gave way and the program was essentially rejected.

[Patsiya] Nonetheless, what was this: Opposition to scientific ideas or a clash of interests?

[Silayev] A clash of views, perhaps. I do not believe that Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, for example, was acting to some particular end. He has his own beliefs and he spoke about them more than once both in the USSR Government and on television. So he has his own views and his own principles, and they have obviously been reflected in government policy. This is natural.

More incomprehensible to me was and is now the position of Abalkin, who saw this program as a danger to the Union's existence. He said from the very outset that it would lead to the destruction of the Union. We claimed the opposite. And these are now profound ideological differences.

[Patsiya] Yavlinskiy's resignation, the demands of certain deputies concerning reports of members of the government on the work that had been done, expressed in the form of an ultimatum virtually at the last Russian Congress, and, finally, the resignation from a key office in the cabinet of Finance Minister Boris Fedorovich.... All this could prompt the thought of a government crisis. Do you not think so?

[Silayev] I disagree, of course, that some crisis in the government has begun. This is a hasty, unduly facile statement, I would say. Of course, these are unpleasant and annoying episodes, but there can be no question of any collapse, any crack in the government.

You know that on my initiative a proposal was submitted to the Supreme Soviet on a broadening of the powers of the government and the chairman of the Council of Ministers. One of them concerns an improvement in the system of appointments and dismissals and a change in the structure. It would be naive to suppose that a government structure effected in a purely theoretical plane may remain fixed once for all and require no changes. Nonetheless, intentions are one thing, direct work on the realization of programs is quite another. The structure should be flexible and should react to a change in basic processes, not the other way about. Processes cannot be written into a structure. Even today we are faced with the question of a change in the structure, we are aware of this.

And the very lengthy, agonizing process, I would say, of the appointment of members of the government is, of course, being reflected in our work. Even today we still



lack several members of the government in most important fields. I would not want to point the finger at this deputy or the other who has very meticulously and with a certain degree of suspicion in respect to the chairman of the Council of Ministers even evaluated each nomination. Although, by the logic of things, the leader responsible for executive authority should have the right to choose his team.

This is why the Supreme Soviet decision on a broadening of the powers of the chairman of the Council of Ministers has emerged. We will strengthen the government as quickly as possible. I would not say that we were wrong in our approach to the formation of a cabinet in principle. The principle was as follows: Complete replacement of the former composition and the appointment of relatively young people not only with reserves of energy but also free of former views and this stereotype or the other. And, generally, the young people are working pretty well. I have no doubt that all the present members of the government will in time really grow into professionals and leaders of great stature. It takes time for the government to work as a single team. But we do not have this time, and it is for this reason that in January we will carry out certain regroupings, and there will be new appointments and, possibly, dismissals.

[Patsiya] The crisis of executive authority in the country is an obvious fact. Much is being said and written about this, and decisions to fortify it are being made. Many leaders are demanding special powers. You, as far as I know, have not made such demands....

[Silayev] You see, I personally am not a supporter of special powers. Some hotheads, incidentally, termed even my modest formulation of the issue concerning a certain freedom in the appointment of ministers a virtual coup d'etat. This is even ridiculous.

We should be strong not by special powers. This is a backward step, suppression, and the imposition of some strict, severe measures. Of course, when discipline declines and business contracts are not fulfilled, this requires vigorous intervention, but not with nightsticks and whips. A mechanism should begin to operate. Consequently, we should be working more actively and declaring a state of emergency among ourselves within the government in order to get economic levers working in accelerated fashion, which would, in fact, enable us to quickly halt the destruction of the economy. This is, if you will, compulsion, but economic compulsion. Therefore, I do not believe that the government today needs any special powers.

[Patsiya] Aside from internal problems, the Russian Government has many difficulties of a different nature also. What is hampering fulfillment of the scheduled programs most?

[Silayev] When the declaration on Russia's sovereignty was adopted, this evoked in us optimism and a belief that all would go swimmingly. But the subsequent development of events opened our eyes to the fact that the

defense of our sovereign rights would require a struggle. The particular confrontation and the endless rebukes directed at us to the effect that we are organizing a parade of sovereignties and attempting to pull down the Union are, of course, diverting a mass of forces and nerves and proving detrimental to government activity.

The republics are demanding attention, demanding respect for the adopted declarations of sovereignty. This is a natural, historical, and inevitable process. But we can today utilize our sovereign rights to a very negligible extent. Mainly in instances where they are not in any important fashion contrary to the centralist line. In everything else, however, we are forced into some infractions, legal conflicts even. Otherwise it is impossible and pointless to remain the head of government.

For this reason the question of recognition of sovereignties is a most important condition of the elaboration and, subsequently, signing by the republics of the Union treaty. Treaty of the republics precisely. We need on the basis thereof to organize all policy: economic and social, and the interaction of the republics and the center.

[Patsiya] You do not feel yourself to be the premier of an independent state, consequently?

[Silayev] As yet, no. I would like to say that Russian interests have been so infringed that we do not have, as is customary in other republics, our own national Russian theater. The Bolshoi is a Union theater, the Malyy, a Union theater also, the Moscow Academic Art Theater.... Even in the field of culture we have been written into the Union plan, not to mention the characteristics of any kind of statehood. How can I fully feel myself to be premier of not an independent state much less a sovereign republic?

[Patsiya] Ivan Stepanovich, many people are calling your government a government of public trust. Do you hope to fully justify the expectations of your fellow citizens?

[Silayev] The government has not done that much for results to have been seen and for a position of public trust to have taken shape on this basis. The principles and intentions that we have simply proclaimed and our persevering struggle for Russians' rights are consonant, as I myself see it, with the thoughts and aspirations of our citizens. This engenders trust, which is undoubtedly very valuable for us, but it cannot be abused.

It is immaterial to the individual what difficulties and what problems the government has. Since you have taken on the job, kindly perform your functions. We do, therefore, have a certain concern about not letting down those who trust us. And the people's trust is our principal driving force.

[Patsiya] How are your professional contacts and personal relations with your colleagues in the republics taking shape and what are the results thereof?

[Silayev] To the great satisfaction of all of us, and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is of the same opinion; I believe,

we have no problems on basic issues pertaining to mutual relations with the republics. Together we are upholding our rights to sovereignty. And this has largely brought closer our positions as chairman of republic councils of ministers and ensured the corresponding support for one another. As a result of the interaction of the leaders of the republics and their legislative authorities, of course, we have succeeded in quite confidently preparing and signing a number of agreements. This is a new page in the history of our relations.

We knew one another earlier also. But knew in what way? We would meet periodically at official activities. And the chairmen of the councils of ministers would make contact with one another via the center. All questions were decided there. We have now moved toward other forms of communication and have seen one another in our economic structures: who is being supplied with what, what the balance sheets are, where there is a positive, and where, a negative, result. This has made it possible to put our intentions concerning economic cooperation in writing, as they say. Although this is only a test of the pen because a mechanism of interaction has not been worked out yet, and there is not even as yet a professional approach to such relations. The creation of particular components of executive authority responsible for interaction among the republics is essential. There would then be no unfulfilled commitments, and the barriers that have appeared in places would disappear.

I have to say that the Russian Federation has erected no barriers in the way of movement from republic to republic. We treat our partners with great respect and are seeking ways to develop economic relations, and I have no doubt that we will find them.

[Patsiya] Are you not worried by the prospect of becoming a "center," as the Union Government is currently seen from the republics, for the subjects of the Russian Federation?

[Silayev] I believe that the approach to a solution of national problems in the Russian Federation may be considered a success. From the very outset the Supreme Soviet and government told the national autonomies: You wish to acquire different status? Certainly. We already have many republics, and there will, most likely, be new ones also. This is, obviously, a natural, although, perhaps, forced process of national self-expression.

However, we see that there are also in this process certain difficulties and that there has been a chain reaction, I would say, of the manifestation of independence, and intentions of seceding from the Russian Federation have emerged.

There are at least two aspects here. First, the age-old process of the creation of the Russian state cannot be compared with present-day processes. Particular Russian statehood was brought forth and formed over too long a time for it to disappear all at once. A severance of traditional ties needs to be approached very cautiously.

At the same time, however, the economic mechanism and the market recognize no national characteristics. It all depends on the economic state of society and relationships. We see, therefore, that in the future the economy will adjust these processes and, possibly, lead to a revision of the aims of those who today intend to secede from Russia virtually.

On the other hand, we intend to pursue a policy of a very great degree of the economic independence of our republics and regions. It seems strange to me when the Union Government and sectoral leaders are afraid to assign the republics certain functions. After all, the fewer the regional functions of a government, ours included, the more the opportunities for dealing with truly all-Russian, all-state problems.

The localities have a keener and more precise feeling for production and, particularly, social needs. We, therefore, had the idea of the need for the creation as part of the government of a federal body made up of representatives of the regions and republics. Inasmuch as this will be an economic committee, we would not like to recruit for it administrators but professionals with an accurate knowledge of both economic mechanisms and problems of their own regions and who are capable of making proposals and defending the interests of those they represent. We are not, I believe, threatened by a fascination for centrist functions, the more so in that we do not aspire to this.

[Patsiya] Ivan Stepanovich, how do you see Russia 20 years hence?

[Silayev] Twenty years on? This is a long time. I believe that we are in a position, and if not us, then those who replace us, to lay the foundations of a strong modern Russia about which the world says respectfully that this is an advanced country culturally, spiritually, and economically.

We have for this the foundations emanating from our history. Russian science, art, and spirituality were once at a very high level. At the start of the century Russia emerged as a new economic power also, backward, but nonetheless attaining certain positions in the world economy. I therefore believe that in 10 years even, no more, Russia will occupy a worthy, proper place.

[Patsiya] The present New Year's holiday was not, perhaps, the most joyous, the holiday tables were not the most abundant and hopes were not the most optimistic. Nonetheless, what would you like to wish SOYUZ readers in the new year that has just begun?

[Silayev] I address to citizens of the Soviet Union wishes for good things and happiness for each family. I wish that each person may retain his presence of mind and steadfastness in order that he may more easily survive today's adversities. They are temporary, these adversities.

This I wish Russians, my fellow citizens, also. I ask of them patience for a little while yet. The Russian people

are generally patient, but, when the limit of patience is reached, they are a powerful force. We are for this reason trying to do everything in order not to put this patience to a long test, we understand and feel our responsibility to our fellow citizens and will do everything necessary to ensure that we are back on our feet as quickly as possible and that our people sense the improvement.

A traditional popular holiday—Christmas—is returning to our families. The appeal to the sources of our spirituality is very healthy. I would, therefore, like to congratulate everyone on Christmas also. And I would like, of course, happiness to come this year to Russian families and the families of Russia.

### Khasbulatov on Political, Economic Issues

91UN1003A Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov by Vladimir Kuzmishchev; place and date not given: "We Are Prepared To Work Honestly Together"]

[Text] Crisis processes are intensifying in the country. It is important in this situation to have a more precise concept of the contending positions, different viewpoints and assessments and opinions on the ways out of the crisis. To this end we carry today an interview with R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. We would mention once again here that not all the positions expressed in such material for discussion are, naturally, shared by the editorial office.

[Kuzmishchev] Ruslan Imranovich, the start of the year has brought little joy to our society. What is your assessment of recent events?

[Khasbulatov] We should, perhaps, begin with the exchange of banknotes. I do not see any meaningful substance in this action. It is possible, of course, to allude to conspiracies, domestic and foreign, but generally, in my view, the exchange has done nothing other than produce another outburst of distrust and uncertainty among our fellow citizens. The amount of the money not handed over at the time of the exchange—7 or 8 billion rubles [R]—would indicate that the reference to a conspiracy of international banking forces was not serious.

But the situation is truly not simple. The disorganization of retail trade, joint-labor ties and reciprocal deliveries, transport and municipal services have led to a real catastrophe in the supply sphere.

Huge amounts of commodity products have been piling up for several months now at the warehouses and the enterprises. People are waiting the price increases. And one has the impression that conditions of shortage are being specially intensified in many industrial centers of Russia in order to channel people's dissatisfaction against the Russian authorities.

General discontent is abundant soil for social and national conflicts.

Under these conditions the supporters of a return to the old administrative system are moving onto the attack. Some concepts connected with honor and the impermissibility of dirty, slanderous claims leveled at leaders of the state, the Union republics and parliament have already been jettisoned.

[Kuzmishchev] Just one specific example, Ruslan Imranovich....

[Khasbulatov] The concept of a Chechen mafia around the Russian Government, around the parliament, has been created. Who is the organizer of these insinuations? I do not know, but the ideological basis of this slander was born some time ago. A document was prepared back in September in which quite an odd version of the country's development was offered the president and the central government by a group of specialists and scientists. I read this document. It dealt with a rejection of many of the values of perestroyka. The authors recommended that the emphasis be put on power methods of the suppression of opponents.

It was said that the democratic leaders and their activity should be viewed via links with the criminal world. And it is the realization of this aim that we are seeing in the attempts to discredit both the Russian parliament and the Russian Government. Attempts are being made to link the Tarasov affair, for example, with the mafia. The newspaper GLASNOST says plainly that when Yeltsin was first secretary of the Moscow City party committee, he facilitated the emergence of the Chechen mafia in Moscow.

The notion of some powerful enemy within society is being impressed upon people. This is being done deliberately, of course, in order to attempt to tame the people once and for all and return them once again to the 1937 condition, but under some more liberal or neo-Stalinist coating. All these are very disturbing symptoms.

Our intellectuals are to blame here also. Their refined concepts are in a number of instances being taken up by reactionaries as well. The idea of a strong hand, for example. After all, our political scientists and philosophers were writing a year or two ago that a strong hand and strong presidential authority were needed. From my viewpoint, this is a perfectly groundless, unsubstantiated opinion. Why should authorities be strong or weak? They should be efficient, rational and, primarily, productive. What is the benefit in the president having amassed immense powers in his own hands. There is in fact no chance of their being realized if they are contrary to the interests of the republics. After all, we will never agree to these powers of the president being used on the territory of Russia unless our parliament approves this edict or the other by its own enactments.

[Kuzmishchev] In my view, the "efficiency of power" concept is quite vague. What does it mean?

[Khasbulatov] Power should take account of the interests of all the forces with which it comes in contact. If, for example, we fail to regulate relations connected with the organization of the soviets of all levels, there will be no strong authority at the top of a pyramid somewhere. The point being that the USSR Supreme Soviet has itself demolished the hierarchical system, which existed more or less firmly, of soviets ensuring order. By its Soviets Act the USSR Supreme Soviet has in practice created thousands of different parliaments, from the community and rural soviet through the Supreme Soviet.

And we in Russia are attempting to regulate this activity. A whole number of decrees and laws has been adopted for this, but the matter needs to be taken to its conclusion. We are working on the appropriate law. We recently organized an important meeting of the chairmen of oblast and kray soviets. We set ourselves the task of having drawn up such a bill by 15 March. Not simply the president should have power, there should be power in the state, the power of the law and the authority of the law. But now everyone is violating the law, thereby undermining respect for both the law and presidential power itself.

[Kuzmishchev] How do you evaluate the first steps of the cabinet?

[Khasbulatov] Even when the "500 days" program was rejected by the former Ryzhkov government, which was able to impose its wishes on the president, the center nonetheless had an understanding of the need for in-depth economic reforms.

A clear rejection of the majority of ideas is now showing through. A limited, abridged understanding of private property, a nebulous interpretation of privatization and a clear-cut orientation toward the administrative management of the economy are in evidence. The path of privatization strengthening the sphere of private ownership is being declared pernicious, virtually, and so-called de-state-ization remains, consequently.

Just look how this "de-state-ization" is being effected by the central departments and ministries. They are all of a sudden declaring themselves concerns or associations. The signboard is changing, but the management remains practically the same, but this management is freer now even than before. It is becoming the proprietor, as it were, of the means of production and capital. Productivity is not rising, production of commodity supplies is not increasing. And after a certain length of time ownership becomes by way of some evolutions mixed, foreign, joint-stock, group, collective, cooperative, and so forth, and state property is being bargained away at a loss. It is being atomized. And I repeat, what is more, there is no growth of production indicators, but the wages of government officials, who are becoming a mainstay of the new presidential regime and its premier, are, on the other hand, rising rapidly, by a factor of three or four.

I personally am opposed to such privatization. But it is being effected primarily by the Union ministries.

[Kuzmishchev] Everyone is now anxiously awaiting the price reform. How justified is it, in your view? And how to explain to people the need for it? After all, the Russian Government and parliament are not opposed to an increase in prices either.

[Khasbulatov] You may, possibly, remember my recurrent articles in the press in 1986-1987, when the State Committee for Prices had begun to demand an increase in the price of foodstuffs and nonfood commodities. Many economists were at this time inclined to support this increase in prices, but I counseled, insufficiently persuasively, apparently, against this measure. Why? Because there was at that time a perfectly realistic possibility of the accomplishment of structural transformations of the economy, the channeling of substantial resources into the development of manufacturing industry and the development of light industry and of active use being made of our foreign economic relations.

But, unfortunately, it then came to be impressed upon the population that prices would be raised in a day or two, and a cave-in of the consumer market and speculative demand, which we are observing today even, began.

A catastrophic situation has come about now throughout the country, of course. The Ryzhkov government effected a very serious increase in purchase prices. Specifically, for meat, livestock, feed, and much else. Livestock is now surrendered at R10 per kilo. Has there ever been such a price?

As a result the republics have been forced to raise prices also. The kolkhozes and sovkhoses [collective and state farms] were not, of course, demanding such an increase in prices for the sake of it. They could not, after all, purchase tractors, combines, and fertilizer. Prices had been raised on that without which it is impossible to cultivate the fields and engage in stock breeding. Who had raised them? That same State Committee for Prices when it was headed by Comrade Pavlov.

And all this led to this surge of wholesale and purchase prices. This cannot fail to be reflected in retail prices. A price increase has, as a result, become an objective necessity. This is a direct consequence of the activity of the central administration and the present head of the cabinet.

[Kuzmishchev] But did not the "500 days" program provide for price increases also?

[Khasbulatov] Yes, but it retained stable prices for 150 of the most essential products until market laws took effect.

[Kuzmishchev] It is always easier to criticize, Ruslan Imranovich. Russia's leaders are frequently censured for merely opposing the decisions of the center and being



themselves unable to offer constructive solutions pertaining to a way out of the crisis.

[Khasbulatov] Truly, we are constantly being accused of having started the war of laws, but I would like to emphasize that this opposition was imposed on us. For example, it was with very great difficulties, by way of negotiations with the president, that we secured the creation of our own banking institutions. The Central Russian Bank is helping us comprehensively in the implementation of economic reform and support for the pension act and other programs. The Foreign Trade Bank has only just begun operations and has not actively shown what it can do as yet, it is true. Recently, when an offensive against Russia with the full weight of the central machinery has been under way, our banking structure has been chosen as a target. And, generally, each of our steps is under close, total supervision on the part of the central administration. Obstacles are being raised at every step.

But would it not be simpler for the Russian Government and the Pavlov cabinet to sit down at the negotiating table and clearly delineate spheres of authority in the economy? Why wait for the conclusion of a Union treaty; work needs to be done now. This matter has been raised repeatedly. I recall that at a meeting with the president on 11 November of last year Ryzhkov and Gorbachev on the one side and Yeltsin, Silayev, and myself on the other agreed that the two governments would immediately sit down at the negotiating table and determine the specific range of powers of the center and Russia and delineate the power functions of the two governments. It would then be easier for all of us, and we would not, most likely, need to be talking about confrontation and a war of laws. But these negotiations have yet to take place. This muddle, when all difficulties may be heaped on us, is probably beneficial to some people.

Now concerning the constructive program proposed by the Russian parliament. The central component of our entire economic policy is the agrarian program. This is a unique phenomenon in the history of our state, except for the long period of the NEP [New Economic Plan], when we are allocating the countryside 15 percent of the total budget.

Specifically, our policy on this matter is as follows. The sovkhozes and kolkhozes that are operating inadequately need to be strengthened. So an aspiration to break up the collective farms is being ascribed to us in vain. No, this must not happen under any circumstances. When kolkhozes and sovkhozes have been hanging on the neck of the state and its hard-working people for decades, this is another matter. In this case, of course, it is expedient to break the farms up into smaller units and transfer their land to the peasants.

[Kuzmishchev] But might not the local authorities rob the tenant farmers, as earlier they robbed the kolkhozes and sovkhozes?

[Khasbulatov] It is for this reason that we are creating local land committees. They are to help the development of the peasant farms and protect them against the arbitrary action of the local authorities. You are right. Attempts are already being made to fit that same horse collar on the emergent peasant farms, and their labor is being used to support the collapsing kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This is why we are endeavoring to ensure that the farmers themselves, knowledgeable specialists, and employees of our soviet organizations join these committees. But there is a tremendous aspiration locally to subordinate these committees to the soviets directly. Of course, the allocation of plots of land should be under the supervision of the soviets, this is clear. But the land committees should be independent.

Why do I emphasize the agrarian program? Because the main task is feeding people. And thereby creating conditions for radical economic transformations in other spheres of the economy. If we provide the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and the peasant farms with seed, equipment, and breeder cattle at the start of the agricultural year, we can expect to have appreciably rectified our food situation in the fall. But quite a complex situation is taking shape in the countryside currently—I believe that this problem will be a central issue at a special Congress of People's Deputies of Russia.

[Kuzmishchev] Is there not some idealization and expectation of a miracle, which is customary for us, here? After all, the peasants are not all that readily taking land as yet....

[Khasbulatov] You must first give up this land! As yet the local authorities are not readily doing so everywhere. And we should not be reproaching our peasant for not taking the land. This is wrong.

[Kuzmishchev] When, at the start of the 1920's, we were able to feed the country, having substituted the tax in kind for forced grain requisitioning, Russia was still peasant, but now there are not enough farmers, and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes have poor prospects....

[Khasbulatov] Truly, there are in the republic only 10,000 tenant farms currently, and there should be about 200 times more. Our agrarian policy also creates favorable conditions for them. We are exempting the peasant farms of taxes for the whole time it takes for them to stand on their own two feet. But, naturally, hundreds of plans are needed—how to implement these decisions, specifically in the localities, with regard for the specific features of the regions. Unless we have such plans and if things are allowed to proceed haphazardly, nothing will result.

It is now being portentously declared that we want to sell off the land to the big wheels of the shadow economy in order that the people end up in bondage to them and that if the land reform proceeds according to the plan envisaged by the RSFSR parliament, the situation could push us into civil war (these are Pavlov's words in TRUD). Yet the positions of the president and the Russian



Congress on the agrarian issue coincide in almost all particulars. The sole difference is that our congress has decreed after 10 years, in a limited quantity, under the supervision of the local soviets, authorization of the sale of land. But who knows what the situation will be then. After all, it is now sometimes difficult predicting events six months ahead....

[Kuzmishchev] Nonetheless, the Russian Government will very soon, as far as I know, submit a program for development of the economy strictly computed in terms of timeframe. This will, apparently, be another, the fourth, reembodiment of the Yavlinskiy program?

[Khasbulatov] No, not exactly. We still aspire to fulfill the "500 days" program, but within the framework of our constricted possibilities now. We had hoped that we would be taking this path together with all the Union and autonomous republics. But since this has not happened, we need within the "500 days" framework, consequently, to perfect our action version. Which is what in fact the government is now doing. This version is to be presented to parliament by 15 March.

It should ultimately be understood that the economy needs to be separated from the state. In no developed country does the economy suffer from the fact that not all that successful a government, say, assumes office. Why? Because the course of economic life is determined not by the government itself but by entrepreneurs.

But we have no independent economy. We have no basis and no superstructure—they are intertwined. And for this reason we will have confusion in the economy until we free the economy from arbitrary state action and the actions of politicians.

[Kuzmishchev] Consequently, without serious political changes there will be no independent economy and real market either. Political accord is needed, but the longer it goes, the worse it gets as far as this is concerned. Is it possible at all following B. Yeltsin's television speech?

[Khasbulatov] Not only possible but essential. And there is every prerequisite for this. Is Yeltsin refusing to cooperate with the president? No. And this was not what he was talking about in his speech on Central Television on 19 February. He was merely maximally revealing the real obstacles in the way of our economic reforms. Subjective, emanating from the inconsistent actions of the president included. We will cooperate, but the president needs to aspire to such cooperation with Russia also. Is not Russia's fate dear to the president? It is necessary also to think about responsibility to the people, to history. If our position is that of the interests of the people, the interests of the state, cooperation is feasible, and the situation should not be dramatized. We are prepared to work honestly together.

### Deputies for Extraordinary Congress Listed

91UN1001A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 2 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Statement by 123 RSFSR people's deputies with a supplementary list of signatories: "On the Demand To Convene an Extraordinary Congress"]

[Text] On 21 February, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published a statement by 272 RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies, "We Demand the Convocation of an Extraordinary Congress," which conveyed "great concern for the future of the peoples of Russia" in conjunction with the abruptly deteriorating economic and socio-political situation in the country and in the republic. Deputy groups made the statement available to us together with the list of deputies who signed it. However, in the following days the editorial office received telegrams and letters from four RSFSR people's deputies—S.S. Petrishchev (T.O. [Territorial District] 504), A.M. Golishnikov (T.O. 872), N.A. Chausskiy (T.O. 900), and A.M. Kostin (T.O. 554)—to the effect that they had not signed the statement on convening the extraordinary congress. So they demanded that we communicate this in our newspaper, which is what we are hereby doing.

At the same time, many readers have asked us to publish the names of RSFSR people's deputies who signed a statement by the Rossiya deputies group on convening the extraordinary congress (it was read at the session by RSFSR People's Deputy N.A. Pavlov) and a list supplementary to the one already published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, which was submitted to the presidium by cosmonaut Vitaliy Ivanovich Sevastyanov, RSFSR people's deputy. We comply with the wishes of our readers.

### Statement by RSFSR People's Deputies

We consider it necessary to state the following in conjunction with a speech by B.N. Yeltsin on Central Television on 19 February 1991.

The current crisis situation in our country is to a large degree due to the actions of the Union leadership, and the mistakes and inconsistent policy of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev personally. It was the right of B.N. Yeltsin as a citizen and USSR people's deputy to demand that the president resign. However, we are profoundly convinced that this was not what the voters expected of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The people expect peace and accord, and specific measures to overcome the crisis, rather than an aggravation of the protracted confrontation of the leaders or appeals aimed at splitting the people.

We consider it necessary to invite the attention of our fellow citizens to the main point of B.N. Yeltsin's demand—handing over the government of the country to the Council of the Federation. This demand is absolutely anticonstitutional from a legal point of view; from a political point of view, it brings about the elimination

of the USSR as a state, as a union of republics with equal rights. Therefore, fighting a specific leader of the state has turned yet again, and as openly as can be, into fighting the existence of the state itself. The illusion that the disintegration of the Union will stop at the borders of the RSFSR is dangerous. Deliberate destruction of the USSR cannot but be accompanied by the disintegration of the republics seeking to become independent states themselves. These processes are already under way, also in the RSFSR, because the destiny of Russia and the destiny of the Union are linked inseparably.

In light of the speech by B.N. Yeltsin, the strange passivity of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet leadership with regard to working on the Union treaty becomes understandable; at the same time, the conclusion of bilateral treaties between the RSFSR and other Union republics is accelerated. The premeditated breakdown of the Union proceeds contrary to the clearly stated will of the Congresses of RSFSR People's Deputies.

Proceeding from the firm conviction that no acceptable alternative to the USSR as a federated state exists, we express our resolute disagreement with the position of B.N. Yeltsin and consider it necessary to immediately discuss the political and economic situation in the RSFSR and in the country as a whole at an extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

[Signed] RSFSR People's Deputies: A.A. Askalonov—T.O. 153, M.A. Aleksandrov—N.T.O. [National Territorial District] 106, A.A. Alekseyev—T.O. 113, A.M. Anipkin—N.T.O. 30, V.P. Anishchev—N.T.O. 34, V.D. Artyev—T.O. 731, V.V. Antonov—N.T.O. 65, N.G. Aminov—N.T.O. 85, S.N. Baburin—T.O. 539, V.A. Bokov—N.T.O. 58, G.M. Benov—N.T.O. 18, Yu.M. Beloglazov—T.O. 800, V.S. Babichev—N.T.O. 103, O.A. Bariskin—T.O. 496, L.Kh. Bakhtiyarova—N.T.O. 88, V.K. Bochkarev—T.O. 566, I.M. Bratishchev—T.O. 599, V.I. Berestovoy—T.O. 283, N.T. Vedernikov—T.O. 698, S.P. Volkov—N.T.O. 118, N.A. Volodin—T.O. 562, A.Ye. Vasilkovskiy—T.O. 564, Yu.M. Voronin—T.O. 862, I.Ye. Galushko—T.O. 261, A.D. Gerasimenko—T.O. 370, V.A. Gololobov—T.O. 42, V.A. Grachev—T.O. 568, V.A. Gulyashko—N.T.O. 48, A.I. Gurov—T.O. 33, A.N. Greshnevinov—T.O. 779, Yu.A. Guskov—T.O. 269, I.L. Gen—N.T.O. 109, V.P. Gerasimov—T.O. 485, N.P. Grishin—T.O. 643, V.V. Donskikh—T.O. 500, K.M. Doyev—T.O. 846, V.P. Dordzhnev—N.T.O. 104, A.Ye. Yeregin—T.O. 460, A.A. Zhilkin—N.T.O. 26, I.F. Zalevskaya—N.T.O. 63, V.I. Zarubin—T.O. 345, A.G. Zelenukhin—T.O. 550, V.I. Zorkaltsev—T.O. 699, I.A. Ivlev—T.O. 336, A.I. Ilyenkov—N.T.O. 42, G.A. Idelbayeva—N.T.O. 86, M.M. Karev—T.O. 263, N.N. Karulin—T.O. 403, A.A. Kamenev—N.T.O. 62, Z.A. Kornilova—N.T.O. 145, Yu.I. Kornilov—T.O. 675, G.S. Kalistratov—N.T.O. 51, O.V. Kazarov—T.O. 740, V.V. Kalashnikov—T.O. 631, S.G. Kekhlerov—T.O. 815, V.G. Kapustyanskiy—T.O. 561, V.P. Lisin—N.T.O. 37, Yu.Ye. Lodkin—T.O. 297, T.I. Leta—T.O. 325, V.D. Mazayev—T.O. 309, P.S. Moor—T.O. 789, R.S. Mukhamadiyev—N.T.O. 127,

G.N. Maymago—N.T.O. 163, Yu.A. Manayenkov—N.T.O. 53, K.P. Murenin—T.O. 641, I.A. Medvedeva—T.O. 102, I.I. Malkov—N.T.O. 83, S.A. Mikhaylov—T.O. 648, S.N. Nikolayev—T.O. 887, V.N. Ozerova—T.O. 560, Ch.-D. V. Oldar—T.O. 871, S.D. Osminin—T.O. 453, Z.N. Oykina—N.T.O. 70, N.A. Pavlov—N.T.O. 79, O.Ya. Pavlukhin—T.O. 711, A.I. Popov—T.O. 416, V.D. Popov—N.T.O. 39, N.N. Prokofyeva—T.O. 98, T.A. Ponomareva—T.O. 240, V.D. Parshukov—T.O. 432, P.N. Polyantsev—T.O. 450, A.A. Ponomarev—T.O. 690, L.N. Razbitova—T.O. 246, Yu.D. Rudkin—T.O. 772, I.P. Rybkin—T.O. 312, I.S. Savchenko—T.O. 508, V.S. Sokolov—T.O. 206, D.Ye. Stepanov—T.O. 152, S.V. Salnikov—T.O. 629, V.I. Sevastyanov—N.T.O. 73, V.G. Syrovatko—N.T.O. 28, N.I. Solodiyakova—N.T.O. 161, V.A. Serdyukov—T.O. 127, S.V. Stepashin—T.O. 112, O.N. Smirnov—T.O. 133, A.S. Sokolov—T.O. 94, A.N. Solovyev—T.O. 5, U.Ye. Temirov—N.T.O. 155, V.N. Tikhomirov—T.O. 382, V.F. Toporkov—T.O. 498, V.A. Tikhonov—T.O. 198, V.P. Travov—N.T.O. 22, O.I. Tkunov—T.O. 574, M.M. Traditsyn—T.O. 307, I.G. Ustinov—T.O. 224, I.I. Firyulin—T.O. 569, G.M. Fadeyev—N.T.O. 19, V.V. Frukalov—T.O. 603, V.I. Khubiyevev—N.T.O. 156, Kh.Kh. Khabibullin—T.O. 864, V.N. Khayryuzov—T.O. 385, V.I. Chaptynov—T.O. 162, Yu.K. Chaykovskiy—T.O. 264, R.Z. Chebotarevskiy—T.O. 511, O.A. Chistykh—T.O. 486, V.A. Shuykov—N.T.O. 143, A.Ye. Shevtsov—T.O. 686, L.S. Shapovalova—T.O. 831, M.I. Ettyryntyna—N.T.O. 166, Yu.F. Yarov—T.O. 142, A.I. Yaroshenko—T.O. 204, L.Ye. Yassenkov—T.O. 383, S.P. Yar—N.T.O. 168

**The statement was signed by 123 RSFSR people's deputies; 72 of them are members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet., List Supplementary to the List Published in the Newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. To the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet**

We support a statement by Deputy S.P. Goryacheva made on 21 February and demand that an extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies be convened with the following agenda:

1. Report by chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
2. Conclusion of the RSFSR Federation Treaty.

[Signed] V.I. Abrarov—T.O. 532, A.V. Anikeyev—N.T.O. 107, V.V. Antonov—N.T.O. 65, G.M. Benov—N.T.O. 18, A.P. Volkov—N.T.O. 113, N.A. Zaytsev—N.T.O. 141, G.A. Idelbayeva—N.T.O. 86, P.M. Imedoyev—N.T.O. 164, A.A. Kamenev—N.T.O. 62, V.S. Konev—T.O. 840, Z.A. Kornilova—N.T.O. 145, G.N. Maymago—N.T.O. 163, R.S. Mukhamadiyev—N.T.O. 127, A.G. Nikolayev—N.T.O. 145, S.N. Nikolayev—T.O. 887, T.A. Ponomareva—T.O. 240, V.D. Popov—N.T.O. 39, V.I. Sevastyanov—N.T.O. 73, V.S. Soudykov—N.T.O. 165, A.I. Spitsyn—T.O. 558, I.I. Firyulin—T.O. 569, A.I. Khutyz—N.T.O. 149, Ye.N. Tsybikov—T.O. 808, R.Z. Chebotarevskiy—T.O. 511, O.A. Chistykh—T.O. 486, S.P. Yar—N.T.O. 168

**Deputies on 'Monitoring' in RSFSR Soviet**

91UN0862A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 8

[Untitled response of group of RSFSR people's deputies to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY readers' query on "'secret' rooms in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet building"]

[Text] Following publication in the press about "secret" rooms in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet building, readers have been requesting our editorial office to relate just what these "rooms" are. RSFSR people's deputies participating in clarification of this situation have provided us a response.

At the end of last year, the security section of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet obtained reports of possible communications monitoring in the building of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. In particular, the "proprietors" of Rooms 4-120 and 4-120a were not found.

On 5 February, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published a report on the presence in the building of monitoring equipment. On 6 February, several workers expressed a desire to enter the office of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman "to repair the pneumatic mail system." Since prior to this day, no one was using the pneumatic mail system, their request was denied.

Later this same day, a couple of people from the USSR Eighth KGB Directorate went up to Rooms 4-120 and 4-120a. When the suggestion was made that they enter the rooms in the presence of RSFSR people's deputies and the security service, they declined and left without handing over their keys.

In a state of complete ignorance concerning the contents of these rooms, the security service made the decision to open them in the presence of RSFSR people's deputies. This was accomplished at 1930 hours the evening of 6 February. One of the rooms was empty, and a radio device was found in the second.

At 2020 hours, a communication was made by telephone to Moscow's Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon Procuracy, to the city procuracy, and to the RSFSR Procuracy on the need for procuracy personnel to come to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet building.

Following this, personnel of the USSR Eighth KGB Directorate arrived at the Supreme Soviet.

At 2225 hours, A. Selikhovkin, procurator of Moscow's Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon, in whose territory the RSFSR Supreme Soviet building is situated, arrived. He was presented the article from the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the statement of a number of people's deputies on the institution of criminal proceedings based on Article 135 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (violation of security of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraph communications).

At 0030 hours, in the presence of the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon procurator, RSFSR people's deputies, USSR KGB personnel, and an independent expert on radio equipment, an inspection of the premises began, observing the norms of legal criminal investigation procedure.

At 0415 hours, a protocol of the inspection was signed.

According to the words of USSR KGB specialists, the radio equipment was intended to protect the RSFSR Supreme Soviet building from monitoring. The independent expert believes the radio equipment could be used for other purposes as well.

On 7 February, at a session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, upon the demand of RSFSR people's deputies, the matter of creating a deputy commission to conduct a parliamentary investigation of this incident was resolved.

**RSFSR People's Deputies R. Mikailov, I. Zbronzhko, A. Uglov, V. Belov, V. Veremchuk, A. Kotenkov, B. Nemtsov, S. Shustov**

**Tatarstan Relations With USSR, RSFSR Discussed**

91UN1030A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 9, 2 Mar 91 p 8

[Interview with M. Shaymiyev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan, by V. Leksin, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent: "Policy Does Not Tolerate Vanity"]

[Excerpts] Kazan—On 30 August of last year, a regular session of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan almost unanimously adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty, with one abstention. The Tatar Autonomous Republic was renamed the Republic of Tatarstan. What changed after this? What gave the people of the republic its new status? Or is it the right time to talk about losses? Our own correspondent talks about this with M. Shaymiyev, chairman of the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet.

[Passages omitted]

[Shaymiyev] I am for the Union. I am confident that a majority of the population of our republic will vote this way. It is difficult and impossible to imagine another outcome of the referendum. I understand that our Union is sick. Seriously, but not fatally. It is too early to lose heart—not all political means by far have been used yet. It is time for the leaders of all ranks and levels to forego personal ambitions and to stop the "war of laws"—a true policy does not tolerate vanity, and it is time to return to a basic position—common sense. It dictates one thing: Since we are in a deep crisis together, we will be able to get out of it only together. But if we begin to clamber one by one, agitating, not giving each other a chance in a future sea of passions—no one and nothing will win.

[Passages omitted]

[Correspondent] On what basis are the present mutual relations of Tatarstan with the Union and the Russian Federation being built?

[Shaymiyev] On the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit—strictly within the framework of our declaration. I will not hide the fact that positions are being won with difficulty, step by step. Today we arrived at the fact that the chairmen of the republics will participate on an equal basis in the preparation of the Union treaty. We are equal members of the Council of the Federation with a decisive vote. And we must sign the treaty on a basis equal with all of the republics that make up the Union—this is our principal position.

Eighty percent of our major enterprises are of a Union subordination, and 18 are subordinate to Russian departments. I will mention a well-known fact: Tataria, or the "second Baku," as it was called once, gave the country 2.5 billion tons of oil. But what did it receive in return besides destroyed fields, forests, and rivers? There are not even any good roads... Large petrochemical plants are concentrated on our land, the giant KamAZ [Kama Automobile Plant] was built, and the Elabuga automobile plant is being built. I am not even talking about the powerful defense industry. In developing this entire gigantic potential, we deprived ourselves of much natural wealth. A half million hectares of agricultural land ends up at the bottom of reservoirs. We obtain many more food products from every 100 hectares of remaining arable land than is the average for Russia and the Union. But we only consume, especially meat products, less than in those regions to which we have to deliver them. Is this really fair?..

Or take this example. According to the new law on taxation, as is known, payments from profits amounts to 45 percent. Here, 22 percent of them goes to the Union budget and 23 percent goes to the Russian budget, of which, under mutual calculations, about 10 percent comes back to us. But, you see, in our republic the balance of income over expenditures is positive, and it amounts to no less than about a billion rubles.

Knowing this distribution, is it possible to talk about our caprices? For in the final analysis, sovereignty is economic independence. Of course, it is not a question that Tatarstan, they say, intends to take over for itself the oil, the KamAZ, and the polyethylene—everything that is extracted and produced on its land. This is simply absurd. The question is that Tatarstan has a right to manage its accumulated potential, taking into account the evolved relations, on the basis of a Union treaty and a treaty with the RSFSR.

But the first steps on the way to independence are already being looked over. We intend to sell part of the oil and other chemical products, and, with the money that is acquired, to purchase consumer commodities, first and foremost, those whose absence is demeaning to human dignity—socks, stockings, shoes, clothing. We

have established relations with business circles in Germany, the United States, Italy, Austria, Taiwan, and Holland, and former contacts are being expanded with Yugoslavia, Poland, China, and Turkey. Joint enterprises are being established with foreign firms. A hard currency fund is being set up.

[Correspondent] With respect to Tatarstan's mutual relations with the center, here you put everything in place clearly, but with respect to Russia? Because Tatarstan is situated, as the saying goes, in the heart of Russia.

[Shaymiyev] Relations with Russia, according to our declaration, are the relations of two equal subjects of the future Union treaty. Well, there are nuances in the part on property—Russia declared as its property everything that is on its territory. Including ours as well.

Did the parliament of Russia, in taking this step, think about the fate of new sovereign republics? According to this logic, it turns out that our economy, as previously, will be directed by Moscow offices, only, perhaps, at a lower level. This does not suit us. Relations with Russia will be built on the basis of the treaty. The session of our Supreme Soviet has already adopted a resolution about its draft. It emphasizes that the Tatarstan SSR accepts the responsibility for maintaining and developing the historically developed economic, political, and cultural relations of the Republic of Tatarstan with the RSFSR. The treaty is necessary for the purpose of the demarcation of powers between the republics, first of all, those associated with property.

[Correspondent] Recently, the parliament of Russia and its government made quite a few decisions. Do all of them correspond to the interests of the former autonomies.

[Shaymiyev] Unfortunately, no. Take, for example, the declaration of Christmas as a day off. Was it really possible to make a decision without informing the multinational republics. Naturally, we called it off here.

And here is something else that I would like to note. Russia concluded a number of treaties with the Union republics. But again, it not only did not consult with such large former autonomies as Tataria or Bashkiria, but it did not even let them know.

Therefore, we are convinced that a quick signing of the Union treaty, and also a treaty of the Tatarstan SSR with the RSFSR, will put an end to such misunderstandings. This will be in the interests of all the people of our multinational country.

[Correspondent] Mintimer Sharipovich, what did the republic's sovereignty really give in the area of culture?

[Shaymiyev] The "residual principle" did great damage to culture, including in our republic. Of course, it is not possible to restore immediately what has been treated with neglect for so long.



Work is going on in the preparation of a Tatar encyclopedia—more than one generation of our intelligentsia has dreamed about this publication. Tatar schools and theaters are being opened, and a decision has been made on the creation of our own feature film studio. A new publishing house—Magarif—is being organized, and it will furnish textbook and methodical literature for Tatars who live beyond the borders of the republic. By the way, there are more than five million of them. A decision has been made on the creation of a republic academy of sciences.

Of course, the resources allocated for culture are not yet adequate. We do not have enough museums and monuments to our great fellow countrymen, and there is not even a concert hall to speak of. It is also true that it is the workers in culture who are in worse shape than anyone when it comes to housing, and their salaries are miserable. Although, I repeat, there is progress: While in 1985, R32 million were allocated to the needs of culture, this year R67 million were allocated. I understand that even this is not enough—five times as much is needed. Well, we will think about it, decide, and search—now we cannot blame anyone else.

### Western Republics

#### Moldova Rejects 17 March Referendum

91UN0950A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91  
Union Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent E. Kondratov: "The Choice Facing Moldova" subtitled "The Republic's Parliament Refuses To Hold the Referendum"]

[Text] The discussion of Moldova's future at the session of the Moldovan parliament lasted for four days. The deputies were trying to decide whether Moldova should become part of the renewed federation whose principles were outlined in the draft Union treaty. However, nobody even remembered this very draft. The deputies were presented with an alternate version, the Moldovan concept of the USS—the Union (community) of Sovereign States—on the basis of a confederation of republics. According to this concept, the Union will be rather limited in its powers: It will design general economic, ecological, and scientific programs, coordinate transportation and power grids, conduct space research, set up structures to combat crime, and also create foundations for emergency relief aid. The Union will be ruled by its supreme council consisting of the heads of the sovereign states having the right of the veto.

The draft treaty on the formation of the Union of Sovereign States was presented to the session by the vice president of the parliament, V. Pushkashu, who then said that Moldova's Supreme Soviet Presidium does not think it possible to hold the USSR referendum in the republic. The Presidium considers such a referendum anticonstitutional and in violation of Moldova's sovereignty.

What road would Moldova face if it chooses to reject the Union treaty? According to some of the speakers, this road can be defined by a referendum. Participants of this referendum should be either Bessarabians, spread all over the world by "Soviet expansion," or native Moldovans, but not those who "came here following the tracks of the tanks."

But let us ask ourselves: Does Moldova at present possess sufficient economic potential to provide its people with a decent life, at least? The hopes placed on interrepublic relations have not been justified so far. The destruction of Union relations proved to be fatal. The deputies backing the preservation of the renewed Union spoke about enterprises that were on the verge of being closed down, talked about Moldova's dependence on sources of raw materials within the Union, and mentioned that goods produced in Moldova could not compete on the world market.

The supporters of the referendum insisted that the people have the right to express their will freely. In their opinion, the people would definitely vote to integrate the republics in a free federation, because the very existence of the USSR is the only guarantee in our time that peace and stability would be preserved in the world and optimal conditions for people's lives would be created.

The many hours of discussion were concluded on Tuesday by the republic's ruling triumvirate. After reporting to the deputies on his business trip to Romania, Moldovan President M. Snegur expressed his negative attitude toward both the referendum and the Moscow draft of the Union treaty, for to accept the treaty would mean Moldova "losing everything it has achieved in two years."

Prime Minister M. Druk was more critical. He characterized participation in the referendum as "a mass suicide" and then expressed his opinion that Moldova's only way to salvation was in seceding from the empire. Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Moshanu agreed with him, expressing confidence that the referendum was "a political trick in an imperial spirit" which disregarded the people's right to self-determination.

Once the opinions of the deputies' groups were declared, they finally began to vote. The voting procedure was somewhat unusual: The deputies were asked to stand up as they were named so that the TV cameras could show people how their representatives were voting, one by one. As a result, it was decided not to hold the referendum on 17 March. Instead they approved the Moldovan draft of a treaty on the formation of a community of sovereign states. The list of a parliamentary delegation was also approved. The delegation will go to Moscow and present this draft to other republics as a version of a Union treaty.

Thus, there will be no official referendum on 17 March. But it is no secret that referendum commissions are still being formed in the cities and rayons of the republic.



**Plyushch Assesses West Ukraine Congress**

91UN1024A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Feb 91 p 1

[Report on interview with I.S. Plyushch, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, by Aleksandr Sokol, PRAVDA UKRAINY parliamentary correspondent; date and place not given: "This Is Not Separatism"]

[Text] A joint session of three oblast soviets—Ivano-Frankovo, Lvov, and Ternopol—was held recently in Lvov. The other areas of this region—Bukovina, Volyn, Transcarpathia, and Rovenshchina—were represented by individual deputies. USSR and Ukrainian people's deputies, scientists, and the clergy also attended the session. The forum, to put it frankly, was unusual.

**I.S. Plyushch, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, took part in this meeting of deputies. PRAVDA UKRAINY asked him to talk about it.[end bold]**

[Sokol] Ivan Stepanovich! Several days have passed since this unique session. What can you say about it, taking into account the fact that some time has passed? What is your main finding?

[Plyushch] This form of work can be positive. Regional peculiarities and regional interests exist, and a regional deputy meeting is quite natural. It seems that it would be more effective, if elected representatives not of the three oblast soviets, but from all of the western oblasts participated in it.

There were various attitudes toward the deputy forum that was being prepared in Lvov, and the proposals that were made varied. Today, it can be said definitely: The assertion that it would become a step in the creation of a so-called Galician autonomy on the territory of the Ukraine is erroneous. Of course, there were also more debatable and, moreover, unacceptable statements. But, as the saying goes, they are not the ones that count. An appeal was made in a majority of the speeches to preserve the indivisibility of the Ukraine and the inviolability of its borders. Proposals were made to enlarge the sovereignty of the republic with real content.

Deputies at various levels displayed an interest and aspiration to lead the republic out of the pre-crisis economic situation and toward an improvement in the life of our people.

[Sokol] The economic cooperation of the Ivano-Frankovo, Lvov, and Ternopol Oblasts was highlighted in a special question. What do you think of such cooperation, especially its effectiveness?

[Plyushch] You know: The economy of the country is not just in a slump; it is sinking into general chaos. This process started later in our republic than in the others, but there is not much joy in this. The managers of many enterprises and organizations, jointly with local organs

of authority, are attempting to find a way out of the situation that has evolved. But it is a very difficult situation. Monopolism and centralism—previously we called it concentration—led to monstrous manifestations. I do not want to theorize and expand on this. We ourselves feel in full what has happened. But, nevertheless, I have to touch on one problem.

In recent years, a lot has been said about the fact that it is necessary to turn production to the needs of the individual, and, in particular, to change the correlation of enterprises of group A and group B in favor of industries that produce consumer goods. But the people still do not feel this. And the situation is such that if we rely only on Kiev and Moscow, everything will remain the same, and there will be a lot that we will not achieve. It is better in many ways if this process comes from below, and if the center draws general conclusions, and introduces the necessary corrections. It seems that this is what they tried to do in Lvov.

Republics and individual regions, trying to defend their own interests and the interests of the people living in them, are looking for a way out. In the opinion of those deputies who gathered in Lvov, unification of the efforts of the three oblast soviets will help survival. The session emphasized the special importance of the mutual obligations undertaken in it for the conduct of joint structural, investment, and environmental policy, and other actions. For the organization of partnership activity, it was decided to create a coordination soviet with workers' organs in Lvov.

It is important to emphasize that the documents approved by the session emphasize: Direct economic and other relations must be conducted on the basis of legislation in effect.

In conclusion, I will say this on this question. Since a course has been set on market relations, it is necessary to support the efforts of the western oblasts to have their own production priorities. Under market conditions, objective economic laws must and will rule, and not the interests of individuals or political parties.

[Sokol] The deputies who assembled in Lvov considered the political situation in the region. What is the situation here? What evaluation is it being given, and what is your personal opinion of this problem?

[Plyushch] Today's political situation disturbs everyone. We talk about it at work, at home, and among friends. It is put on the agenda of political movements and public organizations. The deputies of the krais about whom we are talking are also worried in this regard. There are quite enough problems here. There was talk, in particular, about the need to observe democratic and legal norms in the resolution of regional tasks. I should talk about this question as well.

The deputies of the western oblasts expressed concern regarding the fact that, in connection with the condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, appeals can be

heard in the states neighboring our republic for a revision of the existing borders. The session unanimously expressed itself for the indivisibility and the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ukraine. In the appeal to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet that was adopted, the deputies of the region propose the promulgation of a political and legal basis for the current borders of the republic. I think that their word will find a response.

[Sokol] As far as I know, the problem of the all-Union referendum was discussed at the Lvov meeting of the deputies. What can you say in this regard? The opinion exists that the western oblasts are against the referendum.

[Plyushch] On the contrary. A majority is for. But for what kind of a Union?

In the western oblasts, as in the republic, the people are ready to take part in the all-Union referendum that is scheduled for 17 March. As is well-known, the wording of the question presented by the USSR Supreme Soviet does not please many, either deputies or voters. The Supreme Soviet of the republic, as you know, passed a resolution on this question.

In the Ukraine, along with a Union ballot, the voters will turn in a republic ballot. The Ukrainian SSR will finally confirm its content next week. It should reflect the principles set forth in the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine. Our new union is seen as a union of sovereign republics-states. I think that a majority of the people in the Donets, Dnepr, and Polesye areas, and in the western oblasts, are for such a union.

Several days ago, it was said from the rostrum of the USSR Supreme Soviet that tomatoes should not cost as much in places where they are grown as, for example, in Moscow, or beyond the polar circle. An interesting thought. We simply are obliged to look around and weigh the realities. Unity is necessary, but independence and diversity must not be lost in it.

[Sokol] I have heard that the measures about which we are talking have a separatist character. How would you comment on this statement?

[Plyushch] I do not agree with this opinion. Similar charges, it is true, are becoming fashionable, but this does not change the facts of the case. I will repeat what has been said: The assumption that the deputy forum in Lvov will lay the necessary brick for Galician autonomy has turned out to be unwarranted.

Up until now, some have been suffering from the "traditional" suspicion—of individual persons, collectives, and even regions. This kind of position is extremely harmful.

It is necessary for us to look deeply into the reality and draw the correct conclusions.

[Sokol] Ivan Stepanovich, you were in Lvov officially as a representative of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium?

[Plyushch] Yes, I, and also Mikhail Vasilyevich Grishko, chairman of the commission of the Supreme Soviet, officially took part in the session of the three oblast soviets. We were executing instructions from the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium. By the way, another question can also be read into your question: Why do I participate in meetings that are habitually designated as opposition. I answer: I am assigned this work. In passing, I will say one more thing.

Dialogue with the dissenters is difficult. With those who defend extreme positions, it is simply impossible. But to work with thinking and unusual people is both interesting and necessary. When the Supreme Soviet had just begun work, in one of the interviews that I gave, I think it was to you, I said that I do not belong to any parliamentary faction, and, in any case, I try to be independent and objective with each people's deputy. I hold to this line now as well.

In Lvov, the deputies expressed various, even unacceptable, political views, and they gave events and phenomena incorrect evaluations. But in our talk, I purposely did not dwell on these aspects, because it is not they that defined the substance of the matter. Aggravation is harmful to us. Harmony is needed, and constructive work.

### Growth of Nationalism in Lvov Viewed

91UN1016A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by A. Lysyuk under the rubric "Notes on Nationalism": "An Ersatz Ideal Originating in Lvov"]

[Text] Lvov—At the beginning of last year I. Drach, Kievan poet and chairman of Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika], snapped out, "Only a great-power chauvinist masquerading as an internationalist could go looking for nationalism in the Ukraine."

But at the end of that same year Ye. Hryniv, his compatriot and comrade in the republic parliament, made a statement of another sort at a session of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, one that was not protested by any of those in attendance. Embracing the audience with a wide gesture, he said, "We are all nationalists. ...We are nationalists because we defend the interests of our nation within the limits of our structures."

One asks: How did nationalists suddenly appear out of thin air across a period of several months?

The question is a rhetorical one. Because Ivan Drach was being evasive. At the very moment he was pinning the label of "great-power chauvinists" on his opponents, one did not have to go far to find nationalism and those

who practiced it. They were crawling out of every nook and cranny. And they were the ones who masqueraded as internationalists.

Once the first step had been made and it had been "proven" that there was no nationalism to be found, it was necessary to create an attitude of tolerance—the kind of protective atmosphere in which the beginnings of nationalism could establish themselves and gather strength.

But tolerance is still not everything. Nationalism will wither without an excess of democracy. (From such an excess of democracy, says Francois Mitterrand, recalling the lessons of history, can come tyranny).

O. Vitovich, deputy of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, also emerged from such an excess of democracy one day (after I. Drach's statement about the "absence of a presence"). At the Lvov's central square he made a speech: "Today we need a change of reference points. We are no longer satisfied with the slogan 'An Independent Ukrainian State.' We dream of a superstate, we dream of supremacy of the Ukrainian nation. We dream of a state that itself may dictate conditions to the whole world. We dream of a Ukrainian nation that will stand not equal with but three or ten heads higher than other nations. We understand that this struggle will be deadly: Either the Muscovites will beat us or we will beat them. There is no other alternative. Let us not indulge too much in democracy and other forms of parliamentary struggle. There are also other forms of struggle. In the future there will arise new regiments and battalions of members of the OUN ('Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists' or, in common parlance, 'Banderites'—Author), that will lead the nation to victory. Even if this victory is paid for with blood."

It is not often that the leaders of nationalism are so open. Their rules call for a discrepancy between what is said and what is done. After all, Bandera's gangs had a similar instructions: "When a boyevka (detachment—Author) fights, we say that we do not know anything about it."

For example, this is done in the following way. Mikhail Kosiv, deputy chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet Executive Committee and deputy of the republic parliament, publicly declares that the Society for the Ukrainian Language is not a political but a cultural organization. But O. Petryk, deputy of the oblast soviet, representing the interests of that society, Rukh, and the law simultaneously, publicly tears down a wall newspaper issued in Russian at a construction administration.

Or it happens this way. "Unknowns" pour paint on the monument to Soviet intelligence agent Nikolay Kuznetsov, and known people, signing their names, in advance call a documentary film being prepared about him "chauvinist" because Kuznetsov died... at the hands of the Banderites. Now they, and not he, are considered heroes. We also know who considers them heroes. They

are the deputies of the Lvov City Soviet who removed his name from Kuznetsov Street.

The numbers of nationalists who have removed their masks and the numbers of their increasingly open and fierce speeches around Lvov are growing. Could this be grounds for fear? Well, consider: Ten or so radical orators have turned up—let them read the air, what harm does it do. After all, one is already exposed to such things.

But what of constitutional and criminal provisions that prohibit incitement of nationalist enmity? That is the first point.

Second, when those same "ten or so" active nationalists are armed with several hundred thousand copies of their own newspaper, as they are in Lvov, a newspaper that is officially considered a publication of the oblast soviet, and when they have at their disposal the local radio and television, which are considered state property, then the assertion that nationalism is rearing its head in the area of Lvov does not seem to be an exaggeration.

Here is an example of the articles and the position of the "independent" newspaper of the oblast soviet. Under the rubric "For the Ukraine and Its Freedom" is the article "The People's Avenger." We read: "At the beginning of 1949 Bogdan met Major Bugaev, chief of the rayon military commissariat, and his wife in the center of Dobromil several meters from the office of the militia and the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. He fired at point-blank range and killed him on the spot. He himself disappeared without a trace." It goes on to record other terrorist activities of the "people's avenger."

There is no issue of the newspaper that does not savor the "achievements" of the Banderites in one fashion or another. But there was not a single article that described how the Banderites settled accounts with their own countrymen—the paper is not interested in the 30,000 peaceful residents who were killed and tortured. It has a different task—to demonstrate that the Banderites fought exclusively with the NKVD and "occupiers" in order to arouse hatred toward the "Muscovites." It is no rarity to see in the newspaper statements about a search for fellow soldiers of the "Galitsiya" SS division or "fighters" of the UPA—Banderites from the so-called "Ukrainian Insurrection Army." They are looking for one another. The grounds for such a propagandistic onslaught were laid by an almost three-year stage of aggressive "story creation." This production of "historical tales" that are disseminated in the Lvov region orally and through print has pursued one goal—to introduce into the mass consciousness of the Galicians an image of their immunity, exclusivity, and supremacy over others, including the Ukrainians from the eastern oblast of the republic.

As though summing up the results of this stage of "story creation," one of those who took an active part in it—I. Los, deputy of the oblast soviet and assistant professor of

journalism at Lvov University—recently said, “We remembered who our fathers are. Out of the depths of the centuries we called forth our ancestors and those great-great-grandfathers who, under the name of ‘Aryans,’ settled northwestern India.”

Compare the sermons of these “intellectuals” to the statements of Nazi storm troopers... This is the soil in which “everyday” nationalism grows. It is somewhat dissipated, occasional, and episodic—according to Drach it supposedly does not exist at all. But it is there. It is palpable in the lines, at work, and on public transportation. It is insolent and boorish, and for that reason people sometimes ascribe it to the misfortune of our common lack of culture. But this kind of “lack of culture” for some reason always has a nationalist and degrading character. Degrading for both sides, incidentally: As a rule, after any escapade of a “street” type, an oppressive silence hangs over the public place. You do not know what it consists of—condemnation or support and to whom they are addressed.

Do you remember the statement of Ye. Hryniv? “We...defend the interests of our nation within the limits of our structures.” If it were only that, it would be a small loss. But when such a structure becomes the governmental power, when the governmental power for the nationalists becomes “their own,” then it is quite a different situation. Then Yaroslav Velichko, chairman of the Nikolayevskiy Rayon Soviet, heads a crowd of Greek-Catholic believers and leads it against the Russian Orthodox, believing them to be a “bulwark of Moscow and the KGB.” Then Igor Popovich, chairman of the Stryi City Soviet Executive Committee, takes part in a triumphant ceremony memorializing a Banderite—the chief of staff of the UPA. Then Lvov’s Leninskiy Rayon Soviet allots enormous sums to maintain the nationalist youth organization “Plast”...

Finally, the “limits of our structures” took the form of a Committee of Civil Salvation (the initial name was Committee of National Defense). Created at the initiative of the authorities, this committee was headed by V. Chernovil, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, who was allotted “special powers in those extreme situations where there is no time to assemble a committee, a soviet, or a presidium.” As M. Horyn, deputy chairman of the oblast soviet, explained, “You should be prepared so that we are not caught with empty hands.”

In this manner, the authorities have created... a structure that is superior to the government and is strengthened by a unified ideological purpose.

Recently I. Kalynets, chief of the Lvov Oblast board of public education, spoke about the arrival of schoolchildren from the eastern oblasts of the Ukraine to these regions. The children, she said, were clearly frightened and initially looked to see “where that Banderite with the knife in his teeth” was.

I do not know who needs those yarns and their dissemination—there is no one with a knife or with the sawed-off rifle of a “Banderite.”

But something else is true: The Russian-speaking population is experiencing moral and psychological discomfort—like that chief engineer of a major factory who was advised by angry rowdies, “Go home to your Ryazan!” The Russian-speaking population is predicting its future in gloomy tones. This was confirmed in a recent sociological poll by VTsIOM [All-Union Central Institute for the Study of Public Opinion], which V. Chernovil, chairman of the oblast soviet, hastened to repudiate by promising to take action against the “Lvov branch of Zaslavskaya’s institute” and to organize his “own independent poll.” The nature of the reaction of the local authorities was, as always, traditional: The central press is distorting the true situation, and nothing is happening in Lvov.

But what is in fact happening here?

“Lvov-style” nationalism, like any other, would cease to be what it is if only it remained “open,” like the outpourings of Vitovich, and did not change its appearance in conformity with the situation. But it is transforming itself. Let the mob, the “street” types continue to feed the people with hostility to the “Muscovites,” the “elder brother,” in their own environment; let them even, if they wish, demonstrate it—even that will not harm the “cause.” But human values are taught even in kindergarten, and a direct attack does not profit these people, and they find it necessary to change their tune and their appearance.

And they are changing it: Moscow becomes the center, Russia becomes an empire. They designate new subjects of hate, without which nationalism is senseless. They add the CPSU and the Union treaty. All these concepts are like a watchword for the Lvov rallies—“Hanba!” that is to say “Shame!” Each person in the crowd feels morally elevated when he can embarrass someone, and with the cry “Shame!” he raises himself to a great moral height. The people in the crowd who are crying out “Shame!” quite sincerely believe that they are denouncing those who are guilty of causing the social and economic disorders. Thus they are inspired by the politics of a blue and yellow stripe.

It is fine to inspire people, but they have not said what the goal is. But, as always, it is simple: To distract people from the real problems that the “soviets without Communists” should be studying. Because the preelection criticism that they once voiced is returning like a boomerang to the soviets now that they themselves are the powers that be. One can already hear a daily rumble, and a marvel of popular folklore is being revived—the anecdote and the kolomyika, as folk verse is called here. As it was in a totalitarian society, they are told and sung in the kitchen and in one’s circle of close friends. There is a rumor that a specially created department of the KGB is creating the folklore, but it is enough to glance at the

Galician specimens of witticisms collected by Ivan Franko to understand that the "reasoning and creative resources of the people are great." Without any outside help.

As soon as symptoms of "reason" begin to appear, the nationalists turn to their favorite recourse—they use the most varied methods to awaken negative emotional feelings. For example, the exchange of bank notes was denounced and propagandized by a certain portion of the local press as a "terrorist act of the center" against mere mortals. There were no reports about any "victims" of it afterward. And on the eve of the institution of the presidential ukase on street patrols, tanks appeared in Lvov... on the pages of those same newspapers. The militia patrols reinforced by soldiers are patrolling their routes. But in their wake comes the question, "Why does the military officer or warrant officer need a pistol?"

The ones who ask are most likely those who have not become a statistic: Over the last three years crime in Lvov has increased by a factor of three.

As everywhere else, there is not very much sausage and other foods, but any complaint made by someone with an empty stomach is considered base and is denounced along with the center and the empire—hanba! Great ideas require small sacrifices. Any patriot knows this. And the chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee knows this all the more. "Using the new parties," says B. Boyko, deputy chairman of the Ternopol Oblast soviet executive committee, "we must communicate to the broad masses that there will only be sausage when the Ukraine is free."

Nationalism would not be nationalism if it did not declare its existence with an idea and a struggle for the idea. Ye. Yevtushenko called nationalism an "ersatz ideal." He has put it strongly, but not accurately. "I hate the word mass..."—he also said this, and it is accurate. Nationalism, even when it is "ersatz," is able and willing to turn "I" into a mass.

Tbilisi, Karabakh, Lithuania... They ask, who is guilty, who gave the command? Who is asking?

Is it not nationalism?

After all, the question can also be put this way if one is to be consistent and acknowledge that an idea becomes a material force when it takes possession of the masses. But who says that a destructive idea cannot take possession of the masses as well?

## Caucasus

### Yerevan Popularity Poll Ranks Armenian Political Figures, Parties

91US0322A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 4,  
24 Jan 91 p 1

["Popularity Ratings"—EPOKHA headline]

[Text] We are publishing some of the results of a public opinion poll. The poll was conducted by telephone in the city of Yerevan by a sociological group from Elton NTTM [Science and Technology Activities of Young People].

Which of Armenia's political figures do you trust most?						
	Women (179)		Men (150)		Total (330)	
	No	Percent	No	Percent	No	Percent
L. Ter-Petrosyan	77	43	56	37	133	40
G. Arutyunyan	8	4	7	5	15	4
V. Manukyan	4	2	5	3	9	3
P. Ayrikyan	13	7	12	8	25	7.6
G. Pogosyan	-	-	1	0.6	1	0.3
S. Sarkisyan	-	-	1	0.6	1	0.3
K. Sardaryan	1	0.6	-	-	1	0.3
G. Igityan	-	-	3	12	3	1
A. Galstyan	-	-	1	0.6	1	0.3
A. Navasardyan	-	-	1	0.6	1	0.3
V. Sarkisyan	-	-	1	0.6	1	0.3
Z. Balayan	4	2	1	0.6	5	1.5
R. Kazaryan	2	1	3	12	5	1.5
B. Ararktsyan	1	0.5	-	-	1	0.3
Kh. Stamboltsyan	5	3	1	0.6	6	2
S. Pogosyan	-	-	3	12	3	1
S. Arutyunyan	1	0.5	-	-	1	0.3



## Which of Armenia's political figures do you trust most? (Continued)

	Women (179)		Men (150)		Total (330)	
	No	Percent	No	Percent	No	Percent
I. Muradyan	2	1	2	1.3	4	1
A. Manucharyan	1	0.5	1	0.6	2	0.6
Do not trust anyone	34	19	18	12	52	16
Do not know	26	15	34	23	60	18

## Which of Armenia's political parties or public organizations do you support?

	Women (179)		Men (151)		Total (330)	
	No	Percent	No	Percent	No	Percent
Greens	1	0.5	4	2.6	5	1.5
AOD [Armenian Pan-national Movement]	44	25	29	19	73	22
Dashnaksutyun	8	4	17	11	25	8
Democratic Platform of the Armenian Communist Party	3	2	5	3	8	2.4
AIM [National Self-Determination Association]	12	6.7	16	11	28	8
Republican Party	2	1	1	0.6	3	1
Communist Party of Armenia	3	2	8	5	11	3.3
Constitutional law	-	-	-	-	-	-
Christian-Democratic Party	1	0.5	-	-	1	0.3
Ramkavar-azatakan	5	3	18	12	23	7
Do not know	39	22	17	11	56	17
Do not support any	55	31	36	24	91	27

## Azerbaijani Political Parties Law Explained

91US0319A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
23 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Azerbaijan SSR Minister of Justice Alisaab Orudzhev by A. Guseynov, AZERINFORM correspondent; place and date not given: "The Law on Parties Has Taken Effect"]

[Text] The USSR Law on Public Associations that allows the operation of various political parties and movements in our country took effect in January of this year. USSR and Union republic ministries of justice have been instructed to register them. An AZERINFORM correspondent approached Azerbaijan SSR Minister of Justice Alisaab Orudzhev with a request to discuss how such work proceeds in our republic.

[Orudzhev] This issue is regulated by Resolution No. 246 of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers dated 6 June 1990. Pursuant to this resolution, the Republic Ministry of Justice registers republicwide parties and organizations, whereas local public associations of citizens are registered by rayon and city executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies. Work has now been completed on the draft Azerbaijan SSR Law on Public Associations, which also provides for participation by proper organs in resolving the above issues. In

addition, the draft authorizes the Ministry of Justice to register international public associations which, in keeping with their regulations or statutes, extend their operations not only to the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, but also to the territories of another, or several other, Union republics, of one or several foreign states.

[Guseynov] Please tell us what is needed in order to register a public association?

[Orudzhev] A public association may be created on the initiative of no fewer than 10 people. In this reference, as the draft law indicates, republic political parties and trade union associations should consist of no fewer than 1,000 people. I would like to point out to you that, under the all-Union law, the strength of political parties and trade unions for registration purposes should be over 5,000 people. The draft law sets special guidelines for filing registration petitions. Thus, a petition to register a public organization should be filed within one month of the day it adopts its statute. The petition is signed by the members of the leading organ of this public association, with the places of residence of all of them indicated. A statute or regulation and minutes of the founding congress (conference) or a general meeting that has passed them are enclosed with the petition. The petition to

register a statute is reviewed for two months, and subsequently an appropriate decision is made. After this, the association pays state duty in keeping with the law.

[Guseynov] What requirements should the statute of a public association meet in order to get registered?

[Orudzhev] Public associations are not registered and their operations are not allowed if their statutes or operations are determined to be overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional system, changing the territorial integrity of the republic forcibly, or contain propaganda of war, violence, and cruelty, or fuel social, including class, race, ethnic, and religious discord, as well as other actions entailing criminal penalties. It is forbidden to create paramilitary formations. Public organizations that engage in commercial operations under the guise of charity will not be registered because the law does not give us the right to register commercial organizations. It is not allowed to register two or more organizations with the same name. Individuals filing a petition will be notified if registration of a statute is turned down. Decisions to refuse registration may be appealed to the courts.

[Guseynov] Should public organizations that are registered as of today be reregistered after the above draft law is adopted?

[Orudzhev] Yes, naturally. Moreover, existing public organizations that will not be reregistered during 1991 will be considered unregistered, and their activities will be considered illegal. This is why all public associations regardless of who they were previously registered by—the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Justice, or city (rayon) executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies—should cleanse themselves right away of random individuals who have penetrated their ranks in order to satisfy their ambitions or for other unseemly purposes, and reapply for registration. It should be kept in mind that the authority of all public associations depends on the maturity of their members and specific endeavors that they accomplish.

[Guseynov] Many public associations have already sprung up in our republic; their number is likely to increase further in the future. Who will monitor their operation and how?

[Orudzhev] The Ministry of Justice of the republic has registered 37 public associations by now. In addition, documents of eight parties and four public associations have been accepted for review. The organization of a special department within the Ministry of Justice structure is envisaged with a view to organizing the monitoring of their operations. An extra 15 to 20 staff positions will be required to this end. We have repeatedly approached proper organs. However, the issue still has not been resolved favorably. It is important to monitor the activities of public associations in order to avert unlawful deviations in their operation in time. I would like to stress that if departures from the law are found in the activities of a public association, the organ

that registered it or the procuracy may institute proceedings to discontinue its operation. The courts are entrusted with considering such lawsuits.

### Georgian, Ossetian Refugees Interviewed

91US0345A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 91  
Second Edition p 8

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondents G. Ovcharenko and S. Cheremin: "Strangers Among Their Own People"]

[Text] Mtskheta-Tskhinvali-Vladikavkaz—"The problem of the national minorities is not that appreciable a problem because it is contrived. The most noise about it is being made by the center in order to cause interethnic conflicts here (in Georgia—authors). For example, the illegal territorial formation called South Ossetia was created by the Bolsheviks in 1922. An ethnic state of the non-Georgian population has become established here in the years of Soviet power. Georgians have become a national minority on their own land. Their rights are being infringed and they are suffering discrimination and oppression, which could be compared with apartheid"....

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

...We were headed for ancient Mtskheta by no means to see the historical sights. Journalists are frequent visitors here at present, and the final destination of their itinerary is not the old church on the high cliff, but a tourist center where refugees have found refuge. How many there are of them in Georgia no one can say exactly. There are over 5,000 who have been registered alone. We were barely out of the car before we were immediately surrounded by women and children. Plain village clothes, coveralls, head scarves—many had fled from their homes without having had time to snatch up warm clothes even, had fled from the violence, leaving their ravaged hearths behind. Their pain, grievances, and distress cannot be put into words. You would have to see them, these people, who have become social odd men out overnight. Vying with one another, they describe the horrors they have experienced.

"They came and demanded that I give up my husband, who is a Georgian," Z. Pliyeva recalled. "Then they started to threaten me: We will kill your child unless you clear out of the village. Look, I had to walk like this with my little one for several hours in the forest, in heavy snow. I nearly got lost in the night."

"The "Vremya" program says that Georgians are oppressing the Ossetians. This is a lie," V. Cheotashvili joins the conversation. "On the contrary, all Georgians have fled Tskhinvali: The Ossetians are breaking into their homes and beating up even pregnant women and old men. We are completely desperate here and are prepared to expel the Ossetians living in Tbilisi. Let them give us their apartments and themselves clear off to

North Ossetia. They have land there, and good riddance if they do not want to be subordinate to the Republic of Georgia."

"All that has been stolen from our homes in Tskhinvali the Ossetians are selling at the bazaar in Vladikavkaz," N. Gogiashvili says. "They would not sell us bread in the stores, and in the village of Avnevi they beat up our menfolk for defending their land. The Army is helping them: Valuables are being taken away in armored personnel carriers, and in the guise of food they are being delivered weapons."

"And they burned down my house also," one refugee continued. "I am here with two children. Who will take care of me, I have no husband. Look, I am wearing someone else's coat, someone else's shoes.... When Gorbachev's edict was broadcast on the radio, Ossetians shouted in the streets: 'Victory Day!' 'The president is on our side, we've nothing to be afraid of!'"

We scrutinized the faces of these people and could not imagine how peace between the two peoples could be restored. We were distressed most by the mutual dislike, vengeance, and hatred, which have become deeply ingrained in human hearts. The mere idea of reconciliation is seen as blasphemous. We looked into their eyes and saw an unshakable faith in their rightness. And the women went on to say that the Ossetians knew about the coming bloodshed ahead of time and sold their homes before leaving, that Russian soldiers were drinking with the Ossetians, selling weapons, and walking around with their pockets stuffed with wads of money, and that Gen K. Tsagolov had arrived from Moscow with 6,000 airborne troops and was now pillaging and robbing the Georgian inhabitants of Tskhinvali. And there was no end to the stories of torments and insults....

Today they are left without shelter, are embittered and see as the main source of evil people with different blood. They believe any rumors. They are prepared to take up arms and shed this blood, the blood of the enemy. And we recalled an incident which occurred in a Tskhinvali hospital, where a severely wounded Georgian urgently needed to be given a blood transfusion. An Ossetian nurse gave her blood at that time. She gave it because there lay on the operating table not a Georgian or Ossetian but a person in whom life was ebbing away and who needed to be saved. We are sure that a Georgian woman would have done exactly the same....

So where is that barrier beyond which the animosity which separates truth from lies ends? When will our feelings cease to be stirred by the dry news releases from the press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on those killed and wounded? When will this river of blood, which has no ford, dry up?

Yes, they have a roof over their heads, attempts are being made to feed them tolerably and they are being helped out with clothing. But they will never forget that they are refugees, homeless people. And this thought is in itself demeaning.

Refugees have also been living in the officer's club of the helicopter pilot base in Tskhinvali. At the very height of the fighting approximately 1,000 persons took refuge among the military. They included Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians, Russians. They had made their way to the checkpoint on the outskirts of Tskhinvali for one purpose: to save themselves and get their children out of the thick of it. For at home they could not approach a window, they slept on the floor—a stray bullet could fly in at any moment. And a bullet makes no distinction as to nationality. It brings death, before which all are equal. At that time the family of an Ossetian officer gave shelter to a Georgian family, kept them warm and helped evacuate them. And there are a multitude of such examples.

In the yard of the Vladikavkaz School of Printing the slogans "No One and Nothing Are Forgotten" and "The Success of Perestroika Lies in Civic Harmony!" caught the eye. It was strange reading these echoes of poster propaganda since there were in the hostel nearby 60 refugees from South Ossetia.

"Refugees have been taken in in many vocational-technical schools," V. Chekoyev, director of Vocational-Technical School No. 1, says. "We mainly have women and children from Tskhinvali. They began to arrive on 22 January, but we have still not been allocated additional funds for food. Our dining hall director is having to rush around the depots and shake up what he can.... So far we are coping and feeding the people well. Public movements are helping also and allocating money, and we are counting on Moscow...."

This hope is on the lips of all with whom we spoke during the assignment. People want to believe that "no one is forgotten." But as yet, alas, things have not gone beyond promises and declarations. Yes, the press is writing about them and television coverage is being devoted to them, but when will it be time for decisive measures to be adopted? After all, no end to the conflict is in sight, and the number of refugees is continuing to grow. There are already more than 10,000 of them in North Ossetia. These are just the ones who have been registered, but how many more are there with relatives?

"We came because it was frightening," L. Tskhovrebova recalls. "The Georgian militia and the informals were committing outrages in Tskhinvali day and night. The shooting did not stop for a minute even. Armed with assault rifles, they would break into the house and, on the pretext of searching for weapons, would set about downright robbery. We left at night by the ravines and the forest and made our way by icy paths to Dzhava. We crossed from there by bus."

"The real Georgian militia was itself afraid of the militants," R. Sanakoyev said. "It was they who warned us not to walk the streets, where the informals had to be shooting. Although there were 'militia officers' who behaved worse than the fascists and who were shooting at unarmed women and children."

"God forbid that anyone should have to go through such trouble," S. Slanova wept. "I would never have believed that Georgians could commit such brutality and deal so cold-bloodedly with old men and our sons and daughters. It is Gamsakhurdia who has stupefied his people and ordered them to take the knife to their brothers. It is he who is all the while drumming it into people that we are 'guests' and second-rate people. We want to return to our native parts, we were born there, our home is there."

"They can return, but the Georgians have turned my village into a Khatyn, they have burned all the homes to ashes. This should be left as a reminder to posterity about the 'valor' of people pretending to the title of cultured nation," A. Tichiyeva from the village of Mamitykau says through her tears. "We jumped out of the window, when the house was already burning, and barely saved the children. Just watch their "Muambe" ("Vremya"—authors) television program—its nationalism makes me sick; anyone would go out and kill after having been primed this way. We ask the soldiers to protect us, but they reply: 'We don't have orders, we can't interfere.' But neither did Gamsakhurdia give the order to kill Ossetians, but they are being killed. Let the soldiers protect us without orders."

...Here also, as in Mtskheta, it is an endless tale of woe. Here also we heard how old and young were taunted in public view.

"The appearance of the refugees has led, unfortunately, to an explosion of crime," V. Medveditskov, deputy interior minister of North Ossetia, said. "Some of them are engaging in anti-Georgian actions: calling them up, sending letters, threatening to abduct their children. There have been attempts to form fighting groups from the local youth, to stop the gas-delivery stations and switch off the gas pipeline which goes into Georgia. A number of serious crimes have been committed. Thus several days ago two juveniles were arrested: They had chalked up three break-ins. Armed attacks on apartments and many instances of hooliganism have been recorded, and people are behaving audaciously in the street and in public places."

Yes, for small North Ossetia the appearance of thousands of "superfluous" people is a serious problem. It had the highest population density in the North Caucasus as it was. And the allocation to the refugees of land for construction could exacerbate relations with the Ingush population, which claims part of the republic territory. Humanitarian assistance is scant as yet also.

And mention should be made of one further aspect. The status of the refugees has yet to be defined in the country. No one knows who is responsible for their appearance, how to compensate them for the loss of property, and on what grounds to find them work, give them residence permits, and render them financial support. While our members of parliament are spending their days in heated debate and generating dozens of not always pertinent laws, the number of refugees is growing, and no one is

tackling their problems. We were told both in Tbilisi and in Tskhinvali, that people have been left to the whim of fate.

Nonetheless, we believe this is not the case. The center is adopting measures to preserve the USSR and halt the national fratricide and, consequently, prevent hundreds of thousands of people being condemned to forced migration. And if this goal is achieved, peace in our home will be achieved also.

Our multinational people aspires to this also. But there are still forces which, having arrogated to themselves the right to speak on people's behalf, are attempting to separate them, set them at odds with one another and isolate them in national apartments. They want to divide us in order subsequently to rule us. And, flouting current laws, flouting the country's constitution, they are denying people both in that same Georgia and in a number of other republics their right to participate in the Union referendum. Why? Because they are simply afraid that the results of the nationwide ballot will show that people are for the Union, that separatism and chauvinism are alien to them....

Georgians, Ossetians, Russians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis.... How many of them have been driven from their native parts and are wandering in foreign surroundings? Read one more time the quotation which begins this report. It is after such statements that there appear refugees—strangers among their own people....

## Central Asia

### Kirghiz Parliament Discusses Cabinet Ministers Issue

#### Information Report

91US0339A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 1

[Information Report from the first day of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Supreme Soviet Third Session: "Parliament Has Supported the President's Proposals as Considered, Balanced, and Taking Into Account a Wide Spectrum of Public Opinion"]

[Text] On January 22 in Frunze the third phase of the third session of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 12th Supreme Soviet started its work.

The morning session was opened by Supreme Soviet Chairman M.Sh. Sherimkulov.

The deputies remembered with a minute of silence those who had perished during the days of the tragic events in the Baltics.

People's Deputy S. Kamalov proposed to send, on behalf of the republic Supreme Soviet, a letter of appeal to the

embassies of the United States, Iraq, and Kuwait to stop the bloodshed in the Persian Gulf. The proposal was adopted.

The session also adopted an agenda for its third phase. In addition to issues presented earlier, a number of new ones were proposed. Among them: on the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Cabinet of Ministers; on the implementation of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 16 January 1991 on organizational measures and the conduct of the USSR referendum on the question of preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; on designating the day for the people's holiday "Navruz"; on deputies' inquiries addressed to the Supreme Soviet third session; and on changes and additions to the Kirghiz SSR Constitution (Basic Law).

After that, upon the presentation of the Credentials Commission chairman, Deputy K. Turganov, the session confirmed the Kirghiz SSR people's deputy credentials from 212d Northern Electoral District of Osha city for M. Abdurakhmanov, who was elected on 13 January to replace another deputy who had left the deputy corps.

Then the deputies went on to discuss the proposed Republic of Kyrgyzstan Cabinet of Ministers. The lead report on the topic was presented by the Republic President A. Akayev. (His report is published in the current issue of this newspaper.)

#### Akayev on New Administrative System

91US0339B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 1

[Kirghiz Telegraph Agency report on speech by Republic of Kyrgyzstan President A. Akayev at Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Third Session: "Toward New Quality in Administration"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

If we were to characterize the main direction of the third session of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 12th Supreme Soviet's activities, the best way to define it would be to say that it is to form a qualitatively new political system and new state structures, and to create an effective mechanism for the functioning of the state.

You, Comrade Deputies, have already made the first, but most important, steps in this direction: You established the offices of president and vice president, defined their status, and laid the fundamental legal foundation for local self-governing, whereby the substance, contents, functions, and forms of activities of local soviets of people's deputies will fundamentally change.

Today, in this phase of the session, we must start to form, so to say, a general staff of the executive and administrative powers—the Cabinet of Ministers.

There is no need, I think, to go into details of differences between the status of this Cabinet of Ministers and that of the old Council of Ministers. I will name only the

basic features that characterize the political and legal status of the Cabinet of Ministers as they are set in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan law of 14 December 1990.

First of all, the Cabinet of Ministers is the republic's executive-administrative organ; it answers to the president of the republic, and conducts its activities under his leadership.

The Cabinet of Ministers reports to the republic Supreme Soviet and the republic president, and is answerable to them.

The composition of the Cabinet of Ministers includes a prime minister, secretaries of state, ministers, and chairmen of state committees. It is empowered to decide matters of state administration that are within the competence of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, with the exception of those that are within the competence of the Supreme Soviet and the president.

What are the functions of the Cabinet of Ministers? I will name the most important.

First, the development and implementation of the measures to ensure the growth of the commonwealth and culture of the people; the development of science and technology; the rational use and protection of natural resources; and the development of market relations in the national-economic complex of the republic.

Second, the development of current and long-term state plans of economic, social, and cultural development, and of the republic's state budget.

Third, the ensuring of comprehensive economic and social and cultural development of the republic.

Fourth, the implementation of measures aimed at ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and protection of property and public order.

Fifth, ensuring that the obligations stemming from the republic's agreements with the Union, other Union republics, and foreign states are carried out.

Finally, supervision of the executive-administrative activities of the lower-level soviets under the direct leadership of the president.

As we can see, the spectrum of the Cabinet of Ministers functions is quite wide and multifaceted. Correspondingly, the degree of its responsibility for the successful implementation of these functions is also great.

The Cabinet of Ministers unites and directs the work of the republic's ministries and state committees and other organizations under its jurisdiction.

A few words about the legal forms of the Cabinet of Ministers' activities. It issues decrees, organizes their implementation, and checks that they are complied with. Since the Cabinet of Ministers is a collegium organ, its



decrees are signed by the prime minister, who also has the right to singlehandedly issue decrees within the limits of his jurisdiction.

As to the ministries and state committees under the Cabinet's jurisdiction, they are responsible for the state of affairs and the development of their respective spheres of administration.

It should be noted that the republic's Constitution defines the structure, functions, and competence of the Cabinet of Ministers only in a general form. Their more specific and detailed definition should be provided in a special law: "On the Cabinet of Ministers" of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

During the first phase of this session, the republic Supreme Soviet charged the Council of Ministers with preparation of the draft law: "On the Cabinet of Ministers."

The work that has been accomplished in line with this assignment showed that we need time to accumulate and interpret the experience of executive-administrative activities under the conditions of a presidential republic, and to compare this experience with the relevant experience on the Union level and in other Union republics. In short, haste is not our ally in this matter.

For this reason, I am asking the Supreme Soviet to extend the deadline for finishing the work on this draft law, and to permit it to be presented to the next session. Meanwhile, I think, the Cabinet of Ministers could start its work, using existing constitutional norms as guidance.

Comrade Deputies, at the beginning of this session you considered the tentative scheme of the republic state administration. Some additional work has been done on it, taking into account your comments, but it will not be presented for your consideration today. The point is that this scheme by itself does not have legislative meaning. Strictly speaking, it should represent a graphic illustration of the main points of the law: "On the Cabinet of Ministers" and their interaction. Since the work on the draft law continues, the work on the scheme has not been completed either. Also, I think, we make a mistake in attributing too much importance to all kinds of graphs. Our life is so changeable that we have to constantly make corrections to our understanding of its various sides, including the administration.

You charged the Council of Ministers with carrying out the functions and duties of the executive-administrative power until the Cabinet of Ministers is formed.

Comrade Deputies, I think you will agree that the Council of Ministers, headed by esteemed Apas Dzhumagulovich Dzhumagulov, has done a good job.

Let me, on behalf of myself and on your behalf, express our deep appreciation and gratitude to the Council of Ministers and Apas Dzhumagulovich.

In accordance with the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Constitution, the prime minister and state secretaries are appointed by the president and confirmed by the republic Supreme Soviet.

In accordance with these constitutional guidelines, I present for your consideration candidates for the above-mentioned posts and ask you to confirm them.

I would like to note at this point that instead of eight deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, the Cabinet of Ministers will have five state secretaries who will generally carry out similar functions.

The reduction in the number of these high-ranking officials was caused by two types of factors. First, the change in the nature of the administrative activities of the ministries, and of the Cabinet as a whole, under the conditions of transition to a market economy, and the emphasis on the coordinating aspect of these activities. Second, the transfer of a number of administrative functions, mainly in the social-cultural sphere, to the oblast level of state administration and to the local self-governments.

I believe it is necessary for me to explain to the Supreme Soviet my guiding criteria in forming the Cabinet of Ministers. There were several of them. First of all, competence, outstanding moral qualities, and the sense of responsibility to the people in this very difficult time in the life of our republic. Second, the necessity of having the Cabinet composition represent not only Kirghiz but also other nationalities that form the people of Kyrgyzstan, as well as all main regions of the republic. Third, I wanted to combine youth with experience.

Comrade Deputies! In conclusion, I would like to touch upon one procedural question.

In accordance with point 10, Article 114<sup>3</sup> of the republic Constitution, the ministers—Cabinet members—are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, first there is an appropriate presidential decree, and then a Supreme Soviet resolution is adopted.

It seems, however, expedient to use the experience of the USSR Supreme Soviet at this stage of the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers and to slightly change the sequence: first, to present the president's opinion on each candidate for the ministerial post, as a way of presenting this candidate to the Supreme Soviet, and then, having obtained the Supreme Soviet's consent in a form of a resolution, issue decrees on ministerial appointments.

My only motivation for doing it this way is to take into account the opinions and judgments of people's deputies to a maximum possible degree.

I think that the spirit of the constitutional procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers formation—the goal of which is to ensure consensus, agreement, and the unanimity of opinions and initiatives between the representative and

the highest executive power, will not be violated by changing this sequence of actions.

Because of the establishment of new oblasts, members of the presidential council, of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, and of the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement visited the rayons of the oblast currently in the process of being formed; they talked to the people there and familiarized themselves with the state of affairs. As you know, the Supreme Soviet has supported the proposal to create a new oblast—Chuyskaya. Other oblasts existed before, and it is easy to recreate their administrative systems; however, Chuyskaya Oblast is being created for the first time. There are people of many nationalities living there, and it possesses a powerful industrial and agricultural potential which, in many respects, has not been utilized. Taking into account the tremendous significance of Chuyskaya Oblast, as well as the people's wishes, we propose that Comrade A. Dzhumagulov take charge of the organizational committee that will establish the oblast, and then to recommend him for the post of the head of the oblast soviet.

I propose the candidacy of Comrade N. Isanov for the post of prime minister. I do not have to say much about his qualities since all of us just recently went through his confirmation hearings when he was confirmed to the post of the republic's vice president. He graduated from the Academy for National Economy, wrote his thesis on the problems of a market economy, is well-versed in economic matters, and has substantial practical experience. When it comes to knowledge, experience, and human qualities, so far there is no alternative to Comrade Isanov for this post. Therefore I am asking you to confirm him for the post of prime minister.

#### **Amendments to Turkmen Constitution Published**

91US0310A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 22 Jan 91 p 1

[Text of decree: "On Introducing Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Turkmen SSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR hereby **decrees** that the following amendments and additions shall be introduced into the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Turkmen SSR:

1. Part 2, Article 56 shall add the words "organs of state authority and administration" after the word "Functions."

2. Article 81 shall be eliminated.

3. In Article 97:

in Paragraph 10 the words "Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee" shall be eliminated;

the article shall be supplemented by a Paragraph 8<sup>1</sup> with the following contents:

"8<sup>1</sup>) the formation and dissolution of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee; the appointment and dismissal from his post of the chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee upon the proposal of the President of the Turkmen SSR."

4. In Article 100 the words "Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee" shall be replaced by the words "Turkmen SSR State Control Committee."

5. Article 103 after the words "state life" shall add the words "shall give consent to the President of the Turkmen SSR to appoint and dismiss from their posts the deputy chairmen and members of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee."

6. In Article 104 the words "by the President of the Turkmen SSR" shall be eliminated.

7. In Article 108 the words "laws and others" shall be eliminated.

8. In Article 110 the words "Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee" shall be eliminated.

9. In Article 112 the words "Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee" shall be replaced by the words "Turkmen SSR State Control Committee."

10. In Article 113 Part 2 shall be eliminated.

11. In Article 118:

in Paragraph 7 the words "chairman of the Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee" shall be replaced by the words "chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee;"

Paragraph 8 shall add the words "upon agreement with the Presidium of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, the deputy chairmen and members of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be appointed and dismissed from their posts;"

Paragraph 9 shall be set forth in the following version:

"9) shall sign the laws of the Turkmen SSR; he shall have the right—within a two-week period—to return a law along with his own objections to it to the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet for a repeat discussion and vote; if the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet by a two-thirds majority of its votes reaffirms the decision which it had previously adopted, then the President of the Turkmen SSR shall sign the law."

12. In Part 1, Article 125 the words "shall supervise the activities of the lower-ranking Soviets of People's Deputies" shall be replaced by the words "shall coordinate the activities of the lower-ranking Soviets of People's Deputies and the organs of local self-government."

13. In Part 3, Article 128 the words "chairman of the People's Control Committee" shall be eliminated.

14. In Articles 142 and 149 the words "and the conclusions of the Budgetary-Planning and other permanent of standing commissions of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet" shall be replaced by the words "and the conclusions reached by the committees of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet."

[Signed by] S. NIYAZOV, President of the Turkmen SSR.

City of Ashkhabad, 10 January 1991.

### **Law on Turkmen State Control Committee**

91US0310B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 22 Jan 91 p 3

[Text of law: "On the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee"]

[Text]

#### **I. Basic Positions**

#### **Article 1. Purposes of State Control in the Turkmen SSR**

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be instituted for the purpose of exercising monitoring controls on the performance or execution of the Turkmen SSR State Budget, laws of the Turkmen SSR, decrees passed by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, ukases and other acts of the President of the Turkmen SSR regarding matters of economic activity, legality, and efficiency in utilizing the natural, financial, and material resources, as well as preserving and safeguarding the state property of the Turkmen SSR.

#### **Article 2. Legislation Regarding the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be created and perform its activity in accordance with the Constitution of the Turkmen SSR, the present Law, and other legislative acts now in force in the Turkmen SSR.

#### **Article 3. Status of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

As the highest organ of financial and economic control in this republic, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall perform its activities under the direct supervision of the President of the Turkmen SSR.

In order to solve the problems relegated to its competence, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall hold sessions. These sessions shall be deemed legally empowered if they are attended by at least two-thirds of the committee members. The committee's decisions shall be taken by a simple majority of the votes.

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be a juridical person, i.e., a person in the eyes of the law. And it shall have a seal of the officially approved type.

#### **Article 4. Accountability of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall report annually to the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the Turkmen SSR regarding the work which it has accomplished and the conclusions drawn from the results of the checkups which it has carried out.

Without waiting for the deadline for its annual report to expire, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall submit reports to the Turkmen Supreme Soviet and the President of the Turkmen SSR concerning the results of checkups with respect to the most important matters; and these are to be submitted along with other information.

#### **Article 5. Interaction and Cooperation Between the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee and the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet**

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall interact and cooperate with the Presidium and committees of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet; it shall submit conclusions, materials, and information upon their requests. And, at the behest of the Presidium of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, it shall conduct joint checkups with the people's deputies of the Turkmen SSR.

#### **Article 6. Interrelations or Mutual Relations Between the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee and the Law-Enforcement Organs**

In case of necessity, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall interact and cooperate with law-enforcement organs and shall have the right to conduct joint checkups and audits with them.

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee and its organs in the localities shall—in case of necessity—submit materials, documents, and information upon the requests of a court, procuracy organs, or a board of arbitration.

#### **Article 7. Financing the Activity of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

The activities of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be provided with financing from the State Budget of the Turkmen SSR, to be allocated on a separate line. Within the bounds of its own powers, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall utilize these monetary funds independently.

#### **Article 8. The Right of Legislative Initiative**

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall have the right of legislative initiative in the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

## II. Membership Composition and Procedure for Forming the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

### Article 9. Membership Composition of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall consist of a chairman, his deputies, and the committee members.

The committee shall form departments (administrations), regional inspectorates, and other structural subdivisions.

### Article 10. Chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

The chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be appointed for a term of five years by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet upon his name being submitted by the President of the Turkmen SSR. And, upon the proposal of the President of the Turkmen SSR or the Presidium of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, he may be removed from office ahead of time by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

Within the bounds of his competency, the chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall decide all questions connected with exercising control, planning, and conducting checkups and audits. He shall appoint the leading officials of administrations, departments, and regional inspectorates, as well as the controller-auditors.

### Article 11. Formation of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

The deputy chairmen and members of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be appointed for a term of five years and shall be dismissed from their offices by an ukase of the President of the Turkmen SSR upon agreement with the Presidium of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

### Article 12. Departments (Administrations) and Regional Inspectorates of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

Departments (administrations) may be established by the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee in accordance with sectors of the national economy and facilities of the control activity.

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall create regional inspectorates for oblasts, rayons, and cities.

The departments (administrations) and regional inspectorates of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall interact and cooperate with the local Soviets of People's Deputies and their permanent commissions. They shall inform the local soviets about the results of audits and checkups conducted at enterprises, institutions, and organizations situated on the territory of the soviet concerned.

The departments (administrations) and regional inspectorates, when conducting checkups and audits within the bounds of their competencies, shall be independent and not subordinate to government institutions, organs of the local authority or administration.

The tasks, forms and operating methods of the departments (administrations), and regional inspectorates shall be determined and specified by the provisions and statutes concerning them, to be approved by the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee.

### Article 13. Structure and Staffs of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

The structure and staffs of the central apparatus and regional inspectorates of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be approved by the President of the Turkmen SSR.

## Functions and Powers of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

### Article 14. Functions of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee

The Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall monitor and control the following activities:

- 1) execution of the laws of the Turkmen SSR, decrees of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, and acts of the President of the Turkmen SSR which regulate the relations of state property, economic, financial, and tax relations; implementation of state economic, agrarian, social, and other programs, as well as the effective utilization of material and financial resources;
- 2) execution or performance of the budget of the Turkmen SSR by Union-republic and republic-level ministries, state committees, departments, executive and regulatory organs of the local Soviets of People's Deputies, as well as by other organizations and institutions of the Turkmen SSR;
- 3) utilization of targeted allocations and subsidies, along with funds obtained from citizens, enterprises, institutions, cooperatives, and other organizations on the accounts of state organizations and public funds;
- 4) conformity and compliance of the financial and economic activities of state enterprises, institutions, and organizations to the laws and other normative acts;
- 5) activities of leasing, cooperative, state-cooperative, joint-stock, mixed, and private enterprises, as well as public and other organizations with regard to observance of the laws of the Turkmen SSR and their obligations to the state, as provided for by agreements and contracts;
- 6) utilization of loans granted from Union or republic-level budgets, as well as the economic status of those enterprises, institutions, and organizations where the Turkmen SSR shall be the guarantor of the loans and the performance of the agreed-upon or contractual obligations;

7) correctness in applying the prices to be set (regulated) in a centralized manner; activities of the state inspectorates for price control, as well as those of the tax inspectorates;

8) operation of the republic-level foreign-economic and other organizations and enterprises, along with the effectiveness of their use of currency assets.

At the behest of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet or the President of the Turkmen SSR, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall carry out other assignments within the bounds of its competency.

**Article 15. Powers of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

In carrying out its functions, the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be empowered to perform the following activities:

1) conduct checkups and audits in Union-republic and republic-level ministries, state committees and departments, other republic-level institutions and organizations, as well as at the enterprises, institutions, and organizations indicated in Article 14 of the present Law;

2) provide the necessary help to appropriate organs or officials for carrying out assignments to conduct expert production-engineering estimates or appraisals;

3) request from financial and banking institutions the data necessary to conduct checkups or audits;

4) in cases where there has been a violation of the laws, or an infringement upon the state interests, or the rights and legitimate interests of citizens by leasing, cooperative, state-cooperative, joint-stock, mixed, private, or other enterprises, this committee shall be empowered to bring up before the appropriate organs the issue of putting a halt to their activities and penalizing them in accordance with the established procedure for the damage or harm which they have caused;

5) require or demand the cessation of actions stemming from decisions, dispositions, orders, instructions, and other normative acts issued by state administrative organs or officials in the event that these acts contradict the existing legislation; the organs of the procuracy and higher-ranking organs shall be informed about such matters without delay;

6) to furnish the supervisory officials of the enterprises, institutions, and organizations being checked up upon with whatever they need to carry out the prescriptions regarding the elimination of the violations which have been discovered, as well as the adoption of measures to reimburse the material damages caused;

7) address claim-type demands (without paying fees) to a court or board of arbitration for penalizing persons guilty of inflicting damage, or for applying economic

sanctions to enterprises, institutions, or organizations which have inflicted damage to the interests of the state or its citizens;

8) remove from the positions which they occupy those persons who have permitted gross violations of legality or state discipline, who have caused substantial economic damage or harm to the state, to enterprises and organizations, as well as to citizens, while—at the same time—submitting suggestions to a higher organ regarding the possibility of further use of the indicated persons;

9) involve in conducting checkups and audits—in case of necessity—highly skilled specialists (experts) from other institutions and organizations, control and law-enforcement organs, and paying for their work out of the committee's funds;

10) send the materials from the checkups and audits to the government of the Turkmen SSR, to the appropriate ministries, state committees, departments, and other state administrative organs for examination, consideration, and the adoption of reactive measures;

11) convey to the President of the Turkmen SSR and to other state organs representations, i.e., information, concerning the involvement of officials subordinate to them—officials guilty of violating laws, mismanagement, and of causing material damage or harm;

12) in case embezzlement, damage, squandering of physical assets, or other abuses are discovered, this committee shall turn the appropriate materials over to the law-enforcement organs so that they may hold the persons involved criminally or administratively responsible;

13) examine and consider proposals, suggestions, and appeals from citizens regarding matters falling within this committee's competency.

**Article 16. Rights of Officials of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

When performing their service duties, officials of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall have the right to do the following:

1) acquaint themselves and become familiar with all documents pertaining to the matter at hand;

2) enjoy unhindered access to warehouses, storage rooms, production areas, and other facilities for the purpose of checking up on monetary assets, securities, physical assets, and the procedures used for storing them;

3) obtain from officials and other staff members of enterprises, institutions, and organizations the necessary information, as well as oral and written explanations regarding matters connected with conducting checkups and audits;



4) in cases of necessity, the committee shall have the right to seal the cash registers and cashiers' offices, as well as warehouses, storage areas, and archives; and if counterfeiting, forgery, or other abuses are discovered, the committee shall have the right to remove or confiscate the necessary documents, while leaving at the site a written record of the documents removed;

5) other rights in accordance with the duties instructions or position descriptions to be approved by the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee as falling within the bounds of its powers.

**Article 17. Duties and Obligations of Officials of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

In the exercise of their powers, officials of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be obligated to observe the laws, not to create unnecessary obstacles or hindrances to the normal functioning of the facilities being checked up on, to ensure the retention and safeguarding of production and commercial secrets which are entrusted to them, to refrain from statements and evaluations upon the termination of checkups, and to guarantee that the rights and legitimate interests of citizens will be observed; nor shall these officials have the right to interfere in the operational activities of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, unless such activities are in contradiction with laws or other normative acts.

For unjustifiable and illegal actions which cause moral harm or material damage the officials of the Turkmen SSR shall be held responsible in accordance with the appropriate laws.

**Article 18. Obligation and Duty of the Organs of State Authority and Administration To Assist the Turkmen**

SSR State Control Committee in the Performance of the Functions Entrusted or Assigned to It

The republic-level and local organs of state authority and administration shall be obligated to assist in all manner of ways the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee in the performance of the functions entrusted to it, to render the necessary help to the staff members of the state control organs in conducting checkups and audits, to provide them with the necessary rooms and facilities, as well as transportation and means of communication.

Persons who hinder or hamper the activities of the state control organs shall bear responsibility in accordance with the established procedure.

**Article 19. Appealing the Actions of Officials of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

The actions of the officials or of the collegial organs of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee may be appealed within a 10-day period to higher-ranking officials or directly to the committee, to the President of the Turkmen SSR, or to a court by following the established procedure.

**Article 20. Providing Material and Technical Means for the Activities of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee**

Providing material and technical means for the activities of the Turkmen SSR State Control Committee shall be performed by the Administration of Affairs in the apparatus of the President of the Turkmen SSR.

[Signed by] S. NIYAZOV, President of the Turkmen SSR.

City of Ashkhabad, 10 January 1991.

**Russian Population Concerns in Moldova Stressed**  
*91UN0930A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA*  
*in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 1,3*

[Interview with Viktor Grebenshchikov, journalist on an Orkheyskiy Rayon newspaper, by Correspondent I. Vishnevskaya: "Consultant to the Premier on Russian Questions"]

[Text] Kishinev. Viktor Grebenshchikov, a journalist on an Orkheyskiy Rayon newspaper, became famous throughout the republic three years ago. His name was heard at political meetings of both the People's Front, and Intermovement. A Russian by nationality, and an emigrant from Russia, he took an active part in establishing the NFM [Moldovan People's Front] element in the rayon. Grebenshchikov received a great deal of publicity from his article published in GORIZONT, in which he described how he mastered the Romanian language while he lived in Russia (where he independently came to the conclusion on the identical nature of the Moldovan and Romanian languages), and how after moving to Moldova he came to realize the extent to which the rights of its indigenous residents—the Moldovans—have been encroached.

Last year the Prime Minister invited him in for a talk, and proposed that he become a consultant on questions of the Russian minority and its ties with Russia—to which Grebenshchikov gave his consent.

The majority of the Russians living in the republic, myself included, learned of his post in the Government of Moldova quite by accident, from an article in OGONEK. Letters from readers forced me to hold this interview.

Viktor Gennadievich prepared for our meeting. He immediately offered his own ideas on the form it should take:

"I would like to talk about just who are the Russians in Moldova, where they live, what their tasks are, and what they must do in order to become integrated in the life of Moldova. I would like to tell you about the prospects for education and talk about the Law on Languages, and would like to appeal to journalists at both local and nationwide publications.

[Correspondent] Very well, let us start in order: How long have you been in Moldova?

[Grebenshchikov] I have been here since 1971. Before that I lived in Omsk.

[Correspondent] Why did you decide, while you were living in Russia, to study precisely the Moldavian language?

[Grebenshchikov] We had a neighbor who had once lived with Moldovans in Kurgan Oblast. She was very kindly disposed toward the Moldovan people. And I have seen films on its origins ("Daki" and "Kolonna"), and became acquainted with the language. I came to like its robustness: how it is spelled, and how it is spoken. I

also liked the attitude of the Romanians toward the events in Czechoslovakia. And so I developed a passion for the history, culture and language of this country. I came to Moldova in order to study Spanish at the university, since I believed there was simply no better place in the country for studying the romance languages. By that time I understood the literary language well enough, and used to listen to radio and television shows; but my conversational language was not as good.

Moldova forced me to re-examine my political views. I came here as a "good boy," one who believed everything that they said and wrote, and was loyal to the authorities. But I soon learned that it was simply impossible for the Moldovans to freely use only their native language in the republic; the propaganda was trying to foist off the idea that Moldovan and Romanian are different languages—although it is clear to anyone with common sense, any person who is free from political ambitions, that the literary Moldovan language is indeed the Romanian language. A rigorous policy was followed to isolate Moldova from Romania. And all this forced me to take a critical look at our reality.

[Correspondent] How did you earn your daily bread after graduating from the university?

[Grebenshchikov] I was a foreign language teacher in the villages of Rybnitskiy, Vulkeneshtskiy, Kantemirskiy and Orkheyskiy rayons. It fell to my lot to teach Russian language and history, and I was a trainer for table tennis, Russian checkers, and chess. Beginning in 1985, I was employed at the Orkheyskiy Rayon newspaper... And now I am here.

[Correspondent] What are your duties as a consultant?

[Grebenshchikov] I must be well-informed on all events concerning the Russians, their opinions, and their moods; therefore, I keep current with the press, I meet people, and I study the problems. And then I summarize all this for the Prime Minister.

[Correspondent] Does this information have any influence on government policy toward the Russians?

[Grebenshchikov] I think it does. For example, not long ago I supported the proposal to reprint the newspaper MOLDOVA SUVERANE in the Russian language, in order to report information, without distortion, on the life of the Moldovan people, its position on this question or that, events and views.

[Correspondent] You said that you meet with people. But do they appeal to you, as the government's representative to the Russians, for help or for advice?

[Grebenshchikov] Yes, some employees of the Ministry of Science and Public Education came to me. They had been reduced. We had a long talk. I went out to the ministry's leaders. They explained to the people the reasons for their dismissal. It became possible to reinstate several of them. But, as they informed me later,

they did not want to go back, citing interpersonal relationships. Concerning my work on the part of contacts with Russia, I have taken part in preparations for concluding an agreement. I met with Khasbulatov and with Silayev's assistant.

[Correspondent] A bit earlier you stated that you were studying the problems of the Russians. How do they appear to you?

[Grebenshchikov] The problems of the Russian minority in the republic? Chiefly, the problem is failure to adapt to life in Moldova. Russians must acknowledge the Moldovans' right to self-determination, and support this people's struggle for state sovereignty. I believe that it is better for any person, regardless of his nationality, to live in a sovereign state, rather than a dependent one.

In order for Russians to become adapted in the republic it is very important to know the language, especially if one considers that in a few years this will be required, as the law on language goes into effect. The lack of a language barrier will permit the Russians to overcome the state of "cultural ghetto" that is the cause of his alienation from the Moldovan people. We must strive to ensure that the Romanian language is taught in Russian schools and VUZ's at a high level.

If Russians learn the language well, they will not have any particular problems. And the Russophobia that is alien to the Moldovan nature will disappear. Although the actions of the separatists have left a negative imprint on inter-ethnic relations. Speaking of languages, I would like to appeal to the parliament with a request: A great many problems and disputes are now springing up because of the fact that some call the language Moldovan, and others Romanian. It would be good if the parliamentarians were to introduce an amendment to the Law on Languages, calling the state language Romanian.

Further. Russians must raise their cultural level, and in this they could learn from the Moldovans. Starting with creative ensembles, they could start their own cultural society. As far as I know, it has been created, but little is heard of it.

[Correspondent] Have you tried to contact them and help it?

[Grebenshchikov] Yes. We have made contact. Another thing that bothers me is whether Russian youth will be able to obtain a higher education in the republic in the near future or not. There is a variety of opinions on this count. I think that the question must be decided positively, although the reception of aspirants at the Russian department will be reduced, because Moldovans will be studying in their own native language, and citizens of other nationalities will receive the right to be trained in their own—most likely in the corresponding states.

I would also like to touch upon the question of emigration. My opinion is, that if a mass exodus of Russians

begins, it will create problems both for the immigrants, and for the republic—a brain drain is not in the interests of one single country. The way out is—adaptation of Russians. I stress, not assimilation but adaptation.

[Correspondent] And do you have the data on how many Russians have departed Moldova in, say, the last year?

[Grebenshchikov] Not yet. But there is a tendency to leave.

[Correspondent] And the reason?

[Grebenshchikov] I think above all, not knowing the language.

[Correspondent] And are there political motives?

[Grebenshchikov] Various political approaches are inevitable in any democratic state.

[Correspondent] I have formed the impression that for you the measure of many of the situations in which Russians find themselves in the republic is—you, yourself: you learned the language; you have adapted; and—no problems. But I would add to the language and your adaptation—your political views, which have played their role in selecting you for this position...

[Grebenshchikov] I consider it altogether natural that the leadership brings to its team, members who are close to it in spirit. As far as political intolerance is concerned, I believe that it will soon go away. And then, knowledge of the language and cultural adaptation will be the main things.

[Correspondent] My next question may seem strange, but it sprang up in the course of the conversation: Do you think of yourself as a Russian?

[Grebenshchikov] Yes.

[Correspondent] I notice that while preparing for the meeting, you were making notes for yourself in the Moldovan language. Right now, in my presence, while answering telephone calls, you were also making notes on the calendar in the Moldovan language. In which language do you think?

[Grebenshchikov] When I speak Romanian—in Romanian; when I speak Russian—in Russian...

[Correspondent] But when you are all by yourself?

[Grebenshchikov] It varies. It depends upon whom I am getting ready to meet.

[Correspondent] You have children: do they go to kindergarten, or grammar school?

[Grebenshchikov] I have three children of pre-school age. They do not yet know the Russian language. They speak Romanian. My wife is Romanian. But we consider the children Russians (and they are indicated as such in the census). When they grow a little more, we will start to train them in Russian.

[Correspondent] What, in your view, awaits the Russians in Moldova?

[Grebenshchikov] If the situation stabilizes, joint enterprises will be created with the Russians. An agreement with the RSFSR has been signed. We are waiting for it to be ratified. But there is opposition in the Russian parliament, that believes the rights of Russians in Moldova are being encroached; although, the agreement in fact guarantees protection of their rights. Both sides have an interest in its ratification, the Russians living in Moldova as well. You see, in the event it is signed, the RSFSR will be opening a Russian mission here: an agreement will be drawn up on choice of citizenship, on the conditions for voluntary repatriation, and so on.

[Correspondent] And one more question. What is your personal opinion: Are the rights of Russians in Moldova being encroached? If so, to what extent?

[Grebenshchikov] First of all, I would like to direct a request to Russian-speaking journalists in the republic and to the correspondents of the central newspapers. Many articles of the Law on Languages have already gone into effect, in accordance with which populated places on republic territory have one name in all languages. But one can still find in the press Beltsy instead of Belts, and Orgeyev instead of Orkhey... The very same goes for names: they call Stefan Ion, Stepan Ivanovich. Would not Jean Jacques Rousseau be offended if he were christened Ivan Yakovlevich?

[Correspondent] One can understand that, although it is hard to imagine how one could order all languages to use the same geographic titles. But let us return to my question: is there encroachment on the Russians?

[Grebenshchikov] I acknowledge that there are people who prefer to work with people of their own nationality (both among the Moldovans and among the Russians). But one cannot speak of any kind of official policy of discrimination against Russians.

I believe that the Russians are not so much encroached upon, as they feel that they are. One perceives a sense of panic among the Russians. I do not think it is necessary to dramatize the situation. At the very same time all sides must be calm, and must unswervingly obey the laws.

[Correspondent] And the final question. Do you believe that you have added even an ounce of peace and quiet to the Russians' feelings through your work?

[Grebenshchikov] I am confident that the honest reader will admit my right to my own personal opinion. I think a policy from which even one person suffers is a poor policy. I do not want people to think badly of my work.

I invite those who wish to express their ideas and suggestions about the development of the national life of Russians in Moldova to call me at number 22-15-84, or to come to office 412 at Government House.

**Procurator On Tasks Facing USSR Procuracy**

91UN0914A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91  
First Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Procurator General N. Trubin by PRAVDA correspondent G. Ovcharenko; place and date not given: "What the Procurators See Ahead"]

[Text] **The All-Union Conference of Procuracy Employees has ended. Those who gathered discussed the tactics and strategy of operations of the organs of the procuracy and defined the position of procuracy supervision along main directions for strengthening legality and law and order in the country. Thus, what does the future of the procuracy look like? A PRAVDA correspondent talks about this with USSR Procurator General N. Trubin.**

[Correspondent] Nikolay Semenovich, in recent years the activity of the organs of the procuracy has been subject to serious criticism which, it seems, was frequently justified. What in your opinion is the procuracy's main trouble today?

[Trubin] First and foremost, the dissipation of forces. Unfortunately, perestroika in the procuracy took the path of unlimited broadening of the sphere of activity and of structural reorganization. Many of the procurators lost their heads, became disoriented, and began to accommodate themselves to local conditions.

The procuracy, in effect, was divorced from the formation of policy in the sphere of legality and could not fully exercise its potential. A hypertrophied centralism engendered a purely mechanical style, suppressing the self-reliance of local workers and breaking the habit of acting with initiative while taking into account the real situation. Therefore, in many respects we lagged behind life, and were at the tail-end of events.

[Correspondent] Apparently, those negative processes that are ongoing in society itself also had an effect on the activity of the procuracy?

[Trubin] Of course, as the saying goes, the procurators also do not live in a vacuum. But the crisis today has encompassed all spheres of socioeconomic life and the activity of the organs of authority.

Discipline and order are falling, the negative influence of the shadow economy is intensifying, and crime is increasing. The severity of interethnic relations is assuming a dangerous character. The events in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and the Baltic republics ended up with human casualties and personal tragedies for thousands of people.

There are a lot of reasons for such a situation, and a lot has been said about this of late from the highest tribunes. But we, lawyers, cannot help but see what difficult consequences, literally the disintegration of the legal pillars of society, are resulting from the humiliating position of legality and the habit of resolving any questions from a position not of right but on the basis of

arbitrary instructions. It is specifically legal nihilism that is now engendering the infamous war of laws and sovereignties, the inaction of executive authority, and the illegal methods of opposition of political forces.

[Correspondent] What should the procuracy be like under these conditions?

[Trubin] Recent events have once again convincingly proved that the people and the country need a strong procuracy. This was said with great definitiveness at the Fourth Congress of the USSR People's Deputies, and we will undoubtedly receive all-round support on the part of the organs of higher state authority and administration.

It is necessary to preserve a single system of procuracy supervision, but its organization must respond to the needs of the times and take into account today's trends and approaches to state construction. As you know, amendments have been made to the USSR Constitution, in accordance with which the procurators of the republic are appointed by the higher organs of state authority of the republic in coordination with the USSR procurator general, and are accountable to them. In the activity of supervising the fulfillment of the laws of the USSR, they are also subordinate to the USSR procurator general.

[Correspondent] In other words, the republic procurators become more self-reliant and independent of the center. But, obviously, organizational preconditions will also be necessary for this?

[Trubin] And they are being established. Henceforth, republic procurators will have the right to define the structures of their own and subordinate staffs and decide personnel questions. Revisions have been made in orders on the resubordination to the USSR Procuracy of the environmental protection and transport procuracy offices, in the near future a majority of the reports of the procurators of the republics will be abolished, and a change is being made in the internal creation of standards, which in one way or another restrict their independence. Defects that are associated with superfluous centralization of the procurator system are being abolished. The main tasks of the USSR Procuracy are coordination of the actions of the organs of the procuracy on basic problems of legality and law and order, analysis of the practical fulfillment of the laws of the USSR, development of scientifically based recommendations on increasing the effectiveness of procurator supervision, and active participation in the creation of laws.

[Correspondent] Does all of this not mean that in supervising the fulfillment of the laws of the USSR the republics will have to set up structures that are subordinate to the USSR Procuracy?

[Trubin] No. This is not only a task for the center but for the procurators at all levels. It must be resolved with their very close cooperation. Especially because there will also be a change in the leadership of the procurator system itself. The forthcoming introduction of republic



procurators in the collegium system of the USSR Procuracy will enable it to become an organ expressing the interests of both the republic and the entire Union.

Why are we for a centralized procuracy specifically in this form? A common supervisory system makes it possible for the procurators reliably to defend the rights of the republics against the whims of Union departments, the interests of the republics in interrepublic relations, and the rights and freedoms of citizens on the territories of all republics. Moreover, the procurators in the republics will not always be able to defend realistically the rights of citizens of nonindigenous nationalities or to suppress occurrences of discrimination. Practice shows that in such cases the actions of the USSR Procuracy itself are frequently needed. Without its participation it is not always possible to ensure an objective examination of crimes associated with interethnic disputes.

Unification on an all-Union level of the efforts of the republic law enforcement organs is also necessary to fight against criminal organizations and to investigate the causes of emergency occurrences, major accidents, and catastrophes that affect the interests of many republics.

[Correspondent] What directions in the activity of the procuracy seem to you to be basic?

[Trubin] To start with, the main thing is to free the procuracy from functions that are not characteristic of it. The USSR Constitution assigned one function to the procuracy—to supervise the fulfillment of the law. It does not envisage as duties of the procuracy to guarantee legality and answer for its condition in the organs of state administration and control, to guarantee justice, to coordinate the activity of law enforcement organs, or to conduct preliminary investigations. These and many other responsibilities were unjustifiably entrusted to the procuracy by decision of party and state organs. Any replacement by procurators of administrative organs, the execution of their duties, and interference in operational administrative activity is not permissible.

It is especially important for the procuracy to renounce inappropriate methods of the inspection style of work and concentrate efforts on verification of the validity of legal decisions and the suppression of lawlessness and the arbitrariness of authority, no matter from whom they emanate. Such an approach will help all procurators start out in their work not from immediate and opportunistic desires but on a realistic basis which, as a rule, means specific signals of the violation of legality.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, Nikolay Stepanovich, let us outline in more detail the kinds of questions in which the procuracy should be involved.

[Trubin] I would highlight four main ones. These are, first, the supervision of the legality of legal acts of local soviets and organs of administration. Because the matter comes down to the fact that local authorities, hiding

behind independence, frequently even assume the functions of a legislator. For example, the "Proclamation on Authority" adopted by the Ternopol City Soviet proclaims the right to publish decisions without taking into consideration republic legislation and all the law enforcement organs subordinate to the soviet.

It is through supervision of the legality of legal acts that we encounter the most critical problems associated with citizens' rights. Unfortunately, it is not only in Lithuania that openly discriminatory acts are being applied of late that infringe upon the rights of whole groups of the population, especially the nonindigenous population. In the last two years about half a million letters came to the USSR Procuracy alone, among which are quite a few substantiated complaints of employment refusals and illegal discharges, and violations of the fair distribution of apartments and of compliance with the rights of invalids, participants in the Great Patriotic War, and large families.

The second task is supervision of the fulfillment of the law by organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation. There are not too many problems here as yet. But here is one fact. Not long ago, a criminal was arrested who over the course of 12 years had murdered women and children with particular cruelty. At different times, attempts had been made to charge six mentally disturbed people with these crimes. The procurators were in fact allowing themselves to be led by unconscientious investigators and operations officers.

Third—the participation of procuracy workers in the investigation of court cases. Here it is necessary to rethink the legal position of the procurator. The concept according to which the procurator implements supervision of the examination of criminal cases in courts has become obsolete. The procurator is a participant in the judicial process which promotes attainment of the truth and the pronouncement of legal and valid decisions. The main content of our work remains support of the state's charge, improving its quality, and perfecting the professional skill of the procurators.

Finally, the fourth task—supervision of fulfillment of the law in places of incarceration of people that have been arrested and convicted. The level of correction and rehabilitation work for convicts in prisons is very low. About 40 percent of those who have served their sentence commit crimes again. Mass disorders and seizures of hostages are continuously taking place in prisons, murders and other dangerous crimes are committed, and criminal groups are formed. There are many occurrences of arbitrary rule on the part of the administration itself. Many regions, in effect, have stopped finding employment for those who have served sentences.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Semenovich, there is a lot of talk today about the investigative apparatus in the procuracy. What is your position here?

[Trubin] I must say frankly that until now there has been no specificity in this matter. The question of an independent investigative committee is being studied in the RSFSR, several other republics, and by Union organs. I am personally for such a decision. Moreover, I believe that in the interests of legality there should be no investigative staff in the procuracy, inasmuch as it entails supervision. However, in the event of necessity the procurator can undertake any case and investigate it himself. I think that a speedy resolution of this question is in our common interests, because today's lack of specificity has a pernicious effect on the state of investigation and the fight against crime.

[Correspondent] There is a lot of criticism among the workers of the procuracy because of their poor social protection. Is this question being resolved?

[Trubin] Yes. A draft Law on Procuracy Supervision in the USSR has been developed which takes into account changes in the USSR Constitution and other current realities. It now legislatively envisages shielding procurators from any influence or interference in their professional activity, and establishes responsibility for nonfulfillment of the legal demands of the procurator. The procurator must be granted the right of court appeal in the event that his protest against an illegal act is denied.

Questions have also been submitted to the USSR president and the Supreme Soviet on improving the material support and social protection of procuracy workers. In particular, we are requesting an increase in post salaries, additional pay for class ranks, the establishment of additional pay and pensions for length of service, the introduction of state life and health insurance for procurators and investigators, granting them an annual leave of 45 days with payment for travel expenses to and from the place of rest, and the provision of medical and medical health resort services. We think that the workers of procuracy organs should be furnished well-equipped living accommodations as a priority. Questions have been raised about increasing the size of the staff and improving material and technical support, including transportation and modern information science and communications systems. We will hope that these questions will be given a positive response.

We think that the main thing now is to overcome the emerging disconnection of the procuracy system and to unite it on the basis of a deep understanding by each procurator of the pernicious effect of legal chaos and legal anarchy for the fate of the country and each citizen.

### Rise In Court Convictions For 1990

91P50108A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 1

[Novosti Information Agency (IAN) Report: "Justice In 1990"]

[Text] Not counting the activities of the Latvian and Estonian courts, which did not provide information,

809,000 persons were convicted in the USSR in 1990. USSR Deputy Justice Minister Vladimir Gubarev reported this. He noted that last year's figures have exceeded the 1989 data by 20 percent.

### New RSFSR Criminal Militia Described

91UN0984A Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian  
1 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with Major General M. Serdyuk, deputy chief of the criminal militia, by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent N. Nikulin; place and date not given; published under the rubric "No. 6 Ogareva Street": "Criminals Do Not Recognize Borders"]

[Text] A new service has been created within the Russian Federation—a criminal militia. Major General M.I. Serdyuk was recently appointed deputy chief of this service. By education he is a jurist; by profession he is a regular officer and has been working in the organs of internal affairs for more than 34 years. He is a professional who has spearheaded the new trend in fighting crime... That provides hope. SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent N. Nikulin met with him in the famous building at No. 6 Ogareva Street.

[Nikulin] Mikhail Ivanovich, what is happening on the consumer market? The various enterprises are supposedly producing output (according to their accounts, anyway), but it does not reach the consumer. Is everything really being hidden away and stolen?

[Serdyuk] Indeed, there is no cause for celebration. Under conditions of a growing shortage of consumer goods, crime in the economic sphere is getting worse and giving us more work. Judge for yourself—in the last year alone the number of embezzlements on a large and especially large scale increased by 27 percent. Instances of bribery increased by 19 percent, and 12 percent more instances of speculation were uncovered. And what is especially alarming, crime in the countryside is growing. On the farms and in the organizations and enterprises of the agro-industrial complex more than 40,000 crimes by officials and economic crimes were discovered! For the most part they were embezzlements. The material loss comprised 14.7 million rubles [R].

[Nikulin] That, of course, is an impressive sum. The losses are large even for a rich people, and as it turns out we are poor. The state and republic budgets are hardly disposed toward generosity.

[Serdyuk] All that is true, but I had not finished speaking. Almost all of this money, the valuables, and the property were returned to the state. R13.6 million worth of goods stolen by embezzlers were confiscated from them. That proves that the former BKhSS [Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] service was not just sitting around idly.

[Nikulin] And what has happened to it? Instead of the BKhSS we now have a mysterious criminal militia... What is that, just a change of name or a new approach to fighting crime?

[Serdyuk] You are aware that a serious, one might even say critical, situation exists in the economy as a whole and especially in the sphere of the consumer market. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] considers the fight against economic crime to be one of the most important areas of its activities. This is why the criminal militia has been created. The BKhSS has become a part of it, but in a new capacity and with new tasks. After all, today it is necessary to protect not only state property but also the economic interests of citizens.

[Nikulin] As you know, all forms of property ownership have been legalized in Russia, including private property, and privatization of industrial enterprises and the service and trade spheres has begun. The first exchanges, joint-stock societies, and commercial banks have appeared... That is to say, structures have appeared which foreshadow market relations. How has the criminal sector reacted to this? How does it threaten the entrepreneurs and all of us?

[Serdyuk] It is already clear that with the development of market relations and the appearance of various forms of property ownership, new stable, illegal ties will begin to form and the direction of the activities of the criminal communities will begin to change. To keep the criminals from acting freely, we must devise and carry out preventive measures of a legal, economic, and investigative nature, the goal of which will be to create a barrier to criminals. The criminal militia will begin to resolve these questions on a highly professional level.

[Nikulin] What kind of activities, besides those of the BKhSS, will the criminal militia undertake, and does it have enough personnel and training to fight the omnivorous mafia?

[Serdyuk] The criminal militia unites a criminal investigation department, a field investigation bureau, a criminal research subunit, and a subunit to fight crime in the economic sphere. The structure of the latter will include special services to uncover crimes in the area of the production of consumer goods, the financial and credit system, industry, and consumer and trade services, as well as to fight speculation. All this, undoubtedly, will demand that some personnel be shifted around. In the BKhSS some individual field personnel were involved for the most part with analyzing obviously insignificant crimes or even carrying out purely administrative functions. Unfortunately, not all of our present employees are prepared to endure the difficulties of the work in a criminal militia. Presently we are getting some first-class professionals. Otherwise I do not believe the criminal militia could exist.

[Nikulin] There is no doubt that theoretically the future offers hope. It will be wonderful if your professionals can

protect us from groups of economic criminals. But how are we to live today? Where and in what oblasts and regions of the republic is the crime worst? And of what, in your view, is that a result?

[Serdyuk] With the creation of cooperatives and other free economic entities, criminals have begun to develop and make use of completely new mechanisms of embezzlement.

[Nikulin] Pardon me, Mikhail Ivanovich, but I hope that such refined and clever methods have nothing to do with the countryside. When speaking about intrigues of the shadow economy, one usually has in mind urban operators.

[Serdyuk] That, to put it gently, is a somewhat dilettantish approach to the problem. The situation is far more serious than many people think. Today one cannot distinguish the city from the countryside in terms of character and quality of the crimes being committed. Here are fresh examples. In the village of Turinskaya Svoboda in Sverdlovsk Oblast a certain Antshev, the head of the local branch of the Agro-Industrial Bank, received a bribe of several thousand rubles for completing an illegal operation between the Bazis cooperative and a certain mining and concentrating plant. N. Kharitonova, senior bookkeeper at Shchekinagroservis (in Tula Oblast) and V. Bulatova, an engineer-forwarding agent, embezzled goods worth R25,000 that the village needed. In Rostov Oblast a certain Bashakov, head of the Rodinovo-Nesvetay agro-industrial bank, illegally gave the cooperative Novinka a loan worth R370,000. There are many such examples. And the geography of "rural" crimes is extensive.

[Nikulin] And not only Russians are threatened by the danger. What do you do when a crime begins, for example, in Russia, "moves" to Belorussia, and ends up who knows where? Are you connected with the USSR MVD? Are you subordinate to it or "sovereign?"

[Serdyuk] Let me begin with your last question. On the scale of Russia (and at the oblast and kray level as well) our apparat functions completely independently. The Union MVD does not interfere in our ongoing cases. But remember—criminals do not recognize borders. The organs of internal affairs of all the republics touched by the mafia take part in exposing interrepublic crimes. The Union ministry coordinates these activities. And, believe me, they have more than enough cases. The criminals are uniting, and so are we.

[Nikulin] Does this have any connection with the appearance of a presidential edict providing for the fight against economic sabotage and other crimes in the economic sphere? And do we have such sabotage in this country? Some of our public figures categorically reject the existence of it.

[Serdyuk] To give a legal evaluation of the situation, I will say that we can take criminal action on the basis of the Criminal Code alone. The concept of "economic

sabotage" is absent from it. It usually deals with basic mismanagement, negligence, abuse of official position, and failure to take measures on the part of officials, as a result of which the state is subjected to significant material loss. This is what the guilty are charged with, whether their actions are committed with premeditation or not.

[Nikulin] Nonetheless, the presidential edict has frightened, perplexed, alarmed, and even shocked many people. Some believe that it is illegal and unconstitutional and contradicts the laws on enterprises in the USSR, leaseholding, joint labor, and banks. There is even an opinion that the searches, inspections, inventories, attachment of accounts, etc. that are being conducted by organs of the MVD and the KGB are causing the economy material loss and making innocent people suffer.

[Serdyuk] You know, we, the militia, are shocked by such a negative reaction. I do not understand where it comes from. It is as though the activities of all cooperatives and joint enterprises without exception are so illegal that the state has no recourse but to close them all down and put entrepreneurs in jail! But that is not the case. We are only fighting the criminals. As for the rights that the edict grants us, we have always had them. They are clearly set forth in the existing Statutes on the Soviet militia as well, and they are supplemented by an Soviet Council of Ministers decree back in 1981. It is just that people did not know about them: They existed for official use only at a time when there was no talk of glasnost. With time those rules fell out of date inasmuch as they were oriented toward the preservation of socialist property alone. However, recently the leaders of enterprises, organizations, and institutions have begun to fiercely obstruct the aggressive activities of militia employees and openly interfere in the exposure of crimes, citing the new legislation on property, enterprises, etc. At the same time the situation with the preservation of property and valuables held by all kinds of private owners is very tense. Officials of state and joint enterprises and cooperatives and individuals working for themselves have begun to commit criminal actions. It is especially dangerous when they conduct their intrigues through banking, financial, and credit institutions. State money is ending up in people's pockets. So the edict was quite timely. But I believe it is a temporary act that will only remain in effect until there is a law on the Soviet militia, which should have been adopted a long time ago.

### **Crime in RSFSR Corrective Labor Institutions Discussed**

91UN0902A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 4

[Interview with Vyacheslav Razinkin, RSFSR MVD aide, by V. Belykh: "The Chief in the 'Zone' Is the Well-Established Thief"; date and place not specified]

[Text] This time the deputy chief of the corrective labor colony in Kemerovo Oblast did not succeed in reaching the

gates of the "zone" from his home. With the brakes squealing, the road was blocked by a Niva without license plates. Two masked men who jumped out of it grabbed him by the hands. And immediately—threats to make short shrift of his whole family if the obstinate "deputy" does not stop "cutting off the oxygen to honest prisoners."

**Lt Col Vyacheslav Razinkin, senior detective officer for especially important cases of the operational-investigation bureau at the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs reports:**

[Razinkin] Alas, this case is far from unique. The past year yielded an unprecedented level of crime in the corrective labor institutions. In five years there has been an increase in the seizure of hostages and attacks on personnel. In so doing, 126 staff members of the militia and servicemen were killed and wounded. Why?

Not long ago, the chief of the colony of one of the central Russian oblasts was seriously wounded. As his Kemerovo Oblast colleague, he tried to fight against the influence of "the well-established thieves" and the criminal "authorities" in their corrective labor institutions and he paid for it. It is no secret that criminal groupings exist in every "zone", which fight with the administration for influence over the convicts and attain all sorts of privileges for themselves. . . .

[Belykh] But both officers were attacked when they were far from the place of their work. . . .

[Razinkin] The order for "punitive" actions nevertheless came from detention. Illegal connections with "freedom", with the convicts from other colonies are clearly arranged by the criminal world. The professional criminal who has ended up in a corrective labor institution, first of all with the help of little notes ("malyav" [not further identified]), "paves the way" into the local criminal world, and then also to colleagues from other places of confinement. How effectively this "conduit" works can be judged by the fact that the illegal correspondence reaches the addressee much faster than our official communications transmitted through official channels. But there is a reliable connection—and the "well-established thief" who has turned up in the colony, begins to spread his influence on the criminals of the oblast, and even farther.

Thus, in the Samara "zone" there sat not long ago a "well-established thief" nicknamed Yablochko, by birth from Novoshakhtinsk of Rostov Oblast. Soon after his arrival in the colony pocket thieves, car hijackers, and speculators in spare parts already worked for him in Togliatti and in other cities of the Volga region... A flow of narcotics and money poured into the colony, which Yablochko collected allegedly per "common cell." And when he was released, the ex-prisoner purchased a house costing several tens of thousands for himself in the same Togliatti...



Incidentally, in Kemerovo, during the strikes, plans for raids on savings banks were made in local colonies under the direction of "the well-established thief" Chernyy, to "support our brothers held in captivity"....

Among the convicts there are two clearly distinguished poles. On the one hand, the members of the thieves' groupings. At the head is the "godfather" (pakhan) (he is also called "corner" [ugol], "inspector" [smotryashchiy], and "trump pigeon" [kozyrnyy frayer]), and under him are the rank and file "infantrymen" (pekhotintsy), ("torpedoes," [torpedy], "bulls," [byki], "submachine gunners" [avtomatchiki]). On orders of the leader, they can kill, beat up, "maintain the thieves' order," or "take [something] for themselves." There are also young pupils and underlings—lackeys [shesterki] who whirl around the "well-established thief." On the other hand, there are the "downcast," the "aggrieved," the terrible scum of the thieves' system. Here are the homosexuals (frequently under coercion), those who lost and became indebted in card games, those who did not keep their word, and those who simply were unable at the time to stand up for themselves. Their place in the barrack is the worst, their food—garbage. With them it is impossible to start talking, to shake hands without risking oneself to go over into this category. If a "downcast" with a transfer into another "zone" (or having received a new term) tries to conceal the thieves' mark, he will be severely mutilated and even killed.

And between these two poles there is the basic mass of the convicts (70-80 percent)—the submissive "peasants."

The members of the criminal group divide spheres of influence in the colony among themselves. They have their people responsible for the industrial zone, for housing, for the table, and for the penalty isolator. They also engage in racketeering, extorting money from the "peasants", forcing them to work in their stead. The thieves "pick up narcotics," sleep, and the other convicts give them 30-40 percent of their output. Otherwise—cruel beatings or transfer to the "downcast". The greater part of those who have suffered do not make any statements about the beatings. What is more, the dregs apply truly savage methods: They put a stone in the felt boot and flog the victim—a terrible pain, but there are practically no traces.

In order for everything to take place without a hitch, the criminal groups try to promote their people to the key "posts" of brigade leaders, to have them be in charge of work assignments, and storekeepers. And if this turns out to be impossible, then through blackmail and threats they "recruit" the convicts put into "strong posts" without the consent of the "thieves". . . . Then everything is simple: The professional criminals, who have not lifted a finger in production, have the highest fulfillment norms of all, and their early release is close. . . . The prison psychology: The "peasant" should work, but the "thief"—take it easy, he worked a great deal when he was free.

[Belykh] It is well known: From the administration of the colonies, production, above all, is required, and because of this it sometimes has to close its eyes too much to many things.

[Razinkin] The Main Administration for Correction Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (GUID), in terms of production volume, occupies fifth place in the country, compared with such a superministry as the USSR Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry. The enormous amounts of money earned by the colonies are transferred to the central budget. The plan, and only the plan, in spite of the obsolete equipment and the low labor productivity. And so the administration has to lengthen the work day of the convicts, to introduce second and third shifts, to force them to work on days off and holidays. . . . And the temptation is great here to use any methods for this.

A typical example. The head of a shop has to drive the plan ahead by three days. He drives the prisoners to work at night, which is categorically prohibited. But in every brigade there are representatives of the "thieves'" groupings, and they already act as overseers—with blows and swearwords they drive on the "peasants." For this, as soon as they have come through the hitch, they are given benefits and the very best references. As for the rest, the "thieves" already do not ask, but demand. . . .

Thus, the "leader" of one of the Volga strict regime colonies presented an ultimatum to the chief of the corrective labor institution, having demanded the release of two malicious violators from the penalty isolator. Otherwise, he threatened, the officials in charge of the colony will either be dismissed from the posts occupied by them or will be completely removed from the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As it turned out, these were by no means empty words. After a categorical refusal of the impertinent demand, just a little time had passed when two brick yards all at once stopped: Under the pressure of the "thieves" a number of convict crane operators went on strike. The unloading and loading stopped, production was paralyzed. The damage came to tens of thousands of rubles. And a high commission came to the colony to investigate the extraordinary event. . . . And indeed—"the heads and shoulder-straps flew". . . .

If you allow them to bite your finger, they will snap off your hand. Indulgence of the members of "thieves'" groupings, concession after concession—and a very real criminal collusion arises. Of the following sort: The head of guard (again in the Volga Region) led two convicts out of the "zone"—to have a good time. For this, they promised him a car, but they did not succeed in returning on time. Only this way was everything discovered.

[Belykh] Incidentally, I had occasion to hear that to get a hold of an important "black market operator" or a former trade manager in the colony is considered a great success. . . .



[Razinkin] Quite right. This is a joy even for the chief engineer of a corrective labor institution, and for the "deputy" for construction, and for the "well-established thief." Making use of his old connections, the "operator" can obtain building materials for the colony or a commodity in short supply, will help someone from the administration with a travel authorization, and will make arrangements for someone's child to be admitted to an institute. . . . And for all of this—he will get all kinds of benefits—in great numbers. And even the leaders of the criminal groupings have their profit in such people: The "operator" will help with money, and will transmit from the world outside the prison what is needed, and the most important thing, he serves as still another lever of pressure on the administration, intimidated by the plan, cost accounting, and disruption in deliveries. . . .

[Belykh] It turns out, as long as the "zone" is dominated by the plan, the "thieves" are ineradicable?

[Razinkin] If the output of all sorts of products, and not isolation and possible reeducation are in first place in the system of the Main Administration for Correction Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (GUID), it is very, very difficult to change something in the internal life of the colonies. Judge for yourselves. A "zone" in Altay Kray. Foundry production. The number of convicts at work—up to 4,000. How to keep an eye on all of them? Impossible. And so up to 20 persons are missing in a 24-hour period. And the brick yards? 5,000 motor vehicle departures each in a 24-hour period. From the industrial "zones"—the basic mass of escapes, through them narcotics and alcohol make their way into the colonies, and letters and instructions leave in the other direction into the world outside the prison. But this is of little concern to anybody. Even the security non-commissioned officers, who are fighting the "thieves" groupings, they are trying to reduce today, introducing in their place not even educational, but all those technical and production posts. Hence the appropriate results. The operational officials of GUID, without rights, few in number, persecuted by the associates of the convicts under their wardship who remained free, are practically not in the position to hold back the growth of the criminal groupings in the corrective labor institutions. The only thing that is possible for the time being is to "roll"—to transfer the "honorable thieves" from "zone" to "zone", cutting the established connections if only for some time. However, there was the idea of keeping the leaders of the criminal world in separate confinement. For them, they planned a prison and a colony in Tyumen Oblast, beyond the Arctic Circle. Then it would be possible to secure their effective isolation and, within the limits of the possible, not to permit [their] influence on the convicts of other corrective labor institutions. But it did not happen. Although, I think, we must return to this project again.

### Administrative Problems in Leningrad Court System Cited

91UN0920A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 91  
Second Edition p 3

[Article by D. Verevkin, procurator of Leningrad: "What God Should We Pray to or Why the City Law Enforcement Agencies Cannot Find a Common Language With the Leningrad Council"]

[Text] A power struggle is raging everywhere: at all levels, from the USSR Supreme Soviet to the level of the community. The battle of laws is heating up. Every power organ is trying to consolidate the primacy of its own decisions. And these, at times, not only contradict each other, but are mutually exclusive.

And now just imagine the position of a procurator [public prosecutor]. What God should he pray to? To the nation? The Republic? The Leningrad Council? The Rayon Council?

In one of his recent speeches, the president of the USSR said that today all law enforcement agencies are subject to strong pressure from destructive forces. This is a rather understated description of the actual situation.

Let us first consider pressure on the court.

How can we speak of the independence of the court, given the current system of selecting judges? Here I am not speaking merely about elementary lack of respect for the judges of Leningrad on the part of the Leningrad Council, which summoned the judges to appear at a council session for confirmation after their candidacy had been considered by the commissions of the deputies, but failed to pass a confirmation resolution. As a result the judges found themselves in a state of "suspension." And hundreds of criminal and civil cases scheduled in the courts that day were not heard. And what will happen next? The candidate for the position of chairman of the court for the Petrograd rayon, A. Strizhakov, an experienced professional, was rejected. Why? Because he previously had presided at a hearing of cases of hooliganism associated with the election campaigns. The sentence was just and went into effect. It was neither appealed nor overturned. But what do the deputies care about that? In their eyes Strizhakov was "against us," a political opponent. And this was sufficient to cause the Petrograd court to lose a fine professional.

There are reports of the judges about direct interference by individual deputies during court examinations; a special submission on this subject has been made to the Judicial Board of the Leningrad Council. And what were the results? There have been none. And the judges continue to leave their jobs.

To put it mildly, a strange situation has also arisen in the city with respect to the position of chief of the Chief Board of Internal Affairs. Despite the decisions of two ministries - at the national and republic levels - a session of the Leningrad Council has appointed a new individual

to that post, forgetting that this is not an elective position. And Voshchinin's sole crime was that he served as the head of the division of administrative organs of the CPSU oblast committee. As a result, there is growing disorder in the police, which cannot help but be reflected in conditions in the city.

By the way, the relationships between the authorities and the procurator's office were never distinguished for their tenderness. One might speak of mutual respect, but certainly not of sympathy. Supervision by the procurator's office, after all, to put it figuratively, is a bridle that forces the authorities to operate within the law, and not according to the principle of "I will do whatever I want."

Last summer a group of deputies came to me in order, as they expressed it, to "accept" the procurator's office as a kind of "economic subject" of the Leningrad Council. I had to explain that we are not part of the Leningrad Council structure, are not subordinate to it, and are absolutely independent of it.

Because of my profession, for many years I have dealt with criminals and the world of crime. But I never knew how dirty politics could be.

At times it seems as if the people are "shaking up" the law enforcement agencies and trying to destroy them are without even the most elementary instinct of self preservation. We are capable of destroying a great deal. Our "marvelous" economic achievements attest to that. Well, now let us destroy the law enforcement agencies.. But here the deputy himself themselves will be shot in the back alley, his daughter will be raped, his wife undressed in the entrance of the house where they live. How can he fail to understand?!

They say that today the procurator's office and the Leningrad Council are in opposition to each other. I deny this! We are ready to interact with any forces for good, with the rational leaders of the Leningrad Council. But to look for agreement with those who violate the law is completely nonsensical!

From their very first steps, the Leningrad Council succeeded in destroying a great deal. Seizure of the studios of Leningrad Television, organization of commercial trade in alcoholic beverages.. Now, I regret that the measures taken by the procurator's office were insufficiently decisive and severe, and were not enough to sober up certain hotheads. At that time, it is true, there was still hope that the Leningrad Council would "grow up." But then their violations of the law began to be performed in a systematic manner.

Take the "tobacco revolt" that occurred in the city. Recall the supposed assignment given by the deputies of the Leningrad Council to the Leningrad board of the KGB to find the "conspirators."

And yet during its investigation of the tobacco factories, the city procurator's office found many different violations.

For example, the factory imeni Uritskiy sold tobacco products worth 365 thousand rubles to the public catering combine of Avtovax in exchange for seven "Zhiguli" automobiles and 40 thousand rubles worth to the Novgorod television plant in exchange for their products. This was done in violation of procedures established by law.

The report on this compiled by the procurator's office was considered by the Leningrad Executive Committee for more than two months, despite more than one reminder. And in November of last year, the ispolkom announced that if found no reason to prosecute the directors of these enterprises.

As a result the violators of the law, whom the KGB were assigned to search for and about whom the procurator's office submitted reports to the ispolkom, went unpunished.

It is well known that the USSR Council of Ministers decided to raise the prices of nonessential goods. However, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR suspended the force of this law in the territory of Russia. At the same time the Leningrad city ispolkom passed a resolution to increase prices of cigarettes, candy, beer, etc. These illegal acts wage war on the masses.

It is characteristic that issues relating to raising of prices were not discussed at meetings of the ispolkom. Who prepared them, accepted them and put them into effect is a great secret.

I lodged a protest against these decisions with the ispolkom and the presidium of the Leningrad Council. They did not consider them and did not reply officially within the time required.

In a word, it is obvious, that in our state it has become fashionable to ignore not only laws, but also such legal documents as reports and protests of the procurator's office. This is encouraged by the fact that such new structures of the super-parliamentary type as the presidium of Councils is outside the sphere of the procurator's supervision. In other words, the procurator cannot protest any decisions of the presidium even the most ridiculous and illegal ones. And it is for precisely this reason that a number of slippery issues, were simply excluded from the agenda of the ispolkom sessions attended by the procurator, and instead put on the agenda of the Council presidium, from which the procurator is barred.

Of course, we intend in the future to manifest resolution, and perform our professional duty. In troubled times of general decay it is very painful to live under conditions of destitution, but it is downright impossible to live under conditions of lawlessness.

### **Moldovan MVD Minister on Police Force Reorganization**

91UN0935A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 15 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Ion G. Kostas, Moldovan SSR minister of internal affairs, by E. Zamura: "Yesterday the Militia, Today the Police"; date and place of interview not given]]

[Text] [Zamura] Moldova's Ministry of Internal Affairs has repeatedly, in some cases in the press, argued for the need to use the term "police" [politsiya]. You have persuaded many people, Mr Kostas. Others, on the other hand, continue to feel a sense of protest. What, in your opinion, is the most persuasive argument in favor of the terminology change? Does it reflect the new tasks facing the internal affairs agencies?

[Kostas] We are not the only ones who have reached the conclusion that we need an agency of professionals called the police. The Baltic republics leaned toward the same opinion a little earlier. The public is now discussing a draft law on the Russian Federation Police, and the same sort of law is in the drafting stage in the Ukraine.

Believe me, changing the name to police is not a matter of posturing, and not just an attempt to change nameplates. It has been discussed fairly extensively in the parliament and the republic press. In my opinion, enough explanations have been given. In the decades of the Soviet militia's existence, a great deal of good has been done, but there have also repeatedly been things that discredited the very concept of the militia. We are now trying to radically change not just the structure of the republic's internal affairs agencies, but the public's attitude toward the guardians of order. These things are interconnected. A dependable structure cannot be built on the old foundation. And most likely the most persuasive argument in favor of the term "police" is the law adopted on 18 December 1990 by the republic parliament. Underlying it are such concepts as the professionalism of officers, honesty and respect for the individual and his dignity and rights. And those things, you will agree, are precisely what the militia has lacked.

[Zamura] What will be the structure of the police and the Department of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova? What are the state and municipal police?

[Kostas] Let me immediately make a correction. The republic's central internal affairs agency will continue to be a ministry. The Department [departament] of Police of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova is a constituent part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and will be subdivided into state and municipal services. The former is subordinate to the ministry, the second to the ministry and local authorities. The former performs its duties throughout the entire republic, while the latter operates only within given territorial administrative entities.

In and of themselves, the organizational structure and staffing size of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' subdivisions are no great secret. They are based on the laws of logic and necessity. The ministry's constituent parts are departments [departamenty] of internal troops and support, personnel and investigation services. Each department [departament] has corresponding administrations and divisions [otdely]. Independent structural subdivisions include headquarters, the information-protection administration, the prevention and cooperation administration, and the oversight corps. That is the most up-to-date, optimal and acceptable structure.

[Zamura] The militia's lack of rights and protection has always been the number-one problem. What new rights will the police have? The law stipulates conditions and limits for its use of force, special means and firearms. What is fundamentally new here? What sort of legal and social protection will personnel of the renovated internal affairs system have?

[Kostas] Quite honestly, that topic and the discussion of it have gotten thoroughly tiresome. But our entire interview in one way or another concerns the law on the police. Therefore, let me say that, first of all, the reason that we adopted it was that the current working and living conditions of internal affairs agencies' personnel were simply intolerable. If we really want to bring order to the law-enforcement system and society as a whole, the people who will be handling that job should be certain of the stability of their situation and provided with legal and social protection. That is why the new law gives the police rights that only just recently could only be dreamt of.

The fourth section of it, for example, regulates the use of force, special means and firearms in the course of the police's performance of its functions of fighting crime and protecting the public order. The honest and clear legislative codification of these police powers, as well as guarantees of the policeman's protection by law, help him be more aggressive and decisive in his actions. It was the vagueness and lack of clarity on these matters in previous laws on the militia that resulted in officers' indecisiveness. People simply were afraid that their actions would not be judged useful, after which they would be punished or fired from the internal affairs agencies.

The type of special means and the extent to which it is employed are determined by the police officer, taking into account the situation, the nature of the violation of law, and the personality of the lawbreaker. In addition to other actions, a lawbreaker's coming closer than three meters to a police officer following a demand to halt is considered an encroachment on the police officer's personal safety. The concept of the use of firearms has been changed—now it consists of the aimed discharge of a weapon. Henceforth police officers will have the right to permanently keep, wear and use firearms. But that by no means implies that any policeman may, without cause, obtain a pistol and use it as a decisive argument. The law

also defines the exceeding of authority and the liability for doing so. Peaceable citizens can rest absolutely easy: the law is tough only on lawbreakers and criminals.

The document contains a number of provisions pertaining to pay and legal and social protection for police personnel. This will make it possible to staff the police with honest and educated people who are prepared to give of themselves. Not counting benefits and other forms of compensation, the amount of a police officer's salary is to be at least twice the average earnings of a worker or office employee. A system of state insurance and compensation in the event of death or disability has been devised. All employees will be subject to mandatory personal insurance in an amount equivalent to 10 years of monetary support, to be paid for out of appropriate budgets. So in the event that a person dies in the line of duty, his family or dependents will be paid a one-time benefit equivalent to 10 years of the person's monetary earnings. In addition, for five years following an officer's death, his dependents are to be paid a monthly monetary allowance, after which they are to be given pensions, and so forth. Provision is also made for providing police personnel with housing, telephones and transportation—in other words, with the conditions for normal and productive work.

[Zamora] Is it mandatory that a police officer know the state language? Within what limits? What will happen to police officers who do not have a command of it?

[Kostas] The Law "On the Functioning of Languages Within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova" specifies categories of employees who must know the state language on the level necessary for the performance of their professional duties. Employees of the internal affairs agencies, including police officers, belong to those categories.

We face the task, which is of no small importance, of improving our employees language skills. Groups for instructing employees in the state language have been set up and are already operating in our system. Many employees belonging to nonindigenous nationalities regularly attend classes and are working persistently to master language skills. Let me emphasize: they are doing this not out of fear of being dismissed from their jobs, but simply because they understand that they need it for their work. At the same time, I want to note that in selecting and promoting personnel our first consideration is an employee's professional training and competence and his devotion to his duty and the territory in which he serves. And only after that, his knowledge of the state language.

I am confident that by the deadline stipulated in the law there will be no problems connected with the introduction of the state language in our system. Incidentally, the law also stipulates the mandatory command of the language of interethnic communication, i.e., Russian.

[Zamora] The problem of the financing and material and technical supplying of the police is one of the most

painful and painfully perceived. Speaking in the parliament, you cited a sum of 327 million as necessary for implementation of the law, and you stressed that this was not a matter of a step-by-step expenditure of funds. Could you provide some more details about that?

[Kostas] The draft republic budget for 1991 allocates 179.3 million rubles for maintenance of the internal affairs agencies. In addition, over the course of three to five years it is planned to create a corps of internal troops' riflemen, and to expand the detachment of special-purpose police. That will require (one-time) budget allocations for that period in the amount of approximately 146 million rubles. At the same time, I think that the taxpayer need not be frightened by this sum. Such expenditures will not be needed for at least five years.

[Zamora] In the final analysis, maintaining the police will rest on our shoulders. Can we be confident that the new structures will raise the level of the protection of the citizen and his property?

[Kostas] There is no need to try to use talk about money to arouse a negative attitude in people toward the reforms that are being carried out in the system of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. As for the second part of the question—the law is intended exclusively to maintain a high level of security and protect the legitimate interests and property of Moldova's citizens.

[Zamora] You made a statement to the MOLDOVA PRESS agency to the effect that you believe our newspaper's comments on your speeches in the parliament to be debatable. You were referring to the attitude toward the problem of signing the Union Treaty, the language problem, and so forth. We are prepared to give you the opportunity to clearly define your position on these issues.

[Kostas] I do not retract my words. Please come work with operational reports and choose the materials that interest you. We have a press service that will be substantially reinforced this year. And if difficulties arise regarding matters of regulations or investigations, I am always prepared to help. Our cooperation should be mutually useful. It will be so if journalists will not just furiously pursue "hot" facts, but also report on our everyday job and the positive aspects of our work. Incidentally, the quality of our work is the guarantee of the journalists' own security, about which they have been making such a fuss.

As for events in [Dubesar]. In this case, in my opinion, the news media went too far. Some central publications went so far in the arbitrary interpretation of what happened that even specialists were bewildered. The USSR and republic procurator's offices are still conducting an investigation. We will find out what conclusion the investigative group reaches. I believe that the law-enforcement agencies should act vigorously and promptly in cases of the violation of law and disturbance of order, whether certain people on the left or right bank of the Dniestr, or in the north, south or center of the republic like it or not. That is their sacred duty before the republic's citizens. And they will continue to act that way, and only that way.



### Television's Reversed Course During Perestroika Examined

91UNI022A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 9, 6 Mar 91 p 14

[Article by Yuriy Bogomolov: "Back and Forth: Television Before and After Perestroika"]

[Text] It was noticed a long time ago that the mass media is the first one to wake up from the lethargic sleep at the beginning of the society's upturn, and it is the first one to be attacked by the putschists.

The attack may be conducted directly, with weapons, shots, and blood (as in Vilnius), or it may be a peaceful, gradual process that utilizes routine bureaucratic actions (as in Ostankino, when the Gosteleradio [State Committee on Radio and Television] leadership was changed—from Nenashev to Kravchenko).

With the shuffling of the components in the equation, the process of shrinking the democratic space in the airwaves has become noticeable. News programs ("Vremya" to a larger degree, Television News Channel to a lesser) not so much broadcast the information they receive as filter and distribute it. "ATV" ["Author's Television"]—a series of programs that earned a certain authority among the viewers in the 1990—has been moved to the second channel. "Vzglyad" is being urged to bring its political outlook closer to the government officials' views. Reports from the parliamentary forum are becoming increasingly terse. There are increasingly fewer live programs. The circle of independently thinking anchors has shrunk.

We are moving down the up staircase. Let us recall, though, how we went up the down staircase.

We were not going up—we were flying up, as if we had wings, jumping several steps at a time. Somehow, all of a sudden, the broadcasting network dropped the program "With All Our Heart"—a perfection of its kind, an ideal sample of social narcissism. Yuriy Zhukov, with his crushing rebukes of Ronald Reagan, vanished into some netherworld. We were reminded less and less often of Genrikh Borovik's "Position." On the other hand, the "World and Youth" shows were becoming increasingly irreverent and dynamic. Like thunder from a clear sky came the "12th Floor" program—a prototype for the rally actions and parliamentary debates.

Political shows, later played out at the congresses and sessions in Moscow and then duplicated in all cities and republics, were being rehearsed at the "12th Floor." This is where they played out scenarios with the participation of those who came from the streets and from the stairs, those leaving the offices and those moving in. It was there that they defined the roles and images of heroes and antiheroes in the play with a working title of "Perestroika."

All of that was touching and endearing because the script was being written (and the play was being staged) in front of our own eyes, with the participation of television viewers.

Real-life personae playing democratization had acquired even more verisimilitude with the beginning of preelection television debates. During the first congress, with its live gavel-to-gavel broadcasts, it also turned out to be extremely absorbing. It went so far as to be on the verge of becoming a real-life thing.

Life itself, something truly genuine started to emanate from the new invention of Central Television's Youth Programming Department—an information-and-music program called "Vzglyad."

In the beginning, "Vzglyad" did not make much claim to being a political opposition; it differed from other public affairs programs by its informality. Its anchors-informals were young people. But the most important achievement of this program was in something else—it acquired viewers-informals. The role functions of both sides in the communications chain had changed.

Totalitarian television had always rested on the following unshakeable principle: He who is on the screen is the boss, and he who is in front of the screen is the subordinate. Therefore, information coming from the screen is not really information, not the news per se; it is a command camouflaged as information, and put together in such a way that, as it is with an order, it need not be discussed, or mulled over, but does need to be accepted for real or pretended execution.

"Vremya" had become, in essence, an all-Union instruction in how the whole working population should feel and think. Watching it by itself had become, over many years, a sort of a ritual. For the television viewers it was a ritual of obedience.

For the power holders it was a ritual of self-assertion.

Two examples that indirectly confirm this argument.

As is known, Brezhnev loved to watch "Vremya." Some say he loved it as much as he loved hunting. Maybe even more because, even when hunting, he was always in a hurry to get back in time for the program. One would think: What news could Central Television's anchors present to their general secretary, when the most important information was delivered to him through much speedier and authoritative channels? But it looks like the general secretary wanted something from "Vremya" that was not the news. He was exorcizing his subconscious complex of not being elected, and therefore, not being legitimate. "Vremya" testified not only to state and rank status of the First Person, but also to the unshakeability and immovability of the entire hierarchical construction of the lawless state.

Thus, an information program had entirely lost its original function and had acquired the one of an emblem, a state symbol.



This is the first example. The second was provided by Polish history. One of the Polish people's actions in protest against the introduction of martial law in 1981 was the television viewers' demonstrative refusal to watch a Polish equivalent of "Vremya." It is possible that this kind of boycott is in the cards for us in the future. But let us not deceive ourselves from the very beginning: The crux of the matter is not the mistrust in the official source of information, but the lack of trust in the government itself.

This kind of viewer rebellion means the most radical rejection by the viewer of the subordinate role imposed on him by the totalitarian communications system.

From the very beginning, "Vzglyad" offered the viewer a different role—that of an interlocutor, a friend in the same social circle. The program itself had nothing antigovernment or even antiparty in mind. Its entire role as an opposition to orthodox broadcasting was the democratic form of communication.

It is a different matter that this personal, informal communication started to gradually define the democratic contents of this communication. It was the independent viewer that had brought to life the image of an independent anchor.

"Vzglyad" anchors, being led by their audience, could not help but arrive at a very definite political choice. And, just like the informal movement gradually acquired the role of a democratic alternative to the totalitarian regime, informal programs "Vzglyad" and "The Fifth Wheel" came to be accepted as an alternative to state broadcasting.

The paradox—or, to be precise, the abnormality of the situation—was that at some moment television air waves became far more democratic than the structure of television. The latter was of a command administrative type under Lapin, and remained the same under Nenashev.

Along with the perestroika, this ever increasing gap between what was on the screens and what was in the functionaries' offices could only remain unnoticed as long as the temperature of democratic changes kept a stable trend towards the increase. As soon as the stagnation and the decrease in this temperature started to register, it became obvious that all democratic gains rested on a rather shaky ground.

This ground was permission—not law.

The movement down the up staircase started before yesterday, before Kravchenko came to Ostankino. It started when it was decided to broadcast the second congress in recorded form at a more convenient time for the television viewers—from 2200 to 0200.

The then television brass, and their bosses, became hopelessly tangled in the reasons they gave for dropping live broadcasts. They said first, that the broadcasts

distracted working people from productive labor, and, second, that they (the people) had gotten bored with them.

They also said that live broadcast is too expensive for the treasury, forgetting to mention that recording is much more expensive. But the power holders were ready to pay any money because they were paying for the opportunity to "clean up" the up-to-the-minute history. In this respect, control over live broadcasts is just as important as control over the archives, since both put the administration at command heights without any particular democratic troubles.

The command administrative principle of relationship with the viewer that appeared to have been chased out of the door in plain view of everybody, had returned through the window.

There was one more moment in the life of broadcasting that not too many people noticed. When the Law on the Press was passed, television and radio were excluded from its jurisdiction as the media that deserves a special legislative act.

This act had been devised, but nobody wanted to take the risk of presenting it to the public because of its numerous shortcomings.

The absence of legal norms created an ambiguous situation not only for the producers on duty, but also for their immediate supervisors—something that became clear during the very first tension in relations between the two sides.

The first action was not squeezing "Vzglyad" out—it was moving "ATV" to the second channel. This happened in a relatively painless way for the Gosteleradio leadership. The real scandal broke out when "Vzglyad" was canceled. The scale of this scandal was predetermined by the fact that Kravchenko and his team started a conflict not only with the "Vzglyad" journalistic team, but also with the multimillion audience. This is the substance of this conflict—the one the chairman prefers to overlook. It is much more convenient for him to interpret the ruckus that started in the press as his political struggle against ambitious politicians. This stance of a fearless and uncompromising fighter for the Idea against—in one case—the shadow economy dealers, in another—nationalists, in the third—fascist-minded democrats, and in the fourth—the politico-journalists, has become quite widely used. It was used, in turns, by Polozkov, Alksnis, Nevzorov, and now Kravchenko.

It seems that "ours" tend to seriously delude themselves by the world public attention towards their own personae. In reality, the attention is riveted on the not-too-attractive phenomena to which "ours" kindly lent their names.

Operation on preparing all-Union broadcasting to work under the martial law regime already has its code name—"Kravchenko."

This operation is not going smoothly.

But then, what goes smoothly these days?

Those who had banned "Vzglyad" could not—for quite a while—explain coherently what they wanted from the anchors...

To leave Shevardnadze's resignation alone?

To soften the political appraisal of the previous year?

To drop the domestic political topics altogether?

It seems like it was the first, the second, the third, and... the tenth. But, at the same time, they also left the impression that "something else" was implied. This "something else" remained unspoken until Leonid Petrovich finally put himself through the exertion of expressing it, at one of the news conferences, in a sufficiently frank way: "Vzglyad" had made its podium available mostly to political activists from Democratic Russia and the Interregional Group, and paid little attention to supporters of other political groups. He apparently meant that Communists in Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, and other republics find themselves in a less favorable position information-wise, since they do not have their own "Vzglyad" on the air waves.

Thus, A. Lyubimov and his team were given a message to free some space for the Communists in their program.

All of this resembles a well-known folklore tale about a fox who asked a hare to let her into his bast hut after her own ice hut had melted in the spring.

The popularity of Valentina Leontyeva of "With All Our Heart" has melted away; Genrikh Borovik's "Position" is no longer in demand; whose fault is it? "Vzglyad" popularity is the result of the popularity of ideas and programs produced by the democratic movement and of its polemics with the communist ideology. And now "Vzglyad" is being straightforwardly asked to sponsor the ideological bankrupts and popularize them.

Had "Vzglyad" agreed to that, it would have committed a noble, but risky act. It is well known how these stories end. Take the same folk tale: First you let them step over the threshold, then they sneak into the kitchen, then they occupy the living room, and then, before you know it, they evict the owner...

This article was about finished when the presidential decree, changing the state committee into a state company was published. It does not seem to amount to much—just change the sign on the door. Well, it depends... By one stroke of a pen many thousands of Ostankino staff employees found themselves outside of the door. Only one person stayed inside—the state company chairman.

Then the tale about the bast and ice huts became a reality, the main meaning is in taking the television from under the control of the Cabinet of Ministers and the

Supreme Soviet. And, as we recall, it had been taken from under the Law on the Press' jurisdiction even earlier.

The position of the new company chairman is much better than that of a governor. He does not have to ask his employees—as Gradoboyev did—whether they want to be judged by the law or "as the heart tells him." He is permitted, by decree, to do the latter.

As I see it, this action created a precedent of administering the entire branch through the institute of governor-generals.

Whatever it is, we have descended, in one jump, to the bottom of the up staircase—down to the reinforced command administrative foundation.

It is clear that the television and radio company chairman will be in a hurry to hire a new company of employees. The latter may turn out to be the old one—only the collars and leashes will be changed. Television journalists will now sign informal contracts instead of formal labor agreements.

The problem, however, is not the company of television's staff employees, but the company of its free-lance viewers. Will Kravchenko be able to hire them?

Cinematographers have already announced their civil disobedience to the lawless television and radio. Among some people this action only brought out an ironic smile: What is the sense of it? We are not punishing Kravchenko; we are punishing television viewers...

Of course, a boycott is a double-edged sword. But in some instances it is an unavoidable option and the only one open to those who try to preserve their dignity.

In my opinion, the main meaning of a boycott is to deprive Kravchenko, and those under him, and those over him, of moral support. I have heard that they do not need it (the moral support).

This is not true. They do need it, although they need it not for support but for cover. They do not particularly need Culture; they need its Authority.

That is why the chairman, answering journalists' questions, could not hide irritation behind his condescending smile.

People of culture have their own interest in this forced action. It is not a practical one, either—they need to improve the quality of morality. And, if possible, increase its quantity.

What meaning—except for the moral and symbolic one—had Sakharov's protests in the 1970's? But today we could not do without the Sakharov that existed then. If we remain sufficiently firm today in our moral resistance, perhaps, it will make it easier for the generation that will start a new perestroyka.

After all, the debate today is not about the interests of alternative broadcasting, but about the interests of alternative people.

### Col Gen Stefanovskiy on Radar TV Company

91UM0426A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General G.A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy and chairman of the board of TPO Radar, by unnamed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; date and place not given: "What Are Radar's Objectives"]

[Text] *The joint order recently adopted by the chairman of Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] and the USSR Minister of Defense concerning the establishment of the artistic teleradio production company (TPO) Radar has evoked a broad response among KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers. Many are interested first and foremost in the objectives and tasks of the new television and radio company, and in its status.*

*Our correspondent asked Colonel General G.A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and chairman of the board of TPO Radar, to talk about it.*

[Stefanovskiy] First of all, I must note that the question of establishing a similar television and radio association had come up before. But now, when a tense situation has set in about the Army and on many fundamental positions in society, its necessity is rather obvious. The main objective is preparation of thematic broadcasts and also assistance to both television and radio media in resolving pressing problems concerning the defense construction of the state, the conduct of military reform, an increase in the authority of the USSR Armed Forces and the prestige of serving in them, strengthening the unity of the Army and the people, humanization of military service and moral formation, and the patriotic education of our youth.

This is not some kind of declaration of well-known truths. It is a question of priority, if you wish—about the fate of spiritual and political values, with whose help the interests of the security of the state were always supported. Today, these values are being eroded shamelessly in the minds of the Soviet people, especially the youth.

Destructive forces and the leaders of informal associations and parties who are inclined to extremism would very much like to determine by themselves the mood and attitude of fellow citizens toward the events that are occurring in the country, in the Army, and in other state institutions. They do not shun anything in realizing their political ambitions, including illegal actions against servicemen. It is not so much the scale of the anti-Army campaign that is so striking as its essence, which has been reduced to ideological adventurism. As a result,

many are gaining the impression that the Army is almost the incarnation of all of our troubles, among which are the dilapidation of the economy, the reduction in the financial capabilities of the country, and the viability of the administrative command methods of leadership...

Tell me, is it really possible to ignore this inexhaustible stream of distorted information about the Armed Forces? Radar intends to conduct an open and constructive conversation about the life of the Armed Forces, not excluding, of course, criticism as well. But practical and creative criticism.

I also want to emphasize: The new television and radio company, in whose programs army subjects will predominate, has not been organized to settle scores with somebody or to "militarize" people's consciences, as some zealots of abstract pacifism are trying to represent. Radar has a broad program of activity that has nothing in common with these fabrications. But, of course, it will defend the interests of the Army and the security of the country. And there is nothing unnatural here. Incidentally, I will note: Many states of the world maintain such television and radio broadcasts and even television and radio companies at their own expense. As for TPO Radar, it will function on the principles of full economic accounting, self-paying, and self-financing, being guided by the provisions for joint-stock companies and companies with limited responsibilities, which was affirmed by a decree of the government of the country of 19 June 1990.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Incidentally, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, not long ago Radio Liberty, citing the weekly KOMMERSANT, reported that there are no public organizations among the founders of Radar, but that their legal term denotes "two financial military units and two space defense complexes..."

[Stefanovskiy] Very likely, this kind of a political background suits those who are not averse to frightening the people and foreign countries with impending totalitarianism once again. In fact, everything is simpler and more honest. Among Radar's founders there are several public organizations and among these, the All-Union Soviet of War and Labor Veterans, the All-Union Naval League of Youth, and the Youth Association of Soviet Armed Forces Propaganda. There are also two military units that are involved more in the national economy. One of them is engaged in construction, and the other one supports space vehicle launches. But no one is really trying to hide them. To give more information, I will add that the All-Union Foreign Economic Association Goskontsert and six labor collectives of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (USSR Gosteleradio) have also agreed to be shareholders of Radar with full rights... In accordance with this agreement, the preparation of Radar television and radio programs will also be participated in by its artistic and technical personnel. So that idle conjectures about the seizure of the airwaves and the "repainting" for this purpose of military organizations as public organizations is deprived of any logic, to say nothing of their moral aspect.

[Correspondent] You said that Radar has a wide program of activity. How does it differ, for example, from programmed aspects of the military press, and which of them today should be general and priority?

[Stefanovskiy] It is intended that the technical, financial, and legal capabilities of Radar make it possible to resolve various substantive tasks—from artistic and production to philanthropic.

Radar, figuratively speaking, is another mouthpiece of glasnost, which will provide information on problems of the Army and society to a multimillion audience. Therefore, if it talks of key points, like other military press organs, it will have to throw light on democratic processes in the Armed Forces and questions concerning the social and legal protection of servicemen. But also to show how commanders and military-political organs are working in this direction.

Recently, despite the social and interethnic tension in a number of republics, positive changes have taken place in the joint activity of military personnel and local organs with respect to absolutely new public movements and organizations. It is necessary to be able to notice and support the good shoots of stability and harmony. I suppose that everyone is interested in this today who is not indifferent to the fate and security of the people and the Fatherland.

#### **New Youth Aeronautics Newspaper Launched**

91UN1011C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 91  
Second Edition p 6

[Article by A. Tarasov under the rubric "Project 'Space and Children': "Good Luck!"]

[Text] *I am sure that in any normal country dozens of space-related periodicals would have sprung up the day*

*after the first artificial Earth satellite in the history of the world, and especially in domestic history, was launched.*

But ours is not a normal country and in the 33 years of the space age we have never had a single space-related newspaper, nor a single "space" magazine for popular reading. Or, rather, we did not have them until yesterday. Yesterday it finally happened. The first issue of the ZVEZDNYI CHAS [Star Hour] newspaper came out here, in the PRAVDA building. Cosmonaut Aleksandr Serebrov is editor in chief. He is also chairman of the Soyuz All-Union Young People's Aeronautics society which publishes the newspaper. With a natural touch of happiness and bitterness, he says: "Our beginnings are modest but I am convinced that in future we will have magazines no worse than the JAPANESE YOUNG ASTRONAUTS' CLUB NEWS."

Such organizations and public figures as the Ministry of General Machine Building, the Cultural Initiative Foundation, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee, the Peace foundation, the Podolsk offset printing shop, Metropolitan Pitirim, etc. made it possible for the newsletter to appear. The young journalists were greeted in a fatherly and brotherly manner by representatives of their older colleagues.

Here is one more thing: The creative group headed by T. Dragnysh managed to make the first issue really exciting, both for younger and older readers. An unexpected encounter with Saint-Exupery, the portrait of the first woman cosmonauts' detachment, a poetic Universe with Tsvetayeva and Akhmadullina—all of this renders a philosophical touch to its scientific and technological contents. So—Happy flying!

### USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Status of Aral Sea Measures

91WN0306A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 91  
Union Edition p 3

[Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Progress of the Implementation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: 'On Urgent Measures To Ameliorate the Ecological Condition of the Country' With Regard to the Issues of the Aral Sea"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet notes that the Aral problem has become most acute as the greatest ecological catastrophe on our planet. The sanitation, disease-control, socioeconomic, and ecological situation has continued to deteriorate in a large region. An extreme situation in all spheres of life has developed in the Karakalpak ASSR, Kzyl-Orda, Khorezm, and Tashauz Oblasts; an abrupt deterioration of the living and health condition of the populace has set in; overall and infant mortality rates have increased.

The ecological situation in the region is out of human control. The climate of the Aral area has deteriorated abruptly. The drift of salts and dust from the drained bottom of the sea has increased. Dangerous pollution with pesticides and salinization of the main sources of drinking water in the region, the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers, has continued. The table of corrosive sub-surface water has risen; gardens and vineyards have died, and structures have been destroyed. The fertility of soils has declined, and pastures have deteriorated. Due to salinization, the fisheries of the sea have become absolutely insignificant. The genetic pool of valuable species of fish has been depleted. The destructive influence of desertification on the monuments of culture, history, and art of worldwide significance has increased. Economic losses inflicted on the national economy by this ecological catastrophe come to several billion rubles a year in the entire Aral area.

The desertification of land is spreading to still new areas. In addition to the territory of the Aral area within the borders of the Karakalpak ASSR, Kzyl-Orda, Tashauz, and Khorezm Oblasts, it has spread to the area of some rayons of Aktyubinsk Oblast in the Kazakh SSR, Bukhara Oblast in the Uzbek SSR, and Chardzhou Oblast in the Turkmen SSR. The deteriorating quality of the natural environment is exacerbated by the poor development of productive forces and a poor standard of social and living conditions of the populace in the region.

The drying of the Aral Sea and the desertification of the Aral area resulted from an incorrect choice of the strategy of locating productive forces within the tributary area of the sea by state and economic organs of the country and Union republics, the inefficient use of land and water resources, and the dominance of cotton and rice as single crops.

Egregious mistakes were made in designing, building, and operating irrigation systems. Unit water consumption is above design specifications which, given the obvious inadequacy and neglected condition of the collector-drainage network, brings about the extensive salinization of land and its withdrawal from crop rotation.

In the years of perestroyka, the shroud of silence has been removed from the Aral crisis; measures have been taken to mitigate the influence of desertification and to improve living conditions and the sanitary and disease-control situation. In the last three years alone, about 1,900 kilometers of main-line and collective-use water pipelines have been built in the region together with interfarm, city, and settlementwide distribution networks. About three hundred desalination units have been installed that make it possible to provide drinking water for more than 580,000 people. Hospitals with 2,200 beds and polyclinics for 1,500 visits have been built. Comprehensive health check-ups have been conducted; measures to improve the health condition of the populace and to partially restore the natural environment in the delta of the Amudarya are being implemented.

In the course of carrying out the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution dated 27 November 1989: "On Urgent Measures To Ameliorate the Health Condition of the Country," a government commission, the Union and Republic Consortium Aral, the Scientific Research and Coordinating Center Aral and its Nukus Branch have been set up. A competition aimed at developing a concept of restoring the sea has been held. The USSR/UNEP [United Nations Environmental Program] draft: "Participation in the Development of an Action Plan for Restoring the Aral Sea" has been compiled. Scientists from our country and a working group of UNEP experts have determined that an equilibrium in the ecological system of the region cannot be attained without restoring the Aral Sea.

At the same time, the USSR Supreme Soviet believes that the measures being taken are inadequate. Previous decisions made on the issues of the Aral are being carried out unsatisfactorily in Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Turkmen SSR, and Karakalpak ASSR. Most installations of the productive and nonproductive sphere have not been commissioned on time. The issue of job placement of the populace has become more acute, and social tension has increased.

The flawed practice of squandering the water resources of the region has not been overcome; the issue of providing good-quality drinking water for the populace is resolved slowly. The discharge of polluted water into the Amudarya and Syrdarya Rivers continues. The pace of the comprehensive reconstruction of irrigation systems, construction of water supply facilities, sewer systems, and water-treatment facilities, and crop-rotation improvement and soil conservation efforts has been slow. The development of a pattern of comprehensive



use and protection of water, land, and other natural resources of the Aral Sea tributary area has been delayed. Sufficient funds and material resources from the Union and republic budgets have not been provided. Issues of protecting the health of the populace have been resolved unsatisfactorily, especially as far as the construction of treatment and prevention establishments, creation of necessary material and technical facilities, and availability of health-care personnel are concerned. Food consumption in Karakalpakia, Kzyl-Orda, Tashauz, and Khorezm Oblasts is considerably lower than average in the corresponding republics or the USSR as a whole. The situation is also exacerbated by the fact that the share of foodstuffs in which the content of pesticides and other pollutants exceeds standards is growing.

**The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:**

1. To consider a fundamental improvement in the sanitary and disease-control conditions of life of the populace and socioeconomic and ecological situation in the Aral area, as well as stabilization of the level and subsequent restoration of the Aral Sea, an all-Union program task.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers, together with the supreme state organs of government of the Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Turkmen SSR, Tajik SSR, Kirghiz SSR, and Karakalpak ASSR, will develop in the first half of 1991 and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a draft concept to preserve and restore in stages the Aral Sea, aligning it with conditions for the socioeconomic development of the republics of Central Asia and Kzyl-Orda Oblast of Kazakhstan.

To develop and adopt in the third quarter of 1991 the Long-Range Union and Republic Program for 1991 through 1995 and for the period until 2005 aimed at a fundamental improvement in the socioeconomic, sanitary, and disease-control conditions of life of the populace of the Aral area and at restoring the Aral Sea. In view of the aggravation and abrupt deterioration of the ecological situation in the region, to adopt within one month a Union and republic program of urgent measures for 1991-1992 aimed at improving the medical and sanitary conditions of life of the populace and socioeconomic and ecological situation in the Aral area as the first stage of the aforementioned Long-Range Program. To monitor support for the execution of this program.

Financing for efforts on the Aral issue as a whole, including scientific research, will be provided by pooling the funds of the republic and Union budgets, furnishing for the most part material and technical resources allocated from the center.

2. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers, together with the supreme organs of state government of the republics of this region, will develop in the first half of 1991 normative documents setting forth the borders and the status of an ecological disaster zone in the Aral area, regulations on additional measures to compensate the populace of the Aral area based on the degree of the impact of

desertification and other factors affecting the health of people unfavorably, including the introduction and increases in regional remuneration coefficients.

The draft law: "On the Social Protection of Citizens Affected by the Consequences of an Ecological Disaster in the Aral Region" will be submitted in 1991.

Measures will be taken to increase the volume of guaranteed water supply in 1991 through 2000 with a view to preserving the Sea of Aral as a natural unit, as well as to creating regular living conditions in the lower reaches of the Amudarya and Syrdarya Rivers.

3. To approve a proposal of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan to set up an interrepublic commission for restoring the Aral Sea and to establish a fund for aiding the populace of the Aral area. To consider it necessary to develop and sign in 1991 a long-term interrepublic treaty on the rational use of water resources in the Aral Sea Basin.

4. The state organs of government of the Union republics will take measures to ensure full-value foodstuffs for the populace of the Aral area and to speed up the implementation of measures taken with a view to improving the health of the people. To consider it necessary to develop the chapter: "Food Intake of the Populace of the Aral Area" and the curative and treatment subprogram: "Children of the Aral" as parts of the Long-Range Program on the Issues of the Aral. To pay special attention to developing a network of health-care facilities, retaining health-care cadres, supplying drugs and medical equipment, and expanding scientific research into medical and biological aspects of disease prevention.

To implement practical measures for speeding up the provision of quality drinking water for the populace of the lower reaches of the Syrdarya and Amudarya Rivers by considering the possibility of supplying pure water from outside sources, as well as building plants for bottling drinking water.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers will provide assistance with resolving these issues.

5. To recommend that the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics and the Karakalpak ASSR step up the monitoring of the previously adopted decisions aimed at switching to strictly scientific guidelines for agricultural production in the tributary area of the Aral Sea, which will insure high ecological standards in the utilization of nature and the rational use of water, land, and plant resources. To implement measures aimed at discontinuing the discharge of polluted water into the rivers Amudarya and Syrdarya, reducing and putting in order the use of pesticides, and improving the protection of public health. To ensure carrying out a set of crop-rotation and soil-conservation measures. To render all kinds of assistance to local environmental-protection, soviet, and economic organs.

6. The USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology will complete in 1991 the creation of the Institute of Ecology and Water Management Problems of the Aral Sea in the city of Nukus at the facilities of the Nukus Division of the NIKTs [Scientific Research and Coordinating Center] Aral. To reinforce scientific and information support for the socioeconomic development of the region and coordination of the activities of scientific research organizations in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan concerning these issues. To consider it necessary to set up divisions of this institute in the cities of Tashauz, Aralsk, and Urgench. To take measures, in cooperation with the ministries and departments of the USSR, aimed at developing a modern system for ecological monitoring in the Aral area in the course of converting defense industries, using the available potential of the Baykonur space launch complex and scientific resources of the republics.

To develop a comprehensive interdepartmental Union program of scientific research on the issues of the Aral.

7. To enhance the role of the tributary-area water-management associations Amudarya and Syrdarya in the management of water resources in the tributary area of the Aral Sea involving the extensive introduction of automatic control systems. To envisage an enhanced status of these associations and the granting of the status of state inspectors to their employees. To transfer water-management maintenance organizations, water intakes, water engineering systems, and reservoirs along the Amudarya and Syrdarya Rivers to the tributary-area

associations in 1991, as envisaged by previous decisions of the government of our country.

8. To recommend that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the superior organs of state power in the Union republics consider the issue of creating an organ of state government, entrusting it with the functions of interrepublic distribution of water resources and the monitoring of water consumption in the country.

9. The USSR procurator general will create in 1991 an interrepublic environmental-protection procuracy in the tributary area of the Aral Sea.

10. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Issues of Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs, together with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will approach the leadership of the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) with a request to provide assistance with developing and implementing projects for restoring the Aral Sea and to incorporate the issue of the Aral Sea into the UN Program for Desertification Control.

11. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Protecting Public Health will monitor the execution of the present resolution on a regular basis.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Lukyanov [Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 4 March 1991

**Problems of Homeless Children Examined**

91US0281A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 91  
Second Edition p 4

[Article by L. Zakharova: "'I Wish I Could Kill Them!':  
The Words of an Embittered Little Vagrant"]

[Text] *Juvenile vagrants... Nobody knows how many there are in the country. Children run away from parents, from boarding schools and orphanages; young men run away from the army. Moscow militia detains about 6,000 "runners" annually. The number of those who never come in contact with the militia is, probably, much larger. Mass juvenile vagrancy is a fact of our life. This problem cannot be solved by decree. But it does require special attention.*

Moscow juvenile reception and distribution center. I am walking through the cafeteria and do not see a single chair that does not have its vinyl cover in shreds, the tufts of stuffing hanging out. "The teenagers do not care about things," says the center's chief, K. Pervushina. "They deliberately break and cut the furniture, tear the state-provided clothing. They are here only temporarily: Today they are here, tomorrow—somewhere else."

The center has five departments. The first is for run-aways and people without a permanent place to live, age 14 to 18. The second, homeless children, age seven to 14. The third consists of juvenile delinquents who permanently reside in Moscow and are here waiting to be sent to special schools and special vocational schools. The fourth department is for preschool children, age three to seven (girls and boys together). And the fifth is for girls, age seven to 18.

*In 1989, more than 150,000 vagrant children were detained nationwide.*

Many of the reception center inhabitants already have a record of theft, robbery, drinking, and drug use. Among the girls there are some rather experienced prostitutes.

They want to live here the way they are used to, and have trouble following the daily routine. There are sometimes children of 10 to 15 different—and sometimes warring—nationalities in the same department. They immediately form their own clans; even in the cafeteria the Tatars sit at one table, the Moldovans at another, the Kazakhs at yet another... Practically all smoke—sometimes from age five or six. The older ones are embittered against everything and everybody, especially parents: "They should all be killed and go to hell!" I heard one teenager saying: "I go down the street, and ahead of me are a guy and a girl. Well dressed, happy, they talk to each other and laugh... I wish I could kill them!" Only two emotions rule here: envy and hate. There is only one desire: to get rich. A new suit, "a video rig," lots of money, restaurants, girls, binges, "getting high..." Kids with this outlook dominate the atmosphere in the receiving center. Now imagine that a normal, decent boy accidentally finds himself here. He could be robbed on a train or, say, got

separated from his tourist group and got lost in unfamiliar Moscow—what is he to do? He goes to the militia, which delivers him to this friendly company... Here some of the experienced "veterans" will conduct a crash "familiarization" course, will provide useful addresses, and then will get the newcomer together with new shady friends.

The children should probably be separated not by age, but by category. However, to get to know both the children and their "records," their home situation and level of knowledge, and thus to be able to form more or less homogeneous groups requires a lot of time and a lot of personnel, because it is impossible to foresee everything—life constantly supplies new challenges...

The instructors say that it is possible to reach a one-on-one understanding with practically any kid. But when they are together, it is a mob, a mass that may not be homogeneous but is nevertheless bound together by the momentary communality of interests; sometimes this mob becomes totally uncontrollable. If it is agitated, it is dangerous to enter a classroom. One instructor had his nose broken; another was attacked with a metal bar.

The receiving center cannot rehabilitate the vagrants. The best they can do is to keep them alive and healthy. Problem teenagers should be helped at their places of residence. There, however, they are under the supervision of seven nannies, and therefore the results are lamentable.

There are currently three organizations charged with the care of orphaned, abandoned, and unsupervised children—the state education system, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All of them have modest budgets and very limited powers. It would seem that the time has come to create a single center responsible for the care of deprived children under each rayon soviet; these centers should get the maximum available money and would be fully responsible for the destiny of each individual child.

"We have only one wardship inspector per rayon. Meanwhile, in Timiryazevskiy Rayon of Moscow, for instance, there are 480,000 residents... What kind of help can the children get from this one person under these circumstances? We need a special competent service with wide powers that would include both a diagnostic lab and a social service department. This type of wardship center exists in the FRG, in Cuba, and in other countries. We have some sponsors here, too: employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs servicing the diplomatic corps administration—especially Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union] members—which is more than I can say about our official sponsors, the ceramics factory. Instructors from the health cooperative Nord help with sports instruction and games. We have visiting performers, animal theater, and a puppet theater; the little ones go on free visits to the circus by invitation of Yu. Nikulin; we have also had visits from

canine trainers with service dogs from the city department of internal affairs kennels... Of course, this kindness and attention brings out good feelings and improves the mood of these disadvantaged kids.

The issue of importance for the receiving center—how to separate regular kids from juvenile criminals—can probably be solved with the help of specialist-researchers from competent organs. Cooperation between the center instructors and psychologists from the sociological center is being established now.

Something else. I have seen with my own eyes how painfully sensitive and receptive juvenile vagrants are to the word. Are we not neglecting this most powerful of tools, substituting for a heartfelt and kind word orders, threats, and punishments? These are children, after all—children whom fate has dealt a bad hand. They are still children, whether they are three, five, or 15 years old... If we accept this premise, would it not make sense to replace some of the formal lessons with informal talks—provided they are truly sincere and kind—with examples from classical literature that are deeply emotional and reach every heart? Deprived children need talented preachers more than they need teachers.

After all, what kind of serious study can we talk about when temporary "pupils" with three to 10 years of school behind them all sit in the same classroom, knowing full well that in five to seven days they will go someplace else? Is their mind on the lesson, or is it just a way to kill time? And does it make sense for our state—whose budget is already bursting at the seams—to spend money on this so-called "education?" One would not regret the money spent if these lessons were useful, instead of being a collection of haphazard pieces of information that is so removed from these kids' current circumstances and therefore appears to them to be so utterly useless... I do not want to cast a stone at the talented teachers. Not at all. But not everything is in their hands.

#### **RSFSR State Committee Mortality Statistics Outlined**

91US0281B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*  
in Russian No 3, 18 Jan 91 p 7

[RSFSR State Committee on Statistics report: "Lamentable Results: Wish We Would Live To Be 60..."]

[Text] The worsening of the socioeconomic situation in the country shows first of all in the number of deaths from accidents, poisonings, and traumas—that is, unnatural causes. In 1990, the number of people who had died from such causes in the RSFSR was about 200,000, of which 145,000 were able-bodied people; this is one-third more than in 1987. During the last three years the mortality rate from murder almost doubled, the number of suicides showed more than 15 percent increase, and the number of accidental alcoholic poisonings grew by 35 percent.

At present, accidents, poisonings, and traumas are the cause of the death of every third person who dies before reaching retirement age. Russia firmly holds first place in the country in the mortality rate from unnatural causes. The rise in mortality rate from these causes is largely responsible for the general tendency towards increasing mortality rate in the republic.

The mortality rate of able-bodied men is almost four times that of able-bodied women. Among those who died from tuberculosis men constitute 90 percent and of those who died from heart attacks and unnatural causes, 85 percent. The mortality rate of able-bodied men is high in the rural areas, especially from respiratory illnesses (twice that of city residents), and from accidents, poisonings, and traumas (1.5 times as high as in the cities). If the existing mortality rate remains as it is in currently defined age groups, each fifth person (or each fourth in the rural area) of the current generation of 16-year-olds will not live to be 60.

The length of period when men are considered to be able-bodied is currently 44 years for men, and 39 years for women. Considering the high mortality rate in Russia, this period is five years shorter for men and one year shorter for women. To a certain extent it also reflects in the average longevity of the Russian population, which currently stands at 64.2 years for men and 74.5 years for women, with 62.6 versus 74.2, correspondingly, in the rural areas. Male longevity in most Union republics is noticeably higher than in the RSFSR; for instance, in Armenia the difference is five years, in Georgia, 3.5 years and Belorussia and Lithuania, 2.5 years.

#### **USSR Supreme Soviet Official on Introduction of Private Health Care Insurance**

91US0277A Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*  
in Russian 31 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[S. Karkhanin report on Yu.N. Belenkov statement: "It Is Profitable To Be Healthy"]

[Text] This year about R37 billion have been allocated from the state budget for the needs of public health. This is about half of what is needed.

But it is beyond the powers of the state to find additional funding. What is the solution? In the opinion of many specialists it lies in switching to a system of insured medicine that is practiced in most of the world's developed countries.

A concept for draft legislation on insured medicine has been prepared by the USSR Ministry of Health and has been debated twice in the USSR Supreme Soviet Health Committee. The deputy chief of that committee, Professor Yu.N. Belenkov, comments on this.

First it must be emphasized that insured medicine is state medicine, and should not be regarded as switching to private practice everywhere. At the same time it is

medicine for a society with a market economy. And this means that even after the draft fundamental law has been passed, the new system will not immediately go into operation everywhere.

The individual must have a different attitude toward his own health than he does now. Health will acquire some monetary equivalent. We know from world practice that this is approximately how spending is allocated: Half of spending is covered by the state and is mainly for children, the disabled, and retirees, and is divided between federal and municipal budgets. Another 45 percent is paid for by enterprises and entrepreneurs, and the other five percent by citizens. Although I do not exclude the possibility that profitable enterprises may assume full responsibility for that five percent. We do not intend to establish a rigid framework; this will enable the republics to choose their own version giving due consideration to their possibilities.

It is clear that this innovation will not take root without a sensible tax policy. For what happens now? The lion's share of what we earn goes "upward" in the form of indirect taxes and is included in the budget, and often the money does not go where it should. This practice has made it possible for the notorious residual principle to flourish, which cuts away the ground from public health, national education, and culture. With insured medicine a person knows how much he is spending on his own health. And we are trying to achieve a situation in which medical care, at least initially, will not cost the patient more than it does now.

We have a triad here—the owner of the insurance policy, the insurance company, and the hospital. The economic interrelationships will bring clarity to a situation that now seems hopeless and confused. Take the sad case in which it is impossible to save a patient's life. Under the present system, if the relatives lodge a complaint, a commission is set up, and because of its departmental subordination it enjoys scant trust, and in general the ordeal is bad for everyone. But with insured medicine, no payment will be made to the hospital if independent experts are convinced that there was physician error. But if the patient is cured, the bill is paid.

Perhaps the most important thing is that the individual understands that being sick is unprofitable for him. In turn, it is not to the advantage of an enterprise to pay out large sums of money to treat workers, and so concern must be shown for their health. At present it works the other way round: The longer the hospital lists the more it saves on the wages fund, and the greater the bonus and additions... Absurd but a fact!

What kind of size will the insurance be? In an optimum scenario it is not fixed, only a minimum is set, which according to preliminary calculations is about R250 per person annually. Here, it is important that those who fall in "risk factor" categories pay more, for example, if a person smokes or is overweight. The insurance companies are not charitable organizations; they want to make

a profit so as to invest in, for example, new medical technologies. Consequently, a manager who does not show proper concern for his subordinates will be left without a contract under insured medicine until he improves conditions for his workers.

On the other hand we should not forget that many of our foreign colleagues praise the system we now have, even though this may seem strange. It has given a good account of itself in emergency situations for people involved in epidemics and postwar dislocation since it has enabled spending to be quickly reallocated since it is located in one pocket—the state's. And the most important thing is that although we do not have a very high level of medicine, it is the same for everyone. The social guarantees provided by the state do work one way or another. But in the West, private medicine is of the highest level but it is only for the select few. And the first insurance funds appeared there in their time to help those with low incomes. In short, we should not reject the experience that has been accumulated.

Of course, there is a danger that physicians will try to raise the price of medical care. In order to prevent that, as in other countries there is a system of control. Experts and medical associations will not allow any clinic to make superprofits.

I believe, however, that the main difficulty is the unequal insurance conditions in which both the hospitals and the enterprises will find themselves. There are the "rich" and the "poor." This is why it may be that a person may pay his insurance and still be treated in some hospital corridor, and without drugs... We cannot resolve these problems from Moscow, they must be handled in a practical way by the republics.

At the same time, insured medicine will not start to operate throughout the entire country. And it must be recognized that an element of social inequality will appear; it will not be possible to return to a general leveling. On the other hand, I think that in small cities the tasks of the insurance companies may be assigned to State Security and the city public health department. Thus, insurance relations will be built initially on the "enterprise-hospital" pairing, and the money obtained will go to re-equip old hospitals or construct new ones.

Incidentally, I am convinced that there is no need to spend funding to increase the number of physicians or hospital beds, for we have more than enough here in the country. There is no shortage of places in wards because the reason that patients are kept so long in hospital is because of obsolete equipment and lack of proper sanitation; such patients could be treated as outpatients or discharged more quickly.

If being healthy is profitable there is no need to agitate for sports or to debate the inventory of sports equipment. Patient and physician self-awareness will change. The prestige of a profession that was at one time one of the most respected in Russia will be enhanced. Although, you understand, it will be a long and difficult and not



always pleasant road. And in order for collective insurance to come into being with minimum complications, during the initial period we must increase spending on medicine from local budgets. It is precisely on the public health funds operating at the level of republic and oblast that the level of medical care in the region will depend. True, we shall not get by without a central reserve fund for cases of epidemics or disasters.

If the insured medicine system can operate successfully in other countries under the most diverse kinds of social conditions, it can work for us, too. Moreover, the medical profession has welcomed the draft fundamental law on economic principles in the financing of public health in the USSR that has now been published—that is the correct name for the document on insured medicine that we hope to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet at its next session. There have been no fundamental objections to the draft, but there have been many constructive proposals and comments, for which we are grateful. And there is probably nothing so terrible in public health built on a multiple foundation; prohibitions do not help things. We must move along the road of economic expediency. If people are ready to pay for good care in their recovery then they should not be prevented from doing so. Cutting short any attempt to introduce, for example, only paid operations for the removal of an appendix is quite another matter. In emergency medicine we must first think about the patient, and then about all the social implications.

#### Roundtable on Moscow Health Care Insurance

91US0326A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 30 Jan 91 p 3

[Roundtable discussion by V. Kalinin, RSFSR minister of health, and others, conducted by Ye. Baskakova, correspondent: "Insurance-Type Health Care—Is It a Way Out of Our Impasse?"]

[Text] The problems which affect the safeguarding of Muscovites' health have recently evoked the sharpest types of discussion. One such discussion—virtually the most urgent one—is linked to the capital's conversion to providing social insurance for medical aid, or an insurance-type health care. What can a system of medical aid which at one time was flourishing but later was abolished provide for health care and for people? To what extent and in what forms would its revival be feasible? These and many other questions pertaining to the further fate of Moscow's health-care system are discussed below by the following participants in a "roundtable," organized in our editorial offices: V. Kalinin, RSFSR minister of health; R. Anufriyev, chief, Mosgorispolkom Main Medical Administration; V. Nutrikhin, deputy chairman, Mossovet [Moscow City Soviet] Permanent Commission on Public Health Care; A. Solovyev, chief physician, Municipal Clinical Hospital No 6; F. Batyrov, chief physician, Tuberculosis Hospital No 7; V. Kirillov, professor, Moscow Academy of Medicine; and V. Dolinskaya, specialist, USSR Union of Lawyers Central Council.

[V. Nutrikhin] Our commission has attentively studied the state of affairs in Moscow's health-care system. And, to put it bluntly, it's depressing. Approximately 60 percent of the hospital buildings and half of the municipal pharmacies are in urgent need of major repairs; one-fifth of our hospital beds are in an emergency condition. Builders have not met any of their deadlines for constructing medical institutions. The shamefully low wages (averaging 156 rubles a month) of medical employees has brought about an extremely serious personnel staffing problem. Thus, last year the city's shortage of physicians amounted to 14,000 persons, while that of mid-level personnel was 29,000. As you know, the level of a state's civilization is determined or defined not by the achievements of its space technology, but by the life span of its citizens. However, all the previous programs for developing this capital's health-care system have been characterized by words rather than deeds. They have not only lacked support by financial and material resources, but also have not been linked or coordinated with the plans of those ministries and departments engaged in turning out medical equipment and medicines. Last year the shortage of medicines exceeded an amount worth 38 million rubles. More than 200 specific brand names or designations of medicines requisitioned by the health-care system were not supplied at all by the industry involved. To put it in simpler terms, one out of every three patients had nowhere to turn to buy analgin; nor could half the people buy—pardon me—laxatives. And so we should not be surprised that the health indicators of Moscow's inhabitants are practically the worst.

The predominance of the residual or "leftover" principle of financing, along with the formation of centralized funds in isolation from the quality of medical aid or service have led to a complete lack of motivation in health maintenance on the part of people as well as on the part of the enterprises where they are employed. And this has resulted in a sharp decline of the prestige formerly enjoyed by the profession of physician.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, these bitter truths, if I may be permitted to use such an expression, have already set everybody's teeth on edge long ago. Rigid centralization in administering health care by the state, "powdered over" with the legend of the supposedly free medical care, is obviously the source of our present-day troubles. But the time for critical analysis of our former mistakes has dragged on too long. Therefore, let's talk about what must be done in order to rescue or save our medical-aid system from an impending disaster. And, believe me, Muscovites are tired of waiting....

[V. Kalinin] Taking as my point of departure what the deputy from the Moscow City Soviet said about enterprises nowadays being utterly unmotivated to safeguard the health of their own workers, let me add the following points. Russia's Ministry of Health is presently engaged in working out an insurance-type law or, as it is still called, a cash-type medical system. Thus, we want to attract and involve additional funds into medical aid for working people. We intend to channel another portion of

the funds which the state will allot into treating the socially unprotected part of the population: children, pensioners, and unemployed persons. To be sure, the mere thought of paying for medical services causes practically a panic among most of the population. People have been "fed" too long on fables concerning one of the most important achievements of socialism—free health care. And it is difficult to abandon in one hour the stereotypes with which our consciousness has been injected for decades. That's why the mass media, including your newspaper, should explain to Muscovites in popular terms that the conversion to an insurance-type medical-care system will not affect their personal pocketbooks.

[F. Batyrov] The idea seems tempting and attractive, especially for me as a chief physician. But several questions immediately arise. In the first place, what kind of mechanism would there be for the reciprocal relations between the enterprises and the medical-treatment institutions? Would they work directly with each other, as happens, for example, in the Moscow Sanatorium, or would it be through some sort of intermediary organization which would accumulate the funds from enterprises? In the second place, isn't there concealed behind all this the danger of a monopoly on the part of the treatment institutions in selecting the most profitable patients, i.e., those employed at rich, profit-making enterprises?

[Correspondent] I would pose a third question, which is no less important in my opinion. During the period of conversion to a market-type economy many enterprises—and this is unavoidable—will start down the road to ruin. And under the conditions of financial instability an entrepreneur could prove incapable of paying an additional tax.

[V. Dolinskaya] But, after all, the insurance payments for employees cannot be taken as a percentage of the profits, but rather as a firmly fixed monetary sum which is to be set for several years ahead of time. In this case, the idea that employees of unprofitable production facilities will wind up as losers is groundless. I vote enthusiastically "for" the insurance-type medical system. The present-day state system of health care is financed from general tax revenues received into the budget; moreover, it operates in accordance with the residual principle. Under a cash-type system, however, we would avoid the anonymity and vagueness which characterize general taxes. And this means that medical programs would no longer become the victims of a change in budgetary priorities. State-sponsored insurance and insurance paid for by entrepreneurs would form the first level, so to speak; voluntary payments by citizens would be added at the second level. Moreover, at both these levels the quality of the medical aid should be equal, with the only difference being in a higher level of comfort.

[Correspondent] Let's assume that this would all be the case. Nevertheless, the question posed above by F. Batyrov is still reasonable. If suddenly, beginning

tomorrow, treatment institutions begin to receive additional income from enterprises, where is the guarantee that hospitals with ancient equipment and a lack of the basic medications would be able to provide a patient with high-quality treatment and a cure?

[R. Anufriyev] In order that insurance-type medical care not be turned into a primitive method for extracting money, contractual agreements will have to exist which stipulate a guaranteed minimum of services in accordance with the fees being charged. Another issue is the question of who will accumulate these funds, and who will be in charge of disbursing them? The executives of the municipal health-care system have been criticized quite often for the clumsy, inefficient structure used to administer treatment institutions. In particular, it has been proposed to eliminate the rayon-level health departments. But the practical experience of recent years has shown how vigorously all manner of apparatus structures continue to defend their right to exist, even if it means changing their signs.

[A. Solovyev] If I've understood you correctly, you're afraid that, with the conversion to a social insurance type of medical aid, the former rayon-level health departments, after changing their name, would begin to dispose of the funds collected from enterprises, and that they would do this as they saw fit. That is to say, just as in former times, bureaucrats would exercise economic power over medical care and Muscovites. But, of course, insurance-type medical care requires completely different approaches. In particular, what we need is an organ which would be absolutely independent—from the departments as well as from the health-care system.

[V. Kirillov] Have we asked the question as to why the attempts to improve medical aid by means of conducting various experiments, for example, in Kemerovo and Kuybyshev were doomed to failure? Well, it was because they were all keyed on changing the details, whereas the system itself—the administration of health care, based on rigid inter-subordination along vertical lines—always remained firmly immovable. Look at what happens when a person arrives at the usual type of rayon-level polyclinic. From the beginning of his route at his closet and dresser to its end in a visit to the physician's office, he knows that nobody is waiting for him there. In order to change the situation and compel the medical-care system to work for human beings, we must turn to our own experience with insurance- or cash-type medical care, as it emerged at the end of the last century in the West, and then in Russia. But whereas in the West this system of medical aid developed favorably and positively (its present-day achievements are self-evident), in Russia it was abolished in 1918. Four years later it was revived on the basis of a multifaceted economy; but then, together with the NEP [New Economic Policy], it was terminated for good. And it was at that time that the residual principle of financing health care made its appearance. For all the enormous funds of the cash-type medical-care system were transferred to the unified state pocket, and shortly after this they were channeled into

building the "giants" of the first few five-year plans. And this was done, as attested by historical documents, by none other than N. Semashko, the people's commissar of health care. And so at a certain time not only the peasants who were "de-kulakified," but also medical care. And whereas the system of social insurance was assumed by the state, the payment for hospital sick-lists, i.e., medical certificates of unfitness for work, was undertaken by the trade unions. As you know, this procedure has been retained to this very day. And, of course, it is profitable for the trade unions to have this money and the interest obtained from it. But why should the trade unions have our money at their disposal?

[V. Kalinin] The question was posed absolutely correctly because the payment for hospital sick-lists and treatment comprises a unified process connected with a single phenomenon—disease. In other words, what you are proposing is a radical break with the system which has existed for decades. Honestly speaking, I don't know how feasible it would be to take such a step under the conditions of the present social situation which is tense even without this.

[V. Kirillov] If we really want to develop the medical sector, and not merely re-construct the system of reciprocal subordination, we will have to embark upon this course. Because, after all, what is being proposed nowadays? On the basis of the existing system, to create a pitiful imitation of insurance-type medical care. The contractual agreements which are being proposed between the treatment institutions and the enterprises are the most archaic form of medical aid, one whereby health care, being entirely dependent on the entrepreneurs, serves not human beings, but the system of administering their labor.

And so, let's explain just what insurance-type medical care really is. First of all, it is a social-insurance fund composed of money deducted or contributed by state, private, or shareholding, joint-stock enterprises, and, most importantly, by the employees themselves. Because, after all, the income tax which we pay nowadays is dissolved in the state pocket without a trace for medical care. But insurance-type medical care assumes or presupposes deductions from a person's wages (for example, one or two percent), but targeted for medical aid, i.e., into the cash-box. All these funds must be spent to pay for hospital sick-lists, to maintain medical staff personnel and treatment institutions, as well as to obtain medicines. Moreover, a board to be elected at general meetings or conferences controls and administers these funds. Such a board also hires the hospital physicians and thereby provides all of its members with guaranteed medical aid.

[Correspondent] If I have understood it correctly, in this case medical care depends entirely on the cash-box, when the physician begins to provide services to the patient, rather than the other way around. And then there is no longer any need to appeal to his mercy and

lofty professional level; otherwise, the physician would simply be without work. Is that right?

[V. Kirillov] Precisely. Broadly accessible, democratic, essentially free, and highly skilled, cash-type medical care co-existed during the NEP period parallel with generally accessible, free Soviet medicine. In practice, the latter was never distinguished by any high degree of professionalism.

[F. Batyrov] Nevertheless, permit me to disagree with your quite competent opinion. It seems to me that this problem is not to be solved with a single wave of the hand. Time is required, and quite a lengthy period of time, if only because our city's economy is simply not ready for such a decisive conversion. Plus this, I fear that the capital's health-care system would inevitably encounter a lack of desire on the part of the trade unions and the entrepreneurs to start down this path.

[V. Kirillov] If we are to speak about the time periods required for setting up the system, then it seems to me that conversations about the lack of readiness of the national economy for it are erroneous. Let's return to the facts; against the background of the country's complete economic dislocation, with the introduction of the NEP, a cash-type medical system was set up, and after a rather brief period of time it was able to become one of the richest sectors. But here we need to understand something else as well: In its creation an development no employer in any state was interested or motivated from the beginning. It was the result of the proletariat's class struggle. And we cannot fail to consider the lessons taught to us by our own history under the present-day conditions. I am profoundly convinced of the following: If Moscow chooses the correct path of converting to an insurance type of medical care and risks or dares to revive it as it should be, despite the protests of its opponents, which nowadays are the financial organs and all manner of departments, then within just a year or two our crippled health-care system will sense an obvious lightening or easing of its situation.

[V. Kalinin] Your arguments are ironclad, and I would not be so bold as to dispute them. Let me merely add that for Moscow to begin its health-care system, it must carefully determine where it is to be: within the Union or the Russian Ministry of Health. And, after that has been decided, we could conduct a specific dialogue as to including in the draft law on insurance-type medical care proposals proceeding from the capital's health-care staff members.

[Correspondent] In concluding this discussion, I'd like to draw your attention to the following factor of no small importance. What is so striking is not merely the differences in the viewpoints of the participants in this round-table, but at times the most unexpected turns of the topic connected with Moscow's conversion to social insurance for medical aid. Such turns attest to the fact that this is an extremely serious problem. It requires not only balanced approaches, but also profound rethinking. And in

the future the editors intend to publish the opinions on this score of those persons to whom the fate of Muscovites' health care is not a matter of indifference.

### **'Communist Initiative' Movement Presses for Leninist Komsomol**

91US0292A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by A. Pankratov, A. Podkopalov, and A. Fortunatov: "Boldly in Step, Comrades"]

[Text] The specter of communism is stalking the union.... According to the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League.

### **From KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Files**

The initiating group of the "Communist Initiative" youth movement was formed in Moscow in the summer of 1990. Aleksandr Zolotov presented a statement on behalf of this movement at the constituent congress of the Communist Party of Russia.

The first constituent meeting of the DMKI ["Communist Initiative" Youth Movement] was held on 6 October 1990 in the Nizhegorod Obkom building. Approximately 80 persons had assembled from Togliatti, Vologda, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, Moscow, and Nizhniy Novgorod.

The second meeting of the DMKI, at which the main documents for a forthcoming congress were adopted, was held in November 1990 in Nizhniy Novgorod. The "Movement's" Russian congress was held 15-16 December 1990 in the V.I. Lenin Museum in Moscow. Some 170 participants were registered: from high school and college students through party administrative system officials and VUZ [higher educational institution] lecturers.

From the "Communist Initiative" Russian Youth Movement action program:

"Yes' to the RSFSR Leninist Communist Youth League, 'No' to a Komsomol of smart operators and bureaucrats."

"Together with the Communists by conviction and action, separate from party card merchants."

At the sources of the "Movement" are professional Marxist social scientists—Aleksandr Zolotov, assistant professor at Nizhegorod University; Igor Malyarov, junior scientific associate of the MGU [Moscow State University]; and Sergey Chernyakhovskiy, graduate student of philosophy of the MGU. History is being repeated—Marxist intellectuals with a prescription for happiness for all in their pockets are appearing in Russia once again. And this prescription, what is more, is evidently the result of their personal scholarly research in the sphere of Marxist-Leninist teaching, which is, like the electron, inexhaustible. In fact, it is all very simple, Sergey Chernyakhovskiy, for example, believes. Yes, our industrial socialism is now losing to capitalism. But to

postindustrial, information capitalism. And for this reason it is sufficient to mobilize ourselves somewhat and accomplish information industrialization, and we will as a result build the socialism of the 21st century—postindustrial—which will give 100 points start to their present system. And it is by no means necessary to introduce private ownership here, even material stimulation is superfluous—man will receive by ration card all that he needs and will find true satisfaction in intellectual, creative labor.

But what if I do not believe in the latest model of socialism-communism and do not wish to be mobilized for the accomplishment of another supertask in a common formation? If I consider that there have been enough experiments with the country and that it is time to return to the bosom of world civilization?

No, "Initiative" rules out such a possibility: "to ban the activity of all parties and public organizations and associations whose activity leads...to the revival of man's exploitation of man and a weakening of the power and abasement of the dignity of the Soviet Union." But, as experience shows, anyone at all may put anything he wants under this "item." And although the "Movement" declares a readiness "for cooperation with all political forces within the framework of the October spectrum," this spectrum is for it confined as yet to the Communist Party of the RSFSR and the United Workers Front. It is not comfortable with the CPSU Central Committee inasmuch as a "passive-defensive modus operandi" has become established therein, and the reborn Komsomol leaders, on the other hand, want to "make the Komsomol either a cooperative or ministry of youth."

The Russian Communists and "Frontists" (United Workers Front [OFT]) are another matter. Reciprocal signs of attention, incidentally, followed immediately—the leaders of the "Communist Initiative" were in short order assigned "staff" positions—A. Zolotov was elected to the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, N. Tsyplenkov is assistant to the leader of the Soyuz group of deputies, and I. Malyarov is a member of the United Workers Front Coordinating Council.

### **From KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Files**

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zolotov, member of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, member of the "Communist Initiative" Youth Movement Republic Committee. Born in 1958 in Gorkiy. Graduated from the Economics Faculty of Leningrad State University. Subsequently performed graduate work and in 1984 defended his candidate's thesis on the subject: "Soviet Management as a Functional Form of the Development of Socialist Production Relations." He considers research work the basis of his political activity.

In 1987-1989 he was secretary of the Gorkiy State University Komsomol Committee, member of the Komsomol Obkom and delegate to the 21st Komsomol Congress. He wrote in the draft document: "The Komsomol Ideological Platform," which was distributed among the congress



delegates: "A multiparty system has taken shape in which the majority of the political organizations that has arisen is in fact forming a common bloc of struggle against socialist renewal."

In the material of the First Constituent OFT Congress, which was held in 1989 in Sverdlovsk, Zolotov's name is on the list of members of this movement's Coordinating Council. In March 1990, A. Zolotov ran for people's deputy of the RSFSR. He failed to obtain electoral support and did not get through to the second round of the voting.

Zolotov considers that the DMKI is called on to fill the Komsomol's activity with "Communist content," to rally the "Communist forces" in the Komsomol, and in the event of the collapse of the Komsomol to function as an independent political organization.

It has to be said that the appearance of the youth "Initiative" was amazingly opportune. And although the congress of its supporters manfully declares that "it is difficult being a Communist today," we will permit ourselves to disagree. It was difficult for Communists a year to 18 months back, when, seemingly, the party's omnipotence was coming to an end and when, under the fire of the severest criticism, it was very uncomfortable even for those who had in no way besmirched themselves by active promotion of the Stalin or Brezhnev party policy. Today, however, we are seeing how the most conservative forces in the party have reorganized, consolidated and switched to the attack. And to track this chronologically, the formation of the youth "Communist Initiative" coincides with absolute precision with the stages of the maturation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

But the "Movement's" leaders are not confining their activity to cooperation with the OFT, Soyuz, and the Communist Party of the RSFSR. They are conducting propaganda in the Komsomol organizations and the workforce.

Having attended together with Igor Malyarov a meeting with the workers of a Moscow plant, we saw for ourselves that he also knows how to speak. Scathing speeches about the shadow economy operators, cooperativists, the party bureaucracy and the official schedule of appointees robbing the people and about the readiness of the "democrats" to sell Russia on part-payment to foreign capital work faultlessly. And not a word, of course, about the fact that the country's present catastrophic situation is a consequence not of the omnipotence and domination of the democrats, but the burden of past mistakes and the inconsistency of the country's present leadership, which cannot yet make up its mind to radical reforms.

As far as the Komsomol is concerned, the "Movement," its leaders themselves acknowledge, does not have support from below as yet. I. Malyarov rightly believes that a delegate's personal position and resolutions of plenums by no means signify the support of the Komsomol members that stand behind the delegates and the elective bodies. He personally counts more on the spontaneous

communism of the masses, which will inevitably grow in the present complex situation, and effective propaganda of his ideas. If the "Initiative" secures for itself only 1 percent of active supporters in the overall masses of members of the Komsomol, this will be a decisive victory, Malyarov believes. The Bolsheviks were at one time even fewer....

Where, locally, is "Initiative" supported?

#### From KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Files

Novosibirsk. According to Sergey Krupenko, member of the "Communists of Russia" Movement Organizing Bureau, the "Communist Initiative" Youth Movement is not yet structured organizationally. Five or six students of Novosibirsk University are involved in propaganda and the recruitment of supporters. "But I fear that we will not obtain the broad support of the youth," Sergey complains. "The anticommunist mood is very pervasive, and the civic position has been lost."

Kursk. Paragraph 1 of the decision of the January plenum of the Komsomol gorkom reads: "To support the 'Communist Initiative' Youth Movement." This movement was also supported by a recent joint plenum of the CPSU obkom and Komsomol obkom. A local leader of "Communist Initiative," Sergey Loktionov, second secretary of the gorkom, believes that Kursk could be the center of the new movement.

"We have always joked about our 'stagnation,' he explains. "Our city has neither mass meetings nor gatherings of the turbulent. But Kursk people's mercantile roots have played a positive part, apparently. There is disorder and instability everywhere, but with us things are quiet. And whoever is the first to arouse the youth will be in the driving seat."

Yes, "Initiative" is meeting with understanding and sympathy at the administrative system official level—some functionaries yearn for the former clarity and precision of directions and the uncompromising nature of positions.

Getting into an argument with the leaders of "Initiative" is the last thing we want—they have every right to their own views and outlook. But only until they, indeed, begin to speak from lofty and not all that lofty rostrums on behalf of young people. And the young people themselves, disaffected currently with everything, it would seem, are not about to try and grasp the meaning of the plentiful lines of speeches and resolutions of the DMKI, haul xerox copies of its programs in false-bottom trunks, and quote in a whisper at the gateway a particularly felicitous passage from draft rules.

The DMKI program has many clauses (sound ones are encountered there also, of course), but it may, on the whole, be defined in the words of an "Initiative" supporter at the Nizhegorod meeting: For Communists "the rules were always higher than the law, and they should be



guided by this now also," subordinating themselves, in the speaker's opinion, merely to the laws that they need.

No, such an organization (and that the DMKI is an organization, not a movement, is not in doubt: organizational structure, claims to part of the property of the Komsomol, the creation of directive bodies, an independent bank account and so forth) also had, most likely, to emerge, as the "Surgut Alternative" movement formerly emerged. But whereas the "Surgut people" were unable—under the conditions of general political apathy and the quiet, but dogged opposition from the top—"to

consolidate on a basis of principle," the DMKI is succeeding, it would seem. Not from below, from above—given the support of senior comrades, for whom the statements of the "Initiative" people concerning the purity of communist ranks is balm to the soul. Ultimately the CPSU Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Committee will (in the spirit of pluralism and a democratic approach) support "Communist Initiative." But will it be supported by the young people who are tired of every conceivable type of movement, rules, and policy statements and who simply want to live?! In freedom and sufficiency.

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